

COMPOSITIONALITY OF UNIVERSE

Racanāpradarśana

An Essay in Natural Metaphysics

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Abstract

COMPOSITIONALITY OF UNIVERSE: AN ESSAY IN NATURAL METAPHYSICS

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While dogmatic metaphysics has been organised around the *requirements of envisionment of conditionality*, non-dogmatic natural metaphysics can be organised around the *requirements of demonstration of diconditionality or tension of compositionality*. Activity cannot be made a constitutive component of the conceptual schema, but is precisely the aim of the demonstration in the mutual interrelations, the push and pull between the primary concepts in their systematicity that is explanatory of both the force of attraction and repulsion as well as both the temporality and eternity of motion and the unity of efficient and teleological causation. Metaphysics proceeds by carving real conceptual distinction and tries to show participation between distinction by proposing *mode or modes of tension* constitutive of the manner and structure of participation. Dogmatic metaphysics of *conditionality* reduces the whole nature of tensionality to select mode or modes of tension, or reduces the systematic integration of the modes to *incompositionality*. The dogmatism of *conditionality* lies in two kinds of *incompositionality*, namely, substantialisation of activity and deoperationalisation of activity. Non-dogmatic naturalistic metaphysics not only entails systematisation of the mutuality of interaction between the abstract and syncretical sides of all the modes of tension, without reducing to *incompositionality* or *distension*, but also demonstration of potential divergence in the systematisation of *tensionality of compositionality*. Following the planetarisation of metaconvergent dogmatic conditionality in capitalist technoscientific modernity, there is potential for enlivenment and metadiversification in universal metaphysical thinking through the framework of metaphysical diconditionality which is non-dogmatic yet rigorous metaphysics insofar as tension between divergent potential and actual metaphysical demonstrability and demonstration of tensionality is the universality or *transuniversality* of activity.

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Table of Contents

List of Figures	vii
List of Tables	viii
Introduction: Tensional Requirements for the Demonstration of Rigorous yet Non-dogmatic Natural Metaphysics	1
1. THE NATURE OF UNIVERSE	24
1.1.Processuality and Relationality	24
1.2. Discussion in the Context of the History of Western Metaphysics	32
1.2.1.Kant, Whitehead and the Transcendental Synthetic	32
1.2.2.Synthesis and Abstraction	50
1.2.3.Motive Force in Nature	81
1.2.4.Limits of Anti-metaphysics and the Inextinguishability of Universalistic Discussion	100
1.2.5.Compositionality and Incompositionality	117
1.3. Discussion in the Context of the History of Indian Metaphysics	125
1.3.1.The Neglected Naturalist-Pragmatic Problematic of Indian Metaphysics Independent of Indian Theology and Religion	125
1.3.2.Vedism and Śramanism	130
1.3.3.Contestation Over The Structure and Significance of Incessant Activity of Prakriti and Corresponding Significance and Universality of Modes or Phases of Śrama	143
1.3.4.Strategies of Metaphysical Systematisation in Buddhism and Brahmanism	152
1.3.5.Pradarśana of Racanātmaktā Tanāvīyatā and its Unfastening from Niracanātmaktā	164
2. THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE	174
2.1. The Statics and Dynamics of Compositional and Metacompositional Complexity	174
2.2. Factoriality of Composition	181
2.3. Solicitation and Sensitivity	187
2.4. The Work of Intelligibility	193
2.5. The Work of Sensibility	198
2.6. The Work of Actionability	201
2.7. The Genesis of Care	205
2.8. Freedom, that is, Racanāgaharāi	208

2.9. Graded Sociality of Obligation and Contestation	213
2.10. Regimentation and Projection	215
2.11. Speculative Geometry of Existence	220
3. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT	223
3.1. Dialectic of Astonishment and Sobriety	223
3.2. The Work and Shape of Cosmocomportment	226
3.3. Propaedeutic for Study of Geohistoriosophy	235
3.3.1. Pre-metaphysical Universal Thinking as Search for Texturisation within Nature of Diconditionality	235
3.3.2. Chinese Metaphysics as Search for Adaptation with Nature of Biconditionality	236
3.3.3. Western Metaphysics as Search for Acquirement of Nature of Triuniconditionality	248
3.3.4. Indian Metaphysics as Search for Attainment in Nature of Aconditionality	251
3.3.5. Islamic Metaphysics as Search for Submission to Nature of Uniconditionality	253
3.4. From Metaconvergent Dogmatic Metaphysical Conditional Universalistic Discussion to Metadivergent Non-dogmatic Metaphysical Diconditional Transuniversalistic Discussions	263
Conclusion: The Temporalistic and Eternalistic Aspects of Quotidian Experience	271
Bibliography	276
Notes	305

List of Figures

1. Modes of Absynthesis in Whiteheadian Metaphysics	74
2. Complexity of Roundedness of Social Activity	108
3. Processuality and Extensiveness	122
4. Cone of Compositionality	124
5. Vedism	134
6. Nikāya Buddhism	143
7. Madhyamaka	157
8. Advaita Vedanta	160
9. Racanātmaktā Tanāvīyata	169
10. Centrifugality of solicitation and centripetality of sensitivity	189
11. Relative mutual correspondence between solicitation, sensitivity and composition	192
12. Relative mutual displacement between solicitation, sensitivity and composition	193
13. Three works of irreducible and overlapping rigour	202
14. Genesis of care	206
15. Speculative geometry of determination of composition	222
16. From Metadivergence to metaconvergence to potential metadivergence in metaphysical universal thinking	266

List of Tables

1. Modes of Tension	30
2. Modes or Phases of Śrama	148
3. Factors of Composition	182
4. Shapes of Cosmocomportment	231

Introduction: Tensional Requirements for the Demonstration of Rigorous yet Non-dogmatic Natural Metaphysics

The central question being raised in this research is — is there a social significance of metaphysics and metaphysical discussion, both in the colloquial and systematic form, and if so, what is the nature of this significance and how can metaphysical discussion be reinstated or reinvented to its inner significance and function? Traditionally, metaphysics as universal thinking has been dogmatic, since universal thought attempted to serve a harnessing, reining, pulling function against a fundamentally diverse, dispersive and rich world. In modern liberal discourse, especially in the post-war period, the antidote to dogmatic metaphysics has generally been considered to be particularistic specialisation or non-universalistic empirical thinking which actually does not achieve much except entirely conceding and partitioning universalistic thinking to physics and theology, and corollarily, furthering the globalisation of the episteme of capitalist liberal technoscientific modernity. Universalistic thinking and discussion regarding the relationship between the nature of the universe, the nature of experience and the nature of thought is a natural part of social and individual existence and its empiricist anathematisation is either thoroughly mindless or deeply manipulative. Following the planetarisation of capitalist modernity and the spread of encirclement of the consistency of western metaphysical discussion and the industrialisation of its endless commentarial proliferation, how can the world and social experience be metaphysically reopened and reanimated? How can the issue of the requirements of adequacy and demonstration of struggling with the most fundamental questions regarding the relationship between the nature of the universe, the nature of existence and the nature of thought be reopened to

rigorous, systematic yet non-dogmatic social universalistic discussion? Can metaphysics contribute to the continuation of thinking and composing following the culmination and generalisation of dogmatic conditionality? Therefore, the fundamental contemporary speculative question is — what constitutes the rigour of non-dogmatic metaphysical thinking and discussion?

The primitive fact of immediate experience is a sense of activity, or fusion of sense and response, a tension of processuality and relationality. The greatest tensional irreducibility that is yet sustained by constitutive inseparability is in a sense the limit of connectedness and weave of consistency that holds together all potential and real mobilities and immobilities, relations and separations. If irreducibility is prior or more fundamental than inseparability, then the contrast splinters off completely and if inseparability prior to or more fundamental than irreducibility then the contrast collides and unifies, in other words, distinction and participation is the same operation viewed from different angles. Hence the challenge is to speculate the universal tissue of mobile *irreducible inseparability*, that is, *tension of compositionality*. Metaphysics proceeds, in the analytic move, by carving real conceptual distinction and then, in the synthetic move, it tries to show participation between distinction for which it proposes *mode or modes of tension* constitutive of manner and structure of participation. Reason strives to unify the sensuous, perceptive and conceptual manifold into an ultimate ground, conditionality or fundamentality. Dogmatic metaphysics, since it seeks to ground or fasten tensionality, proceeds in four different ways in the schematisation of the ontological and metaphysical priority of one or select modes of tension. *Uniconditionality* is when one mode of tension is metaphysically prior in the structure of unidirectionality of participation, that is, real distinction participates in the fundamentality of the select mode of tension. The schema in which the state of participation between two modes of tension is the fundamental structure of participation I have termed *biconditionality*. When reason attempts to establish the structure of conditionality in the participation of the participation between two modes of tension in a third intermediary mode of tension, this structure of participation is

termed *triunconditionality*. *Aconditionality* is when the structure of participation is itself schematised as reducible to fundamentality of distension or incompositionality. Dogmatic metaphysics of *conditionality* reduces the whole nature of tensionality into select mode or modes and constructs universality based upon the *requirements of envisionment of conditionality* in four different ways. Non-dogmatic naturalistic metaphysics constructs *transuniversality* based upon the *requirements of demonstration of tensionality of compositionality*, which is ultimately tension between ways of systematisation of the modes of tension that is, actual and potential difference between demonstration and demonstrability of *diconditionality*, which is a question of the systematisation of mutuality of interaction between the abstract and synthetical sides of all the modes without reducing to *incompositionality* or distension. Only in *diconditionality* can distinction and participation be shown as the same operation, that is, irreducible inseparability, that is, universal tensionality, integrating modes of tension without reducing distension. While different traditions and strands of dogmatic metaphysical discussion have been organised around the requirements of the envisionment of conditionality, that is, nature of the totality of the conditional participatorial structure of the universe, different traditions and strands of non-dogmatic metaphysical discussion can potentially be organised around the requirements of the demonstration of *diconditionality*, that is, tensionality of compositionality of universe.

Metaphysical *diconditional* thinking is a search for the *nature of tensionality as irreducible inseparability as compositionality of universe* — if separation between the terms of distinction is prior, then the contrast splinters off and if participation between distinction is prior then the contrast collides, in other words, in the case of *diconditionality*, distinction and participation is the same operation viewed from different angles. Compositionality in this naturalistic usage is opposed to the concept of creativity which is a theological mystical idea with ultimate reference to *ex nihilo* creation. The dogmatism of conditionality lies in two kinds of *incompositionality*, namely, substantialisation of activity and deoperationalisation of activity. The non-dogmatism of

compositionality or tensionality is that universal activity is differently and divergently demonstrable, in other words, tension between potential as well as actual difference in demonstrability and demonstration of activity is precisely universality, or *transuniversality*, of activity. There is not only processuality but multiplicity of processuality, that is, relationality or extensiveness, but there is not only multiplicity of processuality but also multiplicity of extensiveness, because otherwise the multiplicity of processuality mutually equilibrate in the sociality of extensiveness. The notion of multiplicity has no meaning without an internal divergence in the sense of relatedness. In the ancient and medieval period in which real tensionality was ontologically prevalent in the world (for example, the relative isolation of societies and geographies from each other, howsoever complexly interlinked nonetheless, etc.), universalistic thought sought the nature of conditionality, but since modernity has been the process of the realisation of conditionality itself (in other words, globalisation, howsoever nuanced and ethnographically rich, etc.), universalistic thinking now seeks the nature of tensionality, in other words, not only very nature of requirements of demonstration of universality are undergoing transformation, but the very paradigm of rigour and requirement itself are undergoing transformation, that is to say, from that of dogmatic envisionment (*darśana*) to that of non-dogmatic demonstration (*pradarśana*).

At the level of pure occasionality, there is no endurance hence no acquired complexity of social character, a kind of formless indifference. But more complex the social character of a regional consistency, the more complex and differentiated will the characteristic forms of organisation or patternings of experience. This is the ancestrally gathered sociality of abstractness of extensiveness of compossibility between occasion and processes that form a *world-transcendental* or *region-transcendental*.

Thought and composition are nothing if not thought and composition about the relationship between the nature of the universe, the nature of experience and the nature of thought. Composition of reality in individual and social experience is projectively driven by care under constraints and

enablements countenanced by the complexity of ancestry of nature, that is, the history of the gain and loss of ancestral potentiality. The meaning of freedom is durational deepening of participation in the genesis of care as power of composition. In this sense, the meaning of freedom is *racanāgaharāī*, that is, deepening of composition. The notion of the impetus of *modalisation* as the motive force of nature is meant to demonstrate the irreducible inseparability between the abstract and the synthetical, since it is the force of the deepening of intersection between the pulling of the abstracts into fullness of synthetical constraints and pulling of the syntheticals into fullness of abstract constraints, that is, of projective mutual complementation between potentialisation and realisation that is explanatory of both the force of attraction and repulsion as well as both the eternity and temporality of motion or activity. *Care* is the appetite for modalisation, not actual modalisation, which is freedom. *Modalisation* is the universal metaphysical impetus in physical and chemical processes that takes the form of care in mentalistic experiences or biological processes as appetite and as actuality of work of freedom. Thus, can, and if so, how can, social metaphysical discussion help in durational deepening of participation in the genesis of care as power of composition? In other words, what is the relation between metaphysics, care and freedom?

The synthetic or ethological question concerns how an entity or process tends to mobilise the factors in its environment in its compositional activity, and the abstract or ecological question concerns how an entity or process tends to get mobilised by the various neighbouring or distant factors in the environment in their respective compositional activities. The tendency of abstraction I will term *solicitation* and the tendency of synthesis I will term *sensitivity*. The occasions and processes make relative weaves of consistency that make the abstract character of togetherness and compossibility, patterns of organisation of experience, this settles into environmental weaves of solicitation and experiential lines of sensitivity. Solicitation is not only how an environment is systemically predisposed to an experience but also the actual ongoing genesis of an environment's disposition towards particular experiences while sensitivity is not just how an experience is

genetically predisposed to the environment but the actual ongoing genesis of an experience's prehensive comportment towards its environment.

The five factors of this real interaction and composition of tendencies and contingencies are - Occasion, Enduration, Nexus, Environment, Metacomposition. A prehensive occasion or entity as the most fundamental unit of actuality is the mobilisation of ingressing datum towards depth of realisation through the three universal modes of absynthesis. *Occasions* are the atomic occurrences of three modes of absynthesis. *Enduration* are individual bodies of experience and existence with relative continuity and integrity that have some kind of historic continuity and spatiotemporal extensity. *Diagram* or *nexus* is a kind of social and non-social linking of multiplicity of endurances and occasions through reciprocal prehensions and mutual genetic derivation with a defining characteristic differentially spread through the members in distributed functions. *Metacomposition* or the cosmogrammatic is an originary mobilisation and relativisation of elementary cosmical factors that adds paradigmatic coherence in the universe conditioning novel compositional possibilities. Metacomposition or cosmogram are the widest and most extensive worlds that provide enough order and coherence for nexus, endurances and ecologies to emerge with adequate complexity, richness and stability. *Ecology* or *environment* is any relatively coherent and commobile region in the universe populated by diverse cosmograms, diagrams, occasions and endurances. If the universe is first order togetherness at the limit between compositionality and incompositionality, metacomposition is second order togetherness organised around the limits between compossibility and impossibility, while diagram is third order togetherness organised around the limits between compatibility and incompatibility.

The roundedness of social practise I will divide into the *work of actionability*, the *work of intelligibility* and the *work of sensibility* which are organised according to overlapping yet distinct orders of rigour. The order of rigour of work of intelligibility, especially in its proper vocation of theoretical conceptual thinking, is the disambiguation and understanding of the structures and

patterns of solicitation, that is the genetic transcendental schema or sociality of abstractness of extensive continuums, abstract sociality of mutual genetic derivation of systematicity of regional or aspectival order, and its link with sensitivity and composition from the lens of solicitation. In this sense, the pursuance of its vocation entails a relative suspension of the respective rigours of the work of sensibility and the work of actionability. The order of rigour of work of sensibility is the expression of aesthetic selection and ethological stylistic taste by retaining or gaining access to its inner spontaneity and capacity for affection in engagement with the patterns of solicitation of sociality of abstractness of real togetherness without getting obliterated. The pursuance of its vocation entails a relative suspension of the respective rigours of the work of intelligibility and the work of actionability. The paradigm of rigour of the work of actionality is to not get subsumed by the flow of real objective composition and to enhance intensity of participation in it, that is, to give real and concrete public form to a vision of actuality and a taste and temperament of being, to aspirational sense and idea. The pursuance of its vocation entails a relative suspension of the respective rigours of the work of intelligibility and the work of sensibility. While the rhythm between rest and effort in work of sensibility and intelligibility is more spontaneous, in work of actionability it is more restricted and systematic.

In the mutual interactions between the patterns of solicitation, flows of sensitivity and the actuality of composition, care takes shape as the motivational kernel of experience, the senseful sieving of universe in the texturation of experience, the real durational force of concern and selection of importance. The genesis of care lies in the translation, interaction, and feedback between the three different registers of rigour constitutive of individual and social experience — the work of intelligibility as thought about the real and potential structures of solicitation, the work of sensibility as organisation of the flows of sensitivity, and the work of actionability as negentropic and aspirational intervention in the flush of composition. Care is the complex form of the durational

aim of experience, that is, impetus for *modalisation*. Care is the appetite for modalisation, not actual modalisation, which is freedom.

Demodalisation is incapacitation of forming durational complementation, inaccess to modal anxiety and tensional unity of activity, suffusion of environment by regimented logics and enervation of diversity. Demodalisation is the blocking or reductiveness of this mutual irreducible feedback. It entails vacillation between connective and separative anxiety, suppression of modal anxiety and non-participation in genesis of care. Demodalisation is a state of intersection or enfeeblement and enervation of intersection between the abstract and synthetical. Regimentation operates by severing or enervating the link between extensional and intensional aspects of activity, which means that it severs or enfeebles the mutuality of interaction between the three different orders of rigours of the whole of social activity. Projection, on the other hand, drives the extension of participation compositional tendency and ethos out of principle of depth of diversity while sustaining the integral link between the intensional and extensional aspects of activity, that is, by promoting meaningful mutual affection between the three orders of rigour of social activity. There is constant battle between the programmatic promotion of demodalisation in regimentational activity and the programmatic promotion of modalisation in projectional activity, and also constant negotiation and battle between paragrammatic activity and metacompositional activity.

Now, there is basic ontological interdependence between all beings and societies. At the same time, there is texture, density and intensity of ontological togetherness and intertwinement that are indeed continually negotiated, contested, produced. In other words, there is general coexistence and textured coexistence. These dynamical densities, thresholds and textures inform and get informed by the densities, thresholds and textures of the roundedness of social activity that is divided into the irreducible orders of rigour of the work of sensibility, the work of intelligibility and the work of actionability. These relative limits and densities of social activity constitute limits and densities of the work and shape of cosmocomportment, that is, the work and shape of mutualisation

between the distinct rigours of the work of sensibility, intelligibility and actionability, as well as integrating the three phases of the dialectic of astonishment and sobriety, namely, wonder, terror and hope, which is basically social universalistic metaphysical discussion. These discussions and social activities of composition have different metacompositional consistency of argumentation, contestation, invention and consensus-building which develop in a historical and genetic process.

It is indeed true, especially about the modern period, that not only is economic activity heavily interlinked, but cultural communication via electronic and virtual mediums is also widespread and complex. But the textures of contiguities of physical day to day coexistence and effort of organisation and the physical relationships with portions of land and water are more fundamental. In other words, there is not only multiplicity of processuality, but multiplicity of extensiveness or relationality as well. The colloquial quotidian vernacular conversation emerging from density and intensity of day to day coexistence generally constitutes the chunk of individual and social life while trans-societal conversation generally constitutes a smaller portion (although possibly of higher symbolic and academic status from the vantage point of economically backward societies) of individual and social life. Both these conversations that are about how to compose the universe in light of whatever is construed as the compositional nature of the universe form the hidden indirect context of systematic metaphysics, but I think the former should constitute the continuous context and the latter the periodic context.

There are people living day to day life together, composing and discussing social existence. This roundedness of social practise I have divided into the work of actionality, intelligibility and sensibility which are organised according to overlapping yet distinct orders of rigour. The moments, pauses, phases, interstices of life when there is a sense of repose, silence, reflection, when we discuss or reflect in a highly abstract sense, the very nature of the universe, the nature of existence, this is what I have termed *social universalistic metaphysical discussion*. The discussion is an exploration of the concerns and issues and stakes constitutive of a social existence, the medium of

which is indeed language, either a common language, dialect, script or a network of languages, dialects and scripts connected through density of interaction and translation. Systematic metaphysics is the systematic and rigorous expression of this general colloquial vernacular discussion. The systematic metaphysics and more colloquial metaphysical discussion constitute the major part of the *work of cosmocomportment*. The work of cosmocomportment is the collective search for the nature of the requirements of the demonstration of universality, and in this sense, it is essential to *societal autonomy*, which is, precisely, search for the nature of requirements of actual and conceptual demonstration of universality. Freedom is projective deepening of participation in the genesis of care as power of composition. The work of cosmocomportment, that is, the work of threading and mutualisation of not only the three phases or moments of the dialectic of astonishment and sobriety, namely, wonder, terror and hope, but also between the three orders of rigour of work, is crucial to the deepening of participation in the genesis of care. Cosmocomportment is to see the operationality of the force of modalisation from the side of the abstract, related to the metacompositional or cosmogrammatic plane, while care is to see the operationality of the force of modalisation from the side of the synthetical, related to the compositional or diagrammatic plane. Thus the search for societal autonomy and the search for experiential autonomy are complicatedly intertwined, which is the source of the problem and struggle of obligation. The individual and transindividual appetite for, one, the threading and mutualisation of three phases of the dialectic of astonishment and sobriety into orientation, two, the three aspects of social activity, the three different orders of rigour, namely, work of sensibility, intelligibility, actionality and, three, the question of the relationship between nature of the universe, nature of existence and nature of thought comprises the *real continuous concrete yet indirect vernacular context* of both colloquial and systematic social universalistic metaphysical discussion.

The loss of autonomy of a society is when its search for the nature of requirements of demonstration of universality becomes suppressed and predominated by the search for the

requirement of demonstration with genetic roots in a different social environment. This is because the search for requirements is not separable from the constitution of care, which is constituted in the course of quotidian interdependent coexistence. The issues, concerns, stakes, importances are constituted locally and vernacularly, which are the context of the search for envisionment or demonstration of universality. Under the predominance of the search of a different society, the issues, concerns, stakes get suppressed.

In the first *Critique*, Kant argues that in its intrinsic vocation, pure theoretical reason oversteps the limits of sensibility to posit the totality of conditionality and thus gets embroiled in antinomies and paralogsms. But, since reflective judgement in the third *Critique* is closer to the faculty of sensibility in its capacity to sustain contrast and tension unlike in the case of determining judgement which is closer to the faculty of understanding, while Kant does not give reflective judgement any constructive role in metaphysical thinking, I argue that, reflective judgement can have potential metaphysical significance, because, firstly, it does not overstep the conditions of sensibility but uses the contrastive tensional nature of sensible experience to speculate regarding the purposive systematicity of nature and experience, and secondly, the principle of purposiveness is regulative and not determinative, thus it only asymptotically approximates towards universality and does not engage in positing determinate necessary universality. The object of naturalistic metaphysical demonstration is tensionality in the interrelation between primary schematic concepts that relates to the tensional nature of natural experience. Reflective judgement regarding systematicity and purposiveness of nature can have gradations of rigour and adequacy. Reflective judgment regarding metaphysical problems can follow requirements of demonstration of tensionality in the interrelation between primary concepts based upon the tensional and contrastive nature of sensible experience in which sense the nature of the universe is not determinately knowable but thinkable and demonstrable to varying degrees of adequacy, systematicity and rigour.

Whitehead writes in *Process and Reality*, regarding the requirements of coherence and systematicity in metaphysical construction:

“Coherence,’ as here employed, means that the fundamental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless. This requirement does not mean that they are definable in terms of each other; it means that what is indefinable in One such notion cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other notions. It is the ideal of speculative philosophy that its fundamental notions shall not seem capable of abstraction from each other. In other words,’ it is presupposed that no entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth. This character is its coherence.”¹

What is indefinable in God cannot be abstracted from what is indefinable in World, except that the extra-systematic conception of creativity as category of the ultimate secures this mutuality of requirement and the concepts fail to secure this systematicity on their own. In this sense reflective judgement is turned into determining judgement which is the source of dogmatic metaphysics. God and actual entities are accidental creatures of creativity that condition creativity. Creativity is the force of creative advance of novelty through which the primordial nature of god, deficient in actuality, assimilates the efforts of temporal concrescence and thus acquire physical multiplicity, and at the same time the disjunctive multiplicity of entities, deficient in everlastingness, acquires a unity of everlastingness. In this sense, creativity is explanatory in the ultimate sense of this mutuality of requirement between God and World or permanence and fluency. But I will argue that the purpose of the metaphysical demonstration of activity is not to ground it in a separate constitutive concept of the schema but rather to demonstrate the nature of tension and activity in the mutual presupposition and requirement as well as irreducibility of function between primary and fundamental concepts of the system. The issue is that without the dynamic concept of creativity, God and World in the Whiteheadian system would fall into static equilibrium, either via collapse

into final synthesis or via splintering off into non-interaction, and this is precisely what the ultimate category of creativity is attempting to avoid and resolve, but backhandedly or extra-systematically, that is, this inexhaustibility or impetus of activity should be an internal character of the nature of mutual interaction between real distinction, in this case, God and World, or perhaps between temporal actual occasions themselves, without having to smuggle in a pre-systematic or extra-systematic component concept to ground the metaphysics. This mutuality of relation is to be explanatory of eternity and temporality of motion as well as the unity of force of attraction and force of repulsion. Distinction and participation are the same process viewed from different angles.

These are the tensional requirements of demonstration of naturalistic metaphysics of diconditionality or compositionality (naturalistic here means systematisation of the tensionality of experience, without positing any realms beyond nature). The push and pull between the primary concepts of the metaphysical schema tensionally relates to the push and pull in the interactions between patterns of solicitation, flows of sensitivity and reality of composition constitutive of the process of the genesis of care, and in this regard potentially entails deepening of participation in the genesis of care which is crucial both for, as care, experiential autonomy and, as cosmocomportment, for societal autonomy.

Another aspect of the tensional requirements is the mutualisation of the abstract and synthetical aspects of the distinct orders of rigour constitutive of roundedness of social practise. Dogmatic metaphysics envisions conditionality using the priority of one aspect or set of aspects over all others and thus reduces the dynamic interrelation to incompositionality. Non-dogmatic metaphysics would imply the mutual interaction between the abstract or social and synthetical or experiential aspects of all the rigours of social practice, although metaphysical construction does not entail any direct empirical reference to the component works constitutive of roundedness of social practice.

The purpose of Marx's analysis was to show that the abstractness of productive activity under the capitalist system of commodity production dominates the other modes of activity, that is theoretical activity and sensible activity and thereby the whole of social activity. Some Marxist scholars have taken this to mean that abstractness as such is the cause of estrangement in social and individual experience from some originary syntheticity of human experience. But I think the point of Marx was that overcoming of the domination of abstract side of production upon the roundedness of social practise can create the conditions for a free and open interaction between both the abstract and synthetic or concrete sides of productive, theoretical and sensuous activity. Capital schematises discontinuity or asymmetry of interaction between different modes of activity but the possibility of relative integration of these activities that especially early Marx wrote about does not mean complete concretisation of the nature of social activity but freeing of the sociality of the abstract and the sociality of the synthetical and improvisatory interaction between different modes of activity hence not reduction to the abstractness or syntheticity of a select mode of activity. Now the horizon of Marx's resolution of the contradiction between the domination of abstractness of productive activity in commodity production and the complex roundedness of improvisatory social activity is the abolishment of private property and the commodity-form and money-form, and the revolutionary transformation of relations of production. But I am arguing that heterogeneity between theoretical, sensuous and productive activity, that is, work of intelligibility, sensibility and actionability is relatively irreducible and that speculative universalistic communication or social universalistic discussion is also required for constructive freeing of mutual interaction and mutual translation between them in social and individual experience. Marxian humanism is premised upon the outsourcing of all metaphysical work to physics and natural science, outside the public domain, as the real source of secularisation of the self-consciousness of the cooperative potential of species-being. Therefore Marx, in the conflation between theology and metaphysics in general, is operating within the schema of the possibility of planetarisation of communism which is premised upon the

planetary control of universalistic communication by physics and natural science.

The enduring question of Indian metaphysics has been regarding the structure and significance of the incessant activity of *prakṛiti* (nature) or *saṃsāra* (universe) and the different modes of universal activity or *śrama* reflective or adequate of the complexity of this structure. The search of metaphysical systematisation in this regard in the different schools of Indian thought has been of coherence between the real cosmological and soteriological structure of incessant natural activity and the mutuality or non-mutuality of participation of diverse mode of *śrama* or universal activity with the cosmological structure of reality. The different contested modes of *śrama* or universal activity make the tension of activity but each attempt at their integration in Indian thought reduces the tension to incompositonality (*niracānātma*). Śankara is in a way faced with the same problematic of two incompatible conceptions of truth in Brahmanic philosophy, namely, *pāramārthikadṛṣṭi* (ultimate or final point of view) and *lokyāvahārikadṛṣṭi* (pragmatic or conventional point of view) that Nāgārjuna was faced with in the context of Buddhist thought, namely, *lokasamvṛtisatyā* (conventional truth) and *paramarthatyā* (ultimate truth), and he broadly follows the Nāgārjunic template of resolving this tension by mutually harmonising the different soteriological and metaphysical understandings of *prakṛiti* and the different modes of universal *śrama* adequating this ultimate structure. Therefore, Nāgārjuna and Śankara are the two great systematisers of the *anātman* and *ātman* traditions of Indian metaphysics. Nāgārjuna and Śankara integrate the modes of *śrama* in *aconditionality* (*nirupādhiyatā*) which negates or reduces the tension of modes of *śrama* and results in *niracānatmakta* of *sunyikaran* (incompositonality of deoperationalisation) and *niracānatmakta* of *drayikaran* (incompositonality of substationalisation) respectively. Instead I argue that the modes of *śrama* are manner of participation between diconditionality of abstraction and synthesis, which is irreducible inseparability of compositionality. The future of Indian metaphysics lies in the possibility of systematising the different modes of

śrama without reducing the tensionality of activity of nature to incompositionality. There is another way to integrate the diverse modes of *śrama* in light of a conception of nature by unfastening their mutuality from different forms of *niracānātmaktā* (incompositionality). The nature of *prakṛiti* is neither *dravya* (substance) nor *śunya* (nothingness), but *racānātmaktā tanāvīyata* (tensionality of compositionality), which is irreducible inseparability between potentiality and reality, that is, distinction and mutual participation between *amurtan* (abstraction) and *sanślesan* (synthesis). *Dravya* and *śunya* are *niracānatmakta*, because they are the efficient and teleological formal unity of aconditionality of absynthesis, thus no mutuality of participation between the modes, between the abstract and synthetical aspects of the different phases of activity. The search for *nirupādhiyatā* (aconditionality) in Indian metaphysics reduces tension of nature and makes it dogmatic. Non-dogmatic metaphysics will mean to demonstrate the nature of tension and the tension between modes of *śrama* both at the temporal and eternal level.

Both the *ātman* and *anātman* strands of Indian metaphysics are *āstika* insofar as they involve survivalist concepts of *karman* and *punarjanman*. Only Cārvāka and some heretical teachers are metaphysically *nāstika* and in this regard genuinely naturalistic (*prakṛitivāda*). The fundamental critique of naturalistic *nāstika* thought in Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism has been that naturalistic metaphysics is incompatible with an aspirational and axiological approach to existence. It is one of my tasks to disprove this dogmatic assumption prevalent in Indian metaphysics in this discussion. The nature of the universe (*prakṛiti*) is *racānātmaktā tanāvīyatā* (tensionality of compositionality) and the motive force of natural experience is *racānāgaharī* (modalisation) which involves the deepening of intersection (*mishrangaharikaran*) between *upasārī amurtiya avichhinnita* (divergent continuity of the abstract) and *upasārī sanślesaniya avichhinnita* (divergent continuity of the synthetical), or durational complementation between potentialistion and realisation, or deepening of participation in the genesis of care as power of composition.

The discussion and negotiation regarding the question of the nature of requirements of the demonstration of universality are a general discussion within and between societies. But the actual demonstration of requirements of universality is to be carried out by societies, that is, whatever are the dynamic, genetic, relative thresholds and limits of discussion and composition. In other words, the actual demonstration of universality or aspiration towards actual demonstration of universality in both discussion and composition is the meaning of societal autonomy. This is because the actual demonstration of universality is subject to the work and shape of the mutualisation and threading between the distinct orders of rigour of work of sensibility, work of intelligibility and work of actionability as the whole of social activity. The subsumption of the textured aspect of coexistence under the general aspect of coexistence as proposed in the dogmatic metaphysics of conditionality entails either the substantialisation or deoperationalisation of activity. This is why the complementarity between the general and textured aspect of coexistence requires non-dogmatic metaphysics in which difference in demonstrability is the transuniversality of activity. Non-dogmatic metaphysical discussions can promote endurance and freshness within societies as well as in the interaction between societies. Metacompositional complexity and depth of ancestral potentiality that provides for complexity and depth of compositional activity is the geohistoriosophical divergences in actual demonstration of universality.

The point is that social universalistic metaphysical discussion does not take place in some kind of removed academic context, but in fact is thoroughly implicated in the real concrete social activity, which are the work of sensibility, intelligibility and actionability, although this implication is indirect and abstract and without any empirical reference to the different works. No matter how forcefully the liberal-globalist view of the world pushes forth a flat and generalised image of existence, these works are carried out with relative limits, texture and consistencies which are the densities and textures of day to day interdependence and coexistence. It means that these textures and densities of quotidian interdependence is the real concrete vernacular context of the work of the

mutualisation of the three distinct orders of rigour and the three phases of the dialectic of astonishment and sobriety, namely, wonder, terror and hope, that is, the work and shape of cosmocomportment, that is, social universalistic metaphysical discussion about the relationship between the nature of the universe, nature of existence and the nature of thought. This does not mean there is no communication between societies, but that is regarding the requirements of demonstration of universality but the actual demonstration or aspiration towards actual demonstration of requirements of universality is the work of cosmocomportment the real concrete context of which is the density, intensity and intricacy of day to day coexistence.

The planetarisation of the actual demonstration of universality can only mean unidirectional depoliticisation and abolishment of thinking and enervation of the complexity of ancestral potentiality, which is what the planetarisation of global capitalist technoscientific modernity is. Metaphysical homogenisation and singularisation leads to the enervation and impoverishment of the rich complexity of the world. Divergence in consistencies of metaphysical discussion adds to the richness and complexity of metacompositional ancestral potentiality that enriches and complexifies compositional activity. The universe is as complex as the development of divergent tendencies and emphases, which if lost or flattened, enervate the complexity of ancestrality and approximate pure distilled compositionality. Divergence of consistencies of metaphysical demonstration enriches natural experience while homogenisation of metaphysical demonstration enervates experience. The purpose of contemporary metaphysics is to promote this diversity against homogenisation. New universalistic discussions that are exigent for free mutual interaction between theoretical, productive and sensuous activity constitutive of the roundedness of social practise cannot be completely delocalised and globalised, but subject to the limits and thresholds between densities, intensities and depths of ontological entanglement and interdependence, the principle of minimisation of incommunicability and stories of belonging. The idea of world community or humanity are only viable concepts as cosmopolitical issues of diplomatic discussion, otherwise it means that only such

notions emerging from one tradition of universal thinking are nullifying others. This does not imply that the social metaphysical discussion of a different society cannot act as a teacher to less complex, rigorous and original discussion, but at some point the student is required to develop its own understanding of the teacher's discourse and synthesise that with its own experiential, intuitive and speculative details without seeking the emotional protection of the teacher's validation and work, in other words, aspire to autonomise the search for the nature of requirements for demonstration of universality. Outside of this aspiration, the student cannot be said to be aspiring to think in any real sense of the term.

These consistencies of discussion and contestation diverge purely genetically. This is relevant to societal autonomy because in the context of cares, issues, concerns, requirements of universality are sought, and loss of autonomy is when the set of requirements expressing the genetic consistency of a different set of concerns, issues, stakes overbears and predominates. What the Indian philosopher K.C. Bhattacharya called '*Swaraj* in ideas'², I will extend to the search for autonomy in colloquial as well as systematic metaphysical discussion, which is to search the nature of requirements of demonstration and not be subjected to the nature of requirements genetically emerging in a different society in a different context of care and metaphysical discussion. These divergence of transcendental consistencies are a lot like the divergences in musical traditions and strands. To say that the internal diversity of western musical tradition covers or subsumes all musical possibilities is ultimately a sad and impoverished way of imagining and thinking about the world, which unfortunately is the prevalent view regarding the internal diversity of western metaphysics in modern academia. The Chinese philosopher Mou Zongsan has argued that each cultural system, out of metaphysical necessity, "must emerge though an orifice"³.

...people express their spiritual life through an orifice that is subject to the limitation of sensibility. This is the limitation intrinsic to humans. There is also the external limitation:

namely, the world around us.... We say that each cultural system, no matter in what ways it emerges, must emerge through an orifice. There is a metaphysical necessity for it to manifest through an orifice. However, why a cultural system manifests through one particular orifice but not another is not at all dictated by metaphysical or logical necessity, but is dictated by historical necessity only.⁴

This notion of orifice I will relate to the concept of care or importance in the constitution of cosmocomportment.

The Indian philosopher Daya Krishna has pointed out that the project of non-dogmatism in the relation between different metaphysical discussions is intrinsically related to the concerns of non-dogmatism within a particular metaphysical discussion. As he writes,

“To search for the distinctive philosophical problems seen as problems or for distinctiveness in the solutions offered to a familiar problem is not only to see the alien tradition in a new way but to enrich oneself with the awareness of an alternative possibility in thought, a possibility that has already been actualised. The awareness of this alternative actualised possibility may, hopefully, free one’s conceptual imagination from the unconscious constraints of one’s own conceptual tradition. Thus comparative philosophy may function as a mutual liberator of each philosophical tradition from the limitations imposed upon it by its own past rather than be what it is at present, the imposition of the standards of one dominant culture over all the others and the evaluation of their philosophical achievements in terms of them.”⁵

I will not use the term comparative philosophy to refer to the divergence between consistency of metaphysical discussion, but *geohistoriosophy*, because the very meaning and approach to the question of *sophia* is divergent, *philia* for *sophia* originating in the sense of wonder is characteristic of western metaphysics. I will reserve the term ‘philosophy’ for the western tradition and the major

Aristotelian strand of Islamic metaphysics, and use the term ‘metaphysics’ more generally to refer to universalistic thought.

There are two intertwined aspects and aims of this research — one, to demonstrate a full-fledged metaphysical system of compositionality or tensionality that is at once non-dogmatic and rigorous in which irreducible inseparability between multiplicity of processuality, that is, divergent continuity of the synthetical, and multiplicity of extensiveness or relationality, that is, divergent continuity of the abstract, is the non-dogmatic tensional requirement of metaphysical demonstration of compositionality, and two, to articulate an imagination of world constituted by social metaphysical discussions regarding both the nature of requirements of demonstration of compositionality and regarding the actual demonstration of compositionality with different metacompositional consistencies that are non-dogmatic and rigorous both internally as well as in interaction with each other in which the tension between difference in actual demonstration carried out by societies is not only the transuniversality of compositionality but the source of metacompositional and compositional complexity and richness. The question regarding tensional requirements of demonstration is the manner of intertwinement between these two aims. The push and pull between the primary concepts of the metaphysical schema tensionally relates to the push and pull in the interactions between patterns of solicitation, flows of sensitivity and reality of composition constitutive of the process of the genesis of care, and in this regard potentially entails deepening of participation in the genesis of care which is crucial both for, as care, experiential autonomy, and the push and pull in the interactions between the work of intelligibility, sensibility and actionality as well the three moments of the dialectic of astonishment and sobriety which is crucial for, as cosmocompartment, for societal autonomy. Furthermore, the attractions and repulsions between the forces of modalisation at play between the abstract aspect of the push and pull in work of cosmocompartment constitutive of the project of societal autonomy and the synthetical aspect of the genesis of care constitutive of the project of experiential autonomy relates

to, at the physico-chemical pole of nature, biodiversity and environmental complexity, and at the mentalistic pole of nature, geohistoriosophical metadivergence in cosmocompartment and transcendental consistency of social universalistic metaphysical discussion generative of metacompositional richness and complexity of ancestral potentiality which is precisely the tension between actual and potential demonstration and demonstrability of transuniversality of activity.

If there is one relational weave of metacompositional consistency, it would gradually subsume all heat motion of atoms in its order, and lead to incompositionality. This is why there must be metacompositional divergence, this metadiversity or metadivergence is crucial for demonstration of tension of compositionality, that is, inexhaustibility of activity and motion. This *metaphysical* argument on the physico-chemical level translates into the *geohistoriosophical* argument about why there must be divergence in societies of cosmocompartment, that is, transcendental consistency of social metaphysical discussion, mere diversity on diagrammatic level is not explanatory of tensionality, since that achieves equilibrium with order of extensiveness, it has to be metadiversity on cosmogrammatic level.

In **Chapter 1 - The Nature of the Universe**, I will commence my metaphysical construction and demonstration by developing concepts of the *modes of tensionality* constitutive of universe as *tension of compositionality*, and how the task of naturalistic metaphysics is to mutually systematise the three modes of tension without reducing to incompositionality. I will discuss this in the context of the histories of western and Indian dogmatic metaphysics, and in the last section I will attempt to carry out this systematisation of tension of composition as irreducible inseparability for non-dogmatic naturalistic metaphysics.

In **Chapter 2 - The Nature of the Existence**, I will continue the metaphysical construction from the interrelated physico-chemical to the mentalistic to the socio-political aspects of existence. I will develop key concepts of *metacomposition*, *solicitation*, *sensitivity*, *care*, *modalisation*, *freedom*,

regime, project, and the works of sensibility, intelligibility and actionality in their mutual systematicity.

In **Chapter 3 - The Nature of Thought**, I will develop accounts of the *dialectic of astonishment and sobriety* and the *work of cosmocomportment* and then discuss how the *geohistoriosophical* metacompositional divergence in transcendental consistencies of social metaphysical discussion metaconverges in capitalist modernity and how the shift from dogmatic requirements of envisionment of conditionality to the non-dogmatic requirements of *transuniversal* demonstration of *diconditionality* can metaphysically innervate, enrich and rediversify the world and social existence.

1. THE NATURE OF UNIVERSE

1.1.Processuality and Relationality

The primitive fact of immediate experience is a sense of activity, or fusion of sense and response, a tension of processuality and relationality. If there is no activity, there is indeed nothing such as experience, that is to say, even if there is nonbeing it can only be of the order of activity. By experience I don't simply mean reflective conscious experience, but any occasion or process that has the capacity to receive or interact with and react to or transform its environment. Reflective experience lies on the complex pole of the continuum of occasions and processes of experience. Let us say there is something that does not have the capacity to interact with anything, such a thing would not register in the universe of interaction and would effectively not exist. From the transitoriness of sound, air and water currents, the fleeting complexity of social interactions and the unceasing flow of mental processes - there are goings-on, there is happening. Metaphysical thinking, insofar as it is itself a mode of activity, must begin from the sense of this primitive fact. Thinking that does not originate in a sense of activity can only strive to achieve complete equilibrium with itself or with the 'entire' set of the real, in other words, take whichever path to inactivation. It is not just that activity is not a fully determinate object but that activity 'is' not in the same way as a spatiotemporally determinate object 'is' in and of itself: what is at stake in occurrence is a kind of energetic tension or relation between distinct factorial modalities. There is indeed a localised and strained sense of inactivity in immediate experience as well — an unwavering vase atop a table, the permanence of land formations and stillness of a rock — but such

a localised sense of inactivity is always engulfed in a general ambient sense of processuality. Similarly, contiguous with a general sense of activity, there are localised and particular sense of non-relationality — the relative separateness between a hand and the apple being held by the hand, the mental recollection of a recent event and the soft glow of the moon in the sky — but such a particular sense of non-relationality or separation is implicated in an abstract weave of relationality. Just as the difference between potentiality for separation and potentiality for relation cannot be sustained by a more fundamental separability but by a fundamental inseparability, the difference between potentiality for mobility and potentiality for immobility can only be sustained by a deeper mobility or processuality and not a deeper immobility. If we posit a fundamental immobility and separability, then the will of mobility or accident of mobility itself would have to be posited to have a sustaining power, some kind of sustained tension, without which the question of the accident or wilfulness of mobility and relation cannot meaningfully arise without foraying into mystical incommunicability, thus we are back to a fundamental tensionality. The pure stasis of immobility and separation does not register in a universe of interaction, and thus has no effective existence, the highest degree of stasis can only exist in tension.

How can we think the very nature of activity and tension as the texture and fabric of the world of experience? This general search for the nature of activity and tension organises itself around two complementary aspects: the aspect of irreducibility and the aspect of inseparability. The greatest tensional irreducibility that is yet sustained by constitutive inseparability is in a sense the limit of connectedness and weave of consistency that holds together all potential and real mobilities and immobilities, relations and separations. If irreducibility is prior or more fundamental than inseparability, then the contrast splinters off completely and if inseparability prior to or more fundamental than irreducibility then the contrast collides and unifies, in other words, distinction and participation is the same operation viewed from different angles. Hence the challenge is to venture ‘a guess at the riddle’ of the universal tissue of mobile irreducible inseparability, that is, tension of

compositionality. A detailed description of each and every constituent of the empirical datum or the endless carving up of the field of experience into its manifold connections and disconnections does not help to elucidate the very nature of activity or texture and consistency of experience that integrates all the differences between mobilities and mobilities between differences. Metaphysics proceeds, in the analytic move, by carving real conceptual distinction and then, in the synthetic move, it tries to show participation between distinction for which it proposes *mode or modes of tension* constitutive of manner and structure of participation. Reason strives to unify the sensuous, perceptive and conceptual manifold into an ultimate ground, conditionality or fundamentality. Dogmatic metaphysics, since it seeks to ground or fasten tensionality, proceeds in four different ways in the schematisation of the ontological and metaphysical priority of one or select modes of tension. *Unconditionality* is when one mode of tension is metaphysically prior in the structure of unidirectionality of participation, that is, real distinction participates in the fundamentality of the select mode of tension. The schema in which the state of participation between two modes of tension is the fundamental structure of participation I have termed *biconditionality*. When reason attempts to establish the structure of conditionality in the participation of the participation between two modes of tension in a third intermediary mode of tension, this structure of participation is termed *triunconditionality*. *Aconditionality* is when the structure of participation is itself schematised as reducible to fundamentality of distension or incompositionality. But there is a deep ambiguity at the heart of reason's vocation in the sense that, while the notion of cause or condition has meaning as function of efficacious power or capacity, whether mental or material, the construct of ultimate ground or totality of conditionality has meaning through the unity and form of the principle of reason and intelligibility. This ties reason into an epistemological circularity in matters of highest degree of abstractness. Pure and practical reason continue to encounter resistances and irritations in formulations regarding matters of relative concreteness, thus reason tends to transpose the function of its unity to the highest levels of abstractness, but this is the unity of the form of pure

reason itself. Thus it is a challenge for reason to think activity and tensionality as the ultimate weave of the universe. Non-dogmatic metaphysics seeks to think the nature of tensionality, which I will term *diconditionality*, without reducing it to any notion of ground or distension. To think the nature of activity is to think the nature of force or tension of compositionality, which exceeds the unity of sufficient reason. The universe is a mobile irreducible inseparability, which cannot be reduced to principles of unity, duality, nullity or dialecticity, but must be thought as nonrational tension of diconditionality, through real dynamics of attraction and repulsion, push and pull. Distinction and participation have to be shown to be the same operation viewed from different angles, which is irreducible inseparability, for the modes of tension constitutive of manner of participation have to be mutually systematised and integrated without getting reduced to distension. Activity cannot be made a constitutive component of the conceptual schema, but is precisely the aim of the demonstration in the mutual interrelations, the push and pull between the concepts in their systematicity. In this sense, while dogmatic metaphysics is based upon the *requirements of the envisionment of conditionality*, non-dogmatic metaphysics needs to be based upon the *requirements of the demonstration of tensionality or diconditionality*, that is explanatory of both the force of attraction and repulsion (the difference between relation and separation is sustained by a deeper relationality) as well as both the temporality and eternity of motion (difference between mobility and immobility is sustained by a deeper mobility).

Let us say for now that the limits of real distinction are potentiality and reality, or the state of indeterminacy, openness and free energy and the state of complete determination, finitude and resistance. Neither can be posited in a domain supernal to the other, instead they must be shown to be involved in an irreducible inseparability from the perspective of requirements of tensionality insofar as participation cannot be traced unidirectionally or mediately or statically but only tensionally. I will try to replace the requirement of sufficient reason, conditionality or ground with the requirement of tensionality. Dogmatic metaphysical construction proceeds based upon the

requirement of conditionality but non-dogmatic metaphysical construction must be based upon the requirement of tensionality. I will term this diconditionality. Participation must be of the very nature of real distinction, in other words, distinction and participation are the same operation viewed from different angles.

The problem of activity readily spills over into the issue of relationality because the question is how do the disparate aspects or poles of distinction participate with each other, what is the movement of relation between potentiality and reality? What is the manner or mode of participation of real distinction? The problem of activity spills over into the issue of relation also in that the entire spectra of relationality and mobility operate in the mutual participation of potentiality and reality. Therefore relation implies, one, the connecting factor of the synthetical unity of experience as well as, two, the potential abstractions connecting different synthetical unities of experience. The problem of relationality itself spills over into the issue of processuality, firstly, the processuality of interaction between relata, and secondly, in the question of the processuality of the transcendental consistency of relationality constitutive of a field or world. The whole nature of relation comprises of both these meanings. While a real togetherness and inseparability hold together both the potentiality for relation and potentiality for separation, a real processuality and incompatibility holds together both the potentiality for mobility and potentiality for immobility, relative to one another. Both process and relation have an abstract and synthetical side. Processuality is synthetical but relations between processes is abstract. Relationality is abstract but the processuality of relationality is synthetical. Thus, in a deeper sense, the real conceptual distinction is between the *abstract* and the *synthetical*. Potentiality of abstraction, insofar as it is not necessarily real and preserves an openness of sense, itself diverges into interiority of relation and exteriority of relation. A relation is a potential factor in the fact of experience. If relation is not a factor then it is nothing. A relation cannot be mere fact except as cessation of activity or from the perspective of cessation of activity. Thus there is both relation and separation, but only a real relatedness can sustain difference

between potentiality for relation and separation. The whole notion of objective interactivity is not purely atomic but includes resonant relations of molecularity and intensive properties that originate in the qualitative and quantitative dynamics of relationality. The universal tensile tissue of mobile irreducible inseparability has both an extensional and intensional side. While technoscience focus on the former and human sciences focus on the latter, only metaphysics can think tensionality beyond the bifurcation. In this sense metaphysics of tensionality is more fundamental than both technoscience and human science.

In the construction of *naturalistic non-dogmatic metaphysics*, in order to circumvent the distensionalising unity of the form of reason, we have to study the tensional facts or factors of immediate experience. Let us ask once again from the perspective of metaphysical naturalism that aspires to think nature as the weave of dynamical togetherness of processuality and relationality — What are the facts or factors of fact constitutive of the immediacy of any possible or real activity or experientiality? I have carved out four generic senses or tensions - mobility, immobility, relation, separation. The speculative pattern of these factors are three combinatorial modes of tension or which are mutually sensitive phases in the constitution of experience. The three abstractly combined patterns of sense-response or universal modes of tension are nothing other than passivities of activity organising, on the one hand, the becoming of synthetical unity of experience and, on the other, potentiality of relation and separation between experiences. These are the three modes of tension in immediate experience. The fourth mode is not a fact or factor of immediate experience, but is the fourth combinatorial patterns of the four generic sense, which is the combinatorial (or non-combinatorial) pattern of incompositionality —

Mode A Mobility + Relation

Mode B Mobility + Separation

Mode C Immobility + Relation

Mode D Immobility (+) Separation

1. Modes of Tension

Mode A (Mobility + Relation) is felt intimacy of abstraction between a quality of motion or intensity of affection and a sense of its indissociability from ecological relatedness, as though there is a relationship of internality between activity and relatedness. Here there is an intensity of being affected by select components of the immediate environment but there is an indissociability of the intensity of affection from the vague extensive connectedness of the ecology. Mode B (Mobility + Separation) is felt intimacy of abstraction between an immersive sense of movement combined with a tension of separation or independence from the surrounding world, as though activity is immersed and driven by its own intensity in a kind of interiority of relation. This is the phase in which response to environmental ingression is germinating within a sense of interiorisation in abstraction from ambient reality. Mode C (Immobility + Relation) is the expression of response. It is felt intimacy of abstraction between a tension of stasis or immobility combined with a tense of relatedness and interactivity, as though there is a relationship of externality or exteriority of relation between being and relation. This is the tension of complete realisation and satisfaction. These three abstractly synthesised patterns of sense-response are universal in the sense of being applicable to every actual and possible kind of experiential activity. There is a fourth combinatorial pattern Mode D (Immobility + Separation) which is a coming together of the senses of immobility and separation. We can argue that the first three are senses of real experiential activity while the fourth, as pure combination of resistances or inactivities does not have any real existence and is an empty logical postulate. These phases are threaded through a kind of atemporal and non-linear relationship between abstraction and synthesis, where abstraction is conditioned by modes of synthetical unity

and synthesis itself is conditioned by forms of abstraction. Synthesis is a reference to the aspect of activity or experience (ethology) while abstraction is a reference to the aspect of multiplicity of activity or experience (ecology). By reason of the mergence between facticity and factoriality in the dipolarity of fact and value, which is to say that ecology is factor in the fact of ethology and ethology is a factor in the fact of ecology, the references of abstraction and synthesis also tend to overlap and plait. This atemporal mergence is what I am terming *absynthesis*. When we say something is abstract, we mean that it lies in between that which makes synthesis possible differently. When we say something is synthetical, we mean that it has reference to the quality of determinability of operational unity. In other words, if by synthetical we mean the quality of experience, by abstract we mean something in between qualities of experience or prior to quality of experience. The whole nature of relation between processuality and relationality thus shows itself as relation between synthesis and abstraction.

These are the modes of tension constitutive of manner of participation of distinction, that is, tension of compositionality, that is, diconditionality. The three phases are connected through abstraction and synthesis, our task is to systematise all three modes of tension without reducing to incompositionality and distension of Mode D (Immobility + Separation). Dogmatic metaphysics of conditionality reduces the whole nature of tensionality into select mode or modes and constructs universality based upon the requirements of envisionment of conditionality in four different ways - uniconditionality, aconditionality, triuniconditionality and biconditionality. Non-dogmatic naturalistic metaphysics constructs transuniversality based upon the requirements of demonstration of tensionality of compositionality, which is ultimately tension between ways of systematisation of the modes of tension that is, actual and potential difference between demonstration and demonstrability of diconditionality, which is a question of the systematisation of mutuality of interaction between the abstract and synthetical sides of all three modes excluding Mode D (Immobility + Separation). Our task is to integrate the three modes of tension without reducing to

incompositionality of Mode D to demonstrate the irreducible inseparability between the abstract and the synthetic, explanatory of eternity and temporality of processuality (that is, sustenance of difference between mobility and immobility by fundamental mobility) and , both the force of attraction and repulsion, (that is, sustenance of difference between relation and separation by fundamental relationality).

1.2. Discussion in the Context of the History of Western Metaphysics

1.2.1. Kant, Whitehead and the Transcendental Synthetic

Alfred North Whitehead writes in *Process and Reality* that “in the organic philosophy Kant's 'Transcendental Aesthetic' becomes a distorted fragment of what should have been his main topic.”⁶ But careful attention to some of the fundamental problems and issues that Kant continuously reassess and rearticulates in his philosophy throughout the different pre-critical, critical and post-critical phases of his career, shows that the modes and schemas of organisation of experience are more fundamentally nonconceptual and practical in nature and only derivatively conceptual and logical. The question Kant is raising in the critical project is basically — what are the possibilities and limits of speculative universal thinking? In other words, what constitutes the discipline of the interests of speculative universal thinking? This is an inquiry into the *transcendental synthetic*, that is, the relation between the problem of the systematicity of experience and the problem of the

systematicity of nature, which is both nonconceptual (contra Leibniz) as well as nonaesthetic (contra Locke), at times that of the unity of apperception but at times that of nature itself. The reason why it can't be said for Kant that nature and experience are pure physical activity is that that precludes the problem of the systematicity of nature and experience, which can only be raised either from the point of view of human thinking or from that of god. Kant is trying to avoid both solipsistic empiricism and rationalist dogmatism in order to simply stay with the problem to the farthest extent possible, stretch it as far as it goes without splintering off. He is neither arguing that nature does objectively have a general positive systematic unity nor that it is purely thought that imposes this unity upon nature, in fact the question of systematicity is a question of the mutuality and tension of purposiveness, in the relation between experiences or between experience and universe. There is no totality of substance of systematicity situated beyond the conditions of experience as in the dogmatic metaphysics of Leibniz and Spinoza, but it is precisely the struggle of aspirationality to synthesise as much of the abstract as possible, and to abstract as much of the synthetical as possible that elucidates the internality of relation between the problem of purposiveness and the problem of systematicity, both that of experience and nature, that Kant intuitively seeks (which is what I will later relate to the metaphysical demonstration of tensionality).

A theme continuing through the different phases of the philosophy of Kant is the search to sustain processuality and relationality in togetherness without letting them splinter off into Cartesian dualism or collapse either into Leibnizian conceptualism or Spinozan necessitarianism. There is a subtle continuity of this concern in his philosophy which was first articulated in the 1755 essay 'New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition' - "For the soul is subject (in virtue of the inner sense) to inner changes. Since, as we have proved, these changes cannot arise from its nature considered in isolation and as disconnected from other things, it follows that there must be a number of things present outside the soul with which it stands in a reciprocal connection."⁷. In the pre-critical period, there was an ontological realism regarding powers of

reciprocal physical influence between monadic spheres of activity, while an ultimate principle or original source of universal connection was dogmatically situated in god. In the critical period, while ontological realism regarding real entities and physical influence was maintained, the source of organisation of interaction between sensibility and intelligibility became the transcendental conditions of possibility of experience, that is, the modes of time-determination gluing unity of apperception. The entire anxiousness of the transition from metaphysics to physics in the *Opus Postumum* is Kant's search to reroute the function of dynamic synthesis between processuality of activity and extensiveness of relation away from the derivate epistemological and logical necessity to primary nonconceptual and nonaesthetic universality which led to an uncritical substantialisation of this togetherness in the concept of ether.

In the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* published in 1781, the synthetic a priori judgement became the horizon of the conflation of questions regarding the conditions of possibility of objects of experience and the conditions of possibility of experience as cognition or knowledge. But in the original transcendental theory of experience that Kant started developing in the 1770 essay 'On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World', also known as the 'Inaugural Dissertation', the problem of the conditions of possibility of experience was primarily the problem of the sensible conditions of time-determinations in the modes of persistence, causation and interaction and this was not yet subsumed under the conceptuality of cognition, in other words, the possibility of experience was not derivate of the possibility of knowledge but vice versa. The metaphysical inquiry into the order requisite for causal interaction between persisting bodies of experience, and the universality enabling this potentiality for connection and disconnection of the earlier project became in the critical philosophy an epistemological inquiry into the transcendental a priori forms of cognition of the manifold of sensory and perceptual datum. The reason why Kant departed from dogmatic metaphysics to critical philosophy is that there can be no method of adjudicating between different dogmatic metaphysical positions and also no adequate response to

Humean and Pyrrhonian scepticism except from the perspective of an inquiry into the very transcendental conditions of possibility of speculative knowledge. Thus the philosophical emphasis shifted from the transcendental synthetic to the transcendental analytic. But even in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the thematic primacy of synthesis over analysis is present insofar as it is the systems of principles and the three analogies of experience of persistence, causation and interaction which in the schematism are the ultimate organising factors of spatiotemporal experience and the possibility of interaction between forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding. As Paul Guyer has noted,

In his original transcendental theory of experience, Kant tried to demonstrate the objective validity of a priori categories of the understanding by directly demonstrating the role of the concepts of substance, causation, and interaction in the temporal organisation of experience. For the *Critique of Pure Reason*, however, he attempted to separate the pure concepts of the understanding from the principles of temporal determination.⁸

If the meaning of critique is the disciplining of speculative reason from dogmatically overstepping the limits of sensuous experience and at the same time provocation of empirical reason to not sceptically forego supersensuous generalities of connectedness enabling inductive observation, then the more fundamental paradigm of requisiteness for synthetic universality is not rational necessity but force of togetherness of real occasional and combinatorial experiences with mutual potentiality for relation and separation. The substantialisation of participation between subjectivity and objectivity in the human mind that Kant articulated in transcendental idealism is a reduction of a more universal togetherness between processuality and relationality that he more deeply sought in the vein of transcendental naturalism. As Iain Hamilton Grant has argued,

It is immediately evident that not only does the problem of nature not disappear from the transcendental philosophy, but also that, as the critical project progresses, it resumes the central role it enjoyed under Kant's precritical or dogmatic-naturalist period. The engagement with chemistry in the first *Critique*, which persisted long afterward; the problem of the teleological judgment of nature with regard to the actuality of self-organising beings in the third. But nothing makes this cohabitation of dogmatic naturalism with transcendental philosophy more immediate than Kant's final, unfinished project, known under the title *Transition from Metaphysics to Physics*, with its ether deductions and its attempt to square transcendental deduction with ontogenesis.⁹

The four sections in the first *Critique* where the enduring thematic of the transcendental synthetic registers its hidden constitutiveness are 'Second analogy: principle of temporal succession according to the law of causality', 'Appendix: On the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection', 'Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic' and 'The Refutation of Idealism' (added in second edition published in 1787). While in the discussions of schematism and System of Principles, the nonconceptual objective modes of the temporal organisation of experience are foregrounded as the possibility of interaction between empirical intuitions received by the forms of sensibility and the concepts of the understanding derived from logical functions of judgement, in these four sections the objectivity of inner sense is shown to be inseparable from realism regarding objects of outer sense of space. The question regarding the conditions of possibility of objects of outer sense or spatial experience was then fully developed in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* published in 1786 right before the publication of the second edition of the first *Critique*. As Eric Watkins has pointed out¹⁰, the first *Critique* which Kant considered to be the transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature was primarily concerned with the intensive objectivity of temporal

organisation of experience while *Metaphysical Foundations of Nature Science* which he considered to the special part of metaphysics of nature was primarily concerned with the extensive objectivity of spatial organisation of experience. This gap between the intensive and extensive aspects of transcendental led to the *Transition from Metaphysics to Physics* or *Opus Postumum*.

The schematism of modes of time-determination are what organises the sensible datum in perceptual succession, simultaneity and coexistence and provides particularity for the application of the concepts of the understanding. The differentiation between objects that in successive perceptions are actually changing and ones which are not changing and are coexisting is crucial for the work of the faculty of the understanding. But even in the first *Critique*, the schematism of time-determination are further dependent upon the faculty of reason and its search for systematic unity in nature. Kant argues that "Reason therefore really has only the understanding and its purposive ordering as its object; and as understanding unifies the manifold in the object through concepts, so reason for its part unifies the manifold of concepts through ideas, insofar as it sets a certain collective unity as the goal of the actions of the understanding, which would otherwise be occupied only with distributive unity. (A 643-4/B 671-2)" The function of the faculty of understanding is to provide unity and organisation to the sensible manifold, but the function of the faculty of reason is to provide unity to the manifold of concepts without which the concepts would remain in dispersed disconnected states. In the section on the transcendental Dialectic, Kant discusses how reason in its search for unconditioned systematic unity tends to overstep the limits of sensibility and posit the antinomies of world, immortality and god. But in the section on the 'Appendix to Transcendental Dialectic' Kant argues that nonetheless, this search of pure reason is crucial since the sense of objectivity of succession and simultaneity of objects of outer sense is approximated by the requirements of mutual systematicity of different judgements and cannot be approximated by individual judgements. As Philip Kitcher writes,

I suggest that the Appendix to the Ideal completes the work of the Second Analogy by explaining how we are justified in distinguishing merely accidental regularities from those that are endowed with counterfactual-sustaining force. The distinction is to emerge from our efforts to systematize our beliefs in accordance with the principle of unification. Certain claims come to be regarded as lawlike because they play a particular role in the systematization of belief.¹¹

But by the time of the *Critique of Power of Judgement* (published in 1790), this idea of the systematicity of nature gets related more fundamentally to the newly introduced faculty of judgement rather than the faculty of reason. The context of this reassignment is Kant's discussion on the teleology of natural organisms in the section on 'Critique of Teleological Judgement'. As I have shown, there was already a question as to what extent the transcendental laws and concepts of the understanding are necessarily constitutive of the possibility of experience insofar as, firstly, the understanding requires the schematism of modes of time-determination to organise the sensible datum to render the particular subsumable by the universal, but moreover, it is in fact the search of the faculty of pure reason for systematicity in nature and in judgements which grounds the more distributed and discontinuous activity of the understanding. But in the third *Critique*, Kant argues that sensibility might be presented with "such an infinite multiplicity of empirical laws and so great a heterogeneity of natural forms"¹² that the concepts for such a sensible manifold might not actually exist with the understanding and would have to be in fact found or constructed. "But Kant now has a deeper reason as well for assigning systematicity to judgment instead of reason: he is now more clearly drawn to the view that some sort of systematic harmony of natural forms, even though it can only be "presupposed" rather than deduced to obtain in nature, is a condition of the application of

the categories to any empirical manifold and not just an additional desideratum which is not itself necessary for the basic application of the categories to objects of experience.”¹³

Kant differentiates between *determining judgment*, in which the a priori rules and laws of subsuming the sensible particular are already given, and *reflective judgment*, in which the only the sensible particular is given and the universal has to be found or constructed. As he writes,

Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, or law) is given, then the judgement which subsumes the particular under it is *determining*.^{*} This is so even where such a judgement is transcendental and, as such, provides the conditions *a priori* in conformity with which alone subsumption under that universal can be effected. If, however, only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is simply *reflective*.¹⁴

Kant earlier used the idea of reflection in the first *Critique* in the appendix to the transcendental analytic ‘On the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection’. The operation through which the comparison between representations in general is made to relate them to the various faculties of cognition in order assess whether they belong to the faculty of understanding or the faculty of sensibility for the purpose of making judgement of perception is called ‘transcendental reflection’. It was due to the lack of the transcendental distinction between understanding and sensibility and differentiation of representations in regard to which faculty they pertain, and thus deceived by the amphiboly or ambiguity between intellectual comparison of concepts and sensible comparison of things, according to Kant, "Leibniz intellectualised the appearances, just as Locke totally sensitivited the concepts of understanding..."¹⁵ Transcendental reflection operates with regard to the operatives of comparison and distinction — identity and difference, agreement and opposition, inner and outer, and the determinable and determination. Now in the discussion under agreement

and opposition, against Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles, Kant argues that it is possible for two realities to be in real conflict even though they are not in logical contradiction. In the case of the understanding, there can be no contradiction in concepts of a thing unless a negative is connected with an affirmative. But in the case of sensibility, "two realities can indeed be in conflict with each other, and when they are united in the same subject each can wholly or in part annihilate *the consequence of the other as*, e.g., two motive forces in the same straight line insofar as they either pull or push a point in opposite directions; or, again, a pleasure that counterbalances a pain."¹⁶ In this sense, the faculty of sensibility has a deeper capacity to sustain friction and contrast as opposed to the faculty of the understanding that only approaches the sensible intuition through the lens of conceptual unification. Under the heading of inner and outer, Kant argues that the faculty of understanding reduces things to mere monadic conceptual entities but for sensibility there are efficacious force of attraction and repulsion, physical influence and composition operative in the interaction between objects. As Melissa Zinkin writes,

It is only with reference to force and intensive magnitudes that reflection can decide where the representations are to be compared and connected. When force can be thought along with the representations without contradiction, then they are judged by reflection to belong to sensibility.¹⁷

In this light, I argue that the determining judgement is closer to the faculty of understanding while the reflective judgement is closer to the faculty of sensibility. While determining judgement is based upon a constitutive principle which is a priori and necessary and determinately objective, reflective judgement is based upon regulative principle of purposiveness which is not a priori and necessary and it is asymptotically objective. The reflective judgement is not a constitutive principle of purposiveness of nature but rather regulative principle of subjectivity and the belief in the

systematicity and order of the empirical forms and laws of nature in the context of which practical reason and transcendental freedom can set practical, moral and cultural ends for itself in making with nature. The transcendental principle of purposiveness in reflective judgement is not a constitutive principle as in the case of determining judgement but a regulative one, in the sense that, it is not a principle organising nature objectively and determinately but the power of reflective judgement seeking mutual systematicity between, on the one hand, continuity and affinity of natural forms and laws, and on the other hand, the heterogeneity and diversity of natural forms and empirical laws. Lea Ypi notes,

“The purposive constitution of reason, Kant emphasises here, proves the existence of a purposive order of nature without which reason could not promote and realize its essential ends in the empirical world. The final end of practical reason enables the architectonic unity of the system, according to both the scholastic and the cosmic definitions of philosophy, guaranteeing the integration of the theoretical with the practical use of reason, and explaining why nature and freedom which initially form ‘two separate’ systems, are ultimately joined in one ‘single philosophical system’¹⁸

In a similar vein, Paul Guyer writes,

It is by no means fully developed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, for while Kant there denies pure theoretical or speculative reason the power to complete knowledge by terminating series of conditions, he still assigns it the task of systematising knowledge by means of the regulative ideals of hierarchy in laws and continuity in forms and species as well as by means of the teleological conception of the natural world as a system in service of God's purposes (see A686/B 714 ff.). Yet even these regulative rather than constitutive ideals of speculative reason are reassigned in the *Critique of Judgment*: the regulative ideals of systematicity in general are assigned to the newly introduced faculty of reflective judgment, and the teleological conception of the world as a system subordinated to an ultimate purpose is reassigned to reflective

judgment working in conjunction with practical reason as the source of the idea of human freedom as the only purpose that is an end in itself. One can suggest that theoretical reason's positive even if only regulative ideal of systematicity is reassigned to reflective judgment precisely to preserve the critical thesis that it is only as practical reason that pure reason has a positive function.¹⁹

Now in the first *Critique*, Kant argues that in its intrinsic vocation, pure theoretical reason oversteps the limits of sensibility to posit the totality of conditionality and thus gets embroiled in antinomies and paralogisms. But, since reflective judgement in the third *Critique* is closer to sensibility in its capacity to sustain contrast and tension unlike in the case of determining judgement which is closer to the understanding, while Kant does not give reflective judgement any positive role in metaphysical thinking, I argue that, reflective judgement can have potential metaphysical significance, because, firstly, it does not overstep the conditions of sensibility but uses the contrastive tensional nature of sensible experience to speculate regarding the purposive systematicity of nature and experience, and secondly, the principle of purposiveness is regulative and not determinative or constitutive, thus it only asymptotically approximates towards universality and does not engage in positing determinate necessary universality. In this sense, reflective judgement has use in the metaphysical demonstration of tensionality in the interrelation of concepts of the tensional nature of sensible experience. Reflective judgement regarding systematicity and purposiveness of nature can have rigour and adequacy. Reflective judgment regarding metaphysical problems can follow requirements of demonstration of tensionality in the interrelation between primary concepts based upon the tensional and contrastive nature of sensible experience in which sense the nature of the universe is not determinately knowable but thinkable and demonstrable to varying degrees of adequacy, systematicity and rigour.

Since time is both the form of inner as well as outer sense, while space is only the form of outer sense, the principles of objective time-determinations in the schematism supply the requisite particularity for the spontaneity of the categories of the understanding in disconnected determining judgements, determining insofar as the category applicable to sensuous particularity schematised and synthesised in temporal principles pre-exist the sensuous encounter. The function of pure speculative reason is to connect and synthesise disconnected units of determining judgements premised upon the schematic synthesis of the temporal principles into mutual systematicity. Reflective judgements do not operate with pre-existing categories but find and speculate concepts in the context of categorically unsubsumable sensuous manifold, which means that the use of speculative pure reason in the context of reflective judgements is to connect and mutually systematise disconnected reflective judgements premised upon the synthetical schematisation of the objective time-determinations of the principles of experience.



For Whitehead, matter, space and time are mistakenly accorded the status of being the central concepts of speculative physics, and substance is mistakenly considered the fundamental concept of metaphysics. In this context, experience is understood to belong to a subject-object structure, of the relationship between the knower and the known. But for Whitehead, experience is not primarily of the order of cognition, but instead a kind of happening, an activity of the rise and fall of emotional tonality deriving from the power of relevance of factors given to genesis of experience. "The principle that I am adopting is that consciousness presupposes experience, and not experience consciousness."²⁰ The primordial sense of immediate experience is neither that there is something with attributable properties of its own nor that there is a simple occurrence within generic forms of space as simple location and time as simple succession. The primary concrete element discriminated

in nature is that there is a kind of happening with ingredient factors of its own creating facts, and according to the 'doctrine of conformation of subjective form', it is the character of the factors that determines the character of ingreience. So the question is not that of the general forms of reception of an empirical world in representational consciousness but of the real textural modes of relatedness between particular happening and the environment of happenings in a compositional cosmos. For Whitehead, the metaphysical concept of substance needs to be replaced with the idea of events or occasions as the constitutive factor of reality. As he writes in *The Concept of Nature*, "the passage of events and the extension of events over each other, are in my opinion the qualities from which time and space originate as abstractions."²¹ Whitehead does not discard the object-subject structure of experience, but replacing the problematics of cognition with the vector-structure of the genesis of experience, he speaks of the object as the factors performing the function of a datum provoking the subject which is the actual occasion in the process of realisation. An object is an ingredient in the character of some event. In fact the character of an event is nothing but the objects which are ingredient in it and the ways in which those objects make their ingression into the event.

Whitehead's assessment of Kantian philosophy is focussed on the critical system of transcendental idealism in which he diagnoses a misguided prioritisation of the Transcendental Analytic over the Transcendental Aesthetic and seeks to reverse this priority of possibility and structure of cognition over possibility and structure of experience. According to him, both Kant and Hume accord primacy to atomistic data of sense-presentation in the analysis of immediate experience and the notion of pure succession of time and reduce causal efficacy to merely inferential status, whether the habits of thought or the categories of the understanding. This mode of perception consisting of atomic units of sense-data in instantaneous points of time is termed 'presentational immediacy'. Whitehead seeks to reverse such a picture of immediate experience by showing that the more aboriginal and primary mode of perception in nature is 'causal efficacy' which is the sense of the conformation of the present activity to the settled actuality of the past. For Whitehead, presentational immediacy is a more sophisticated mode of perceptual functioning

relevant only for higher-grade or complex organisms while causal efficacy is in fact the primitive mode of perception in nature. The subsumption of direct perception of causal efficacy under the presentational immediacy of the form of time as pure succession of atomic datum leads to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Therefore, instead of positing space and time as the absolute forms of sensible intuition, his interest lies in the independent generative modes that objectify factors in the actual environment as components in the real subjective making of an individual actual occasion of experience. This is one of the primary functions that the concept of prehension is meant to fulfil. As he writes in *Symbolism*, “each step in such reasoning depends on the primary presupposition of the immediate present moment conforming itself to the settled environment of the immediate past”²² The perception of conformation to realities in the environment is the primitive element in our external experience.,²³

For Whitehead, space, time and matter are derivative notions from more fundamental categories. Ultimate facts of experience are mutuality of affection between entities, which is actuality in attainment, and the objects existing independently in complete determination and free from relationality, which is attained actuality. As he writes in *The Concept of Nature*, in a sense fundamentally rearticulating the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible in terms of the distinction between thought and sense-awareness, “the termini for thought are entities, primarily with bare individuality, secondarily with properties and relations ascribed to them in the procedure of thought; the termini for sense-awareness are factors in the fact of nature, primarily related and only secondarily discriminated as distinct individualities.”²⁴

For Whitehead actual entities are utterly monadic in the contemporary sense, but utterly interactive in the temporal sense, so there is independence of actual entities in the processes of concretion and systematic mutuality of interaction in processes of abstraction as subjective forms of prehension objects existing as part of real potentiality. The task of philosophy of organism is to show internality of connection between both processes, the microscopic process of concrescence and the macroscopic process of transition. The ontological principle is to explain all details of

experience using these two processes or fluencies, the question is of the force uniting these processes, which Whitehead terms the category the ultimate. The issue is that the force should be explanatory and demonstrative of the ontological principle instead of grounding it. The ultimate is the generic notion of which all actualisation or individuation is an accident, the primary non-temporal accident of creativity is god which is a non-temporal actual entity. Whitehead writes regarding the requirements of metaphysical systematisation,

'Coherence,' as here employed, means that the fundamental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless. This requirement does not mean that they are definable in terms of each other; it means that what is indefinable in One such notion cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other notions. It is the ideal of speculative philosophy that its fundamental notions shall not seem capable of abstraction from each other. In other words,' it is presupposed that no entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth. This character is its coherence.²⁵

The central concepts of the schema are creativity, actual entities, eternal objects, prehension and god, although god is a derivative notion. The requirements of systematicity are that all the primary concepts should be imbricated in a relationship of mutual requirement and yet retain an original or unique function in the metaphysical schema. God is the primordial accidental instantiation of creativity, and is the sole non-temporal actual entity: "The non-temporal act of all-inclusive unfettered valuation is at once a creature of creativity and a condition for creativity."²⁶ God and actual entities are accidental creatures of creativity that condition creativity. Creativity is the force of creative advance of novelty through which the primordial nature of god, deficient in actuality, assimilates the efforts of temporal concrescence and thus acquire physical multiplicity, and at the same time the disjunctive multiplicity of entities, deficient in everlastingness, acquires a unity of

everlastingness. In this sense, creativity is explanatory in the ultimate sense of this mutuality of requirement between God and World or permanence and fluency. He further explains,

The adequacy of the scheme over every item does not mean adequacy over such items as happen to have been considered. It means that the texture of observed experience, as illustrating the philosophic scheme, is such that all related experience must exhibit the same texture. Thus the philosophic scheme should be 'necessary,' in the sense of bearing in itself its own warrant of universality throughout an experience, provided that we confine ourselves to that which communicates with immediate matter of fact. But what does not so communicate is [6] unknowable, and the unknowable is unknown; 1 and so this universality defined by 'communication' can suffice. This doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an essence to the universe which forbids relationships beyond itself, as a violation of its rationality. Speculative philosophy seeks that essence. ²⁷

The requirement of metaphysical systematicity for Whitehead is that what is indefinable in one concept cannot be separated from its relevance from what is excluded in another concept. The adequacy of the schema does not mean adequacy over each and every item considered, but the very texture of observed experience, the very weave of relationality and processuality must exhibit this texture. This integration of the facts of immediate experience is what he terms 'universality by communication', which is the general systematic metaphysical character that forbids relationship beyond itself. This enquiry into the general systematic metaphysical character is in fact an enquiry into the transcendental synthetic. As he writes in *Science and the Modern World*, "Actuality is through and through togetherness—togetherness of otherwise isolated eternal objects, and togetherness of all actual occasions." ²⁸

Another way of thinking about the transcendental synthetic in Whitehead is the togetherness of the continuity and discontinuity of the processuality of occasions and extension of occasions. In

light of this, the Table 1.0 of section 1.1 of the different modes of tension of immediate experience can be rearticulated in new terms:

Mode A	Continuity of Process + Continuity of Extension
Mode B	Continuity of Process + Discontinuity of Extension
Mode C	Discontinuity of Process + Continuity of Extension.
Mode D	Discontinuity of Process (+) Discontinuity of Extension

It is not about the a priori conditions of possibility of sense-presentation or transcendental forms receiving atomic empirical content, but the *universal modes of compositional efficacy* connecting both the objective world of attained actuality as well as pure potentiality as ingredient factors to the real internal constitution of subjective experiential occurrence which through completion itself gets added to the becoming of the settled actual world or real potentiality as a novel factor for future actual occurrences. The cosmological picture that emerges in Whitehead's account of philosophy of organism can be divided into the process of concrescence and the process of transition. Concrescence is the process in which a subject occasion integrates diverse prehensive qualities from objective occasions towards the intensive attainment of completely determinate satisfaction. Transition is the process in which superjective occasion perishes after acquiring complete determination and passes into objective immortality in the form of a new objective condition in the real potentiality of the settled universe. In this sense, concrescence is the process in which the disjunctive many integrate into the conjunctive unity of immediate form whereas transition is the process in which the immediate unity of experience exhausts itself to become part of the disjunctive assemblage of attained actuality. Elizabeth Kraus writes that "Whitehead's view of micro-process as the subjective appropriation and structuring of what is objectively received enables him to view an occasion as both determined and free, objectively conditioned and subjectively functioning—as a union of efficient and final causality."²⁹ The actual is the objective

immortality of the actual world or the extensive or spatiotemporal continuum conditioning creativity. The factor of pure potentiality or the primordial nature of God acts as the ultimate condition of creativity. But the indetermination conditioning any real concrescence is itself a *conditioned indetermination* or what Whitehead terms 'real potentiality'. What is interesting is that the extensive spatiotemporal continuum which is the totality of contemporary actuality, seen from a different perspective, is nothing other than this very aspect of real potentiality, that is, the collection of eternal objects and patterned entities directly relevant for the occasion of experience in question. "According to the philosophy of organism, the extensive space-time continuum is the fundamental aspect of the limitation laid upon abstract potentiality by the actual world."³⁰ A novel concrescent occasion will always indirectly issue forth from the plane of pure potentiality but more directly be conditioned by the spatiotemporal continuum as limited potentiality relevant to its environment. This will be defined as the problematic of efficient causation.

Creativity is the force of creative advance of novelty through which the primordial nature of god assimilates the efforts of temporal concrescence and thus acquire physical multiplicity, deficiency in actuality, and at the same time the disjunctive multiplicity of entities acquires a unity of everlastingness, creativity is explanatory of this mutual requirement between God and World, permanence and fluency. But I will argue that the purpose of metaphysical demonstration of activity is not to ground it in a separate concept but instead to demonstrate nature of activity and tension in the mutual presupposition between primary or fundamental concepts of the system. The issue is that without the concept of creativity God and World would indeed fall into static equilibrium, where a final synthesis will be achieved, and it is this that the concept of creativity is trying to avoid, but backhandedly, in the sense that this inexhaustibility should be an internal character of the nature of interaction between God and World, or in fact between the temporal actual entities themselves, and not have to be smuggled in by a concept from outside which Willian Christian termed a pre-systematic remnant in Whitehead's mature system. This will be discussed in more detail in section 1.3.

Both Kant and Whitehead are involved in the project of naturalistic metaphysics, though both the systematic philosophies fall short of achieving this aim in their respective ways. While Whitehead's philosophy comes very close to naturalistic metaphysics in terms of the adequacy and coherence of his system, the uncritical dogmatic remnants in his philosophy fundamentally contradict the naturalistic requirements of what he calls the ontological principle. Kant comes very close to metaphysical naturalism in the spirit of his philosophy and the continuous struggle with which he seeks to desubstantialise and operationalise experiential activity, but he sacrifices a degree of speculative boldness whilst disciplining pure reason from transgressing its limits and descending into dogmatism. So the challenge for us becomes how to make Whitehead more critical and Kant more speculative.

1.2.2.Synthesis and Abstraction

Critical philosophy organised itself around the objective primacy of mutual interpenetration between transcendental modes of time-determination conditioning unity of apperception in the constitution of experience as possibility of cognition. The system of the principles of experience is meant to elucidate the insubstantial operationality of the unity of apperception as the extra-logical objective structure of time itself. But the second and the third analogies of experience signal to realism of outer sense insofar as empirical intuitions of inner sense are themselves conditioned by the efficacious power of outer intuitions. This Kantian thematic of the objectivity of outer sense gets addressed in the pre-critical work of the *Inaugural Dissertation* in the principle of causation and the principle of coexistence and the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. In this sense, Kant emphasises the factoriality of different modes of tensionality in different works — the Mode B (Mobility + Separation) gets emphasised in the notion of the unity of apperception, the Mode A

(Mobility + Relation) gets emphasised in the notion of *physicus inflexus* in pre-critical works and also in the second analogy of experience, and the Mode C (Immobility + Relation) gets emphasised in the axioms of intuition in mathematical principles and extensive objectivity of spatial organisation and pure concepts of the understanding. His assessment in the antinomy of reason is that the speculative use of pure reason invariably posits totality of conditions or the unconditioned as thing-in-itself in the noumenal realm and thus falls into dogmatism by exceeding the spatiotemporal limits of experientiality, that is, by positing mode D (Immobility + Separation). But Kant failed to develop a systematic philosophy which would demonstrate the mutually implicative coherence of all three universal compositional patterns or modes of tension without positing incompositionality of mode D (Immobility + Separation).

How have the trajectories, overlaps and faultiness between various subsequent philosophies in both the continental as well as analytic traditions depended upon responses and reconstructions of this complexity of modal emphasis in Kantian philosophy, in the modes of tensionality? Kant addresses the three modes of tension disconnectedly and non-systematically, scattered in different phases of his career. The seminal philosophers of the first generation of continental philosophy, Edmund Husserl, Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger are attempting to think the nature of the participation of participation between Mode A (Mobility + Relation) and Mode C (Immobility + Separation) in Mode B (Mobility + Separation) in distinct ways. The first generation of analytic philosophers, Rudolph Carnap, Gottlob Frege, are attempting to think participation of participation between Mode A (Mobility + Relation) and Mode B (Mobility + Separation) in Mode C (Immobility + Separation) in logico-linguistics. The second generation of continental philosophers, such as Claude Levi-Strauss and Michel Foucault, are attempting to redress the overemphasis on mode B (Mobility + Separation) and think the participation between Mode A (Mobility + Relation) and Mode B (Mobility + Separation) in the synchronic-symbolic or the diachronic-historical transcendental structurality of Mode C (Immobility + Separation). The second generation of analytic philosophy, such as W.V.O Quine and Donald Davidson, are attempting to course-correct

the overemphasis on Mode C (Immobility + Relation) in the concernment of the first generation, and think the participation between Mode A (Mobility + Relation) and Mode C (Immobility + Separation) in Mode B (Mobility + Separation). Late twentieth century metaphysical thinkers, primarily Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou, are attempting to think participation of participation of Mode B (Mobility + Separation) and Mode C (Immobility + Separation) in Mode A (Mobility + Relation) as well as participation between Mode A (Mobility + Relation) and Mode B (Mobility + Separation) in Mode C (Immobility + Separation) (in the case of Badiouian philosophy), but these are incomplete accounts of the nature of tensionality. Then, in the second part of this section, I will discuss the uniqueness and rarity with which Whitehead and Hegel attempt to synthesise all three compositional modes in their respective philosophies. From my point of view, the two thinkers who have accounted for the whole nature of tensionality A, B and C systematically and metaphysically are Whitehead and Hegel, but their respective systems ultimately reduce this integration of the modes of tension to the substantiality of incompositionality of mode D (Immobility + Separation). This is precisely the significance of Marx's philosophy in that he integrates the modes of tension without reducing this systematisation to the incompositionality of mode D (Immobility + Separation), insofar as he sets the avoidance of the immobilism, eternism and substantiality of incompositionality the most fundamental goal of critical thinking, but in this regard the systematisation of tensionality is strictly non-metaphysical, which I will discuss in section 1.4.

The constitutive concern of the seminal thinkers of the continental tradition Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, has been the manner in which participation between Mode A (Mobility + Relation) and Mode C (Immobility + Separation) participates in Mode B (Mobility + Separation), the nonconceptual nature of passive syntheticity of temporality of sensible, perceptual and practical experience respectively, as a counter to the objectivistic and naturalistic assumptions of modern science, and the constitution of temporal experience not centred on the transcendental analytic and the unity of apperception.

Husserlian phenomenology undertakes the project of the transcendental reduction or epoché from naturalistic attitude to, on the one side, the sensuous impressions and the noetic intentional structure of subjective consciousness, and on the other side, the noematic object of perceptual meaning internal to the appearances.³¹ The epoché is meant as a bracketing out of the naturalistic attitude to reality which takes the physical world of objects for granted, and the phenomenological reduction that is conditioned by the epoché is focussed on the theme of correlationism between subjectivity and world. The reduction is supposed to disclose the transcendental subjectivity as the very subjective condition for manifestation or appearance of objects. The Cartesian way of phenomenological reduction discussed in the *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* proceeds through the distinction between consciousness as consciousness of something and consciousness as in itself. Whereas objects of consciousness always appear in a limited manner or from relative perspectives, the consciousness appears to itself immediately in totality. The ontological way of the phenomenological reduction as discussed in the *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* proceeds by focussing on the very appearance of the objects of experience, and in this manner, distilling down to transcendental subjectivity as the very condition of possibly of appearance of objects. The purpose of transcendental phenomenology is to turn attention toward the givenness and appearance of reality, the manner in which reality is given to consciousness or appears to consciousness which requires the suspension of naturalistic attitude regarding reality and the naive metaphysical realism regarding the world. For Husserl, while it is possible to imagine the existence of a wordless subject, it is not possible to imagine the existence of a subjectless world and the reason for this is the transcendental priority of subjectivity which is in this sense the fundamental object of transcendental phenomenology. This is sense in which transcendental phenomenology is a form of transcendental idealism, but it is not an idealism in the sense of denying non-mental reality, but a kind of experiential realism emphasising the correlationism between experience and reality. “Whereas the world can only appear for a subject, subjectivity does not need the world in order to be.”³² As Dan

Zahavi argues, “Husserl speaks of a phenomenological absolute, and, more generally, of the analysis of temporality as constituting the bedrock of phenomenology exactly because it is not by any means to be taken as a mere investigation of the temporal givenness of objects. It is also an account of the temporal self-givenness of consciousness itself”³³. In *Logical Investigations*, the ontological commitment is methodologically bracketed out, but in *Ideas 1*, the ontological relation with the world is a crucial part of the transcendental phenomenology. Thus there is a turn from descriptive phenomenology to transcendental phenomenology in *Ideas 1*. Even though there is a difference between object and consciousness, it is more fundamentally internal to time-consciousness between object-directedness and transcendental subjectivity. “The world has not been lost through the epoché—it is not at all an abstaining with respect to the being of the world and with respect to any judgment about it, but rather it is the way of uncovering judgments about correlation, of uncovering the reduction of all unities of sense to me myself and my sense-having and sense-bestowing subjectivity with all its capabilities”³⁴.

Since the phenomenological method is trying to distill further and further to the appearances, the subject is crucial to the process of the constitution of experience, but this constitution itself entails at the same time the constitution of the constituting subject. This subject is not only involved correlationally in a lifeworld, but also implicated in sociality. The process of the constitution of experience involves a threefold structure — subjectivity-lifeworld-intersubjectivity. In the later writings of Husserl, the three components of this threefold structure become more and more deeply intertwined, but the primacy of subjectivity is still sustained. Ultimately, for Husserl, the time-consciousness is the formal condition for the synthesis of objects of consciousness, thus temporality is the structure of the constitution of experience, but even more fundamentally, temporality is structure of the synthetical constitution of subjective consciousness itself.

In *Time and Free Will*, Bergson develops a difference between two kinds of multiplicity, quantitative, numerical, homogenous, discrete multiplicity of juxtaposition presented in space, and qualitative, continuous, heterogenous, interpenetrating multiplicity presented in time. Bergson says

about Kant that “he did not attribute to duration an absolute existence, having put time, a priori, on the same plane as space.”³⁵ This is the error in Kantian transcendental philosophy that Bergson is attempting to correct, by establishing the ontological primacy of continuity of duration over discontinuity of spatiality. Kant for him thinks in spatial terms; he is the thinker of representation par excellence.

Bergson writes: “In a word, if it is agreed to call every act free which springs from the self and from the self alone, the act which bears the mark of our personality is truly free, for our self alone will lay claim to its paternity.”³⁶ The notion of freedom in Bergson is that, the minimisation of the surface or superficial self, and the integration and assimilation of all data and passion into the dynamics of the whole of the soul, that is, the fundamental self. “It is the whole soul, in fact, which gives rise to the free decision : and the act will be so much the freer the more the dynamic series with which it is connected tends to be the fundamental self.”³⁷ This is the notion of freedom that the physical account of cause and effect that impose mechanical deterministic accounts of spatiality on psychological issues of consciousness miss. In this sense, freedom is simply a fact for Bergson, although degrees of freedom differ as a function of the control of parasitic superficial self upon the whole soul of fundamental self. Suzanne Guerlac write in this regard,

The *Essai*, as we have seen, set out to prove that subjective experience cannot be objectified, that quality (how something feels to us) has nothing in common with quantity (how much there is of it). To this end Bergson cut out a rigid boundary between inside and outside, or between consciousness and things. This enabled the specification of duration, an inner mode of time that has nothing to do with space.³⁸

Bergson writes,

“To sum up ; every demand for explanation in regard to freedom comes back, without our suspecting it, to the following question : " Can time be adequately represented by space ? " To which we answer : Yes, if you are dealing with time flown ; No, if you speak of time flowing. Now, the free act takes place in time which is flowing and not in time which has already flown. Freedom is therefore a fact, and among the facts which we observe there is none clearer. All the difficulties of the problem, and the problem itself, arise from the desire to endow duration with the same attributes as extensity, to interpret a succession by a simultaneity, and to express the idea of freedom in a language into which it is obviously untranslatable.”³⁹

In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson attempts to further complexify his defence of freedom against mechanistic determinism by taking into account the aspect of extensive space and spatial causal interaction in a deeper way than in *Time and Free Will*. Here, the world is imagined as made up of images, and animate bodies are centres of action in this amalgam of images. The point of this speculative move is to disentangle perception from representation by primarily positing it in the context of action. In this way, the activity of representation is freed from the faculty of perception to then be shown to be related to the aspect of memory. Memory is crucially linked to the duration of consciousness, it is not something that is stored or contained in any portion of the brain, but instead exists as the past in general as the pure being of the past in itself. The past is the form under which being is preserved in itself, while the present is the form under which being is implicated in relations outside itself. Each present involve the contraction of the multiple planes and layers of the relaxation and contraction of the past into the passing of the present into the next present. Since there is difference in kind between perception and memory, Bergson argues that there is no pure perception of matter but in fact, the perception of matter gets mixed with the varying degree of contraction of the pure general being of the past that selectively actualises as recollection-image transforming concrete perception. In this manner, the durational aspect of freedom is supplied to pure perception by pure memory in complex living organisms. As Bergson writes, “Freedom

presses its roots into necessity. The mind [*l'esprit*] borrows from matter the perceptions from which it nourishes itself, and returns them in the form of movement, onto which it has impressed [*imprimé*] its freedom"⁴⁰.

In *Creative Evolution*, Bergson stretches the concept of duration and memory to the whole of nature and articulates the force of creativity as *élan vital*, which are the divergent lines of actualisation of the virtual whole, as distinct from the logics of both mechanism and finalism. "the evolution we are speaking of is never achieved by means of association, but by dissociation it never tends toward convergence, but toward divergence of efforts."⁴¹. In the processes of evolutionary creation, the difference in kind between matter and life is central since living organisms are limited in their openness by matter insofar as no limiting function of matter applies to the whole of the virtuality of nature.

The concept of duration as virtual continuous multiplicity develops in *Time and Free Will*, in which the duration of human experience is central and there is peripheral reference to the manner in which things in the outer sense participate in this duration. In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson moves towards a further study and emphasis upon the way in which the things participate in duration, but he does not yet attribute any duration to the things in the material world. It is only in *Duration and Simultaneity* that Bergson directly raises the issue of the problem of one or many durations. As he writes, regarding the single impersonal Time,

Each of these two outer experiences participates in the duration of each of the two consciousnesses. And, since the two consciousnesses have the same rhythm of duration, so must the two experiences. But the two experiences have a part in common. Through this connecting link, then, they are reunited in a single experience, unfolding in a single duration which will be, at will, that of either of the two consciousnesses. Since the same argument can be repeated step by step, a single duration will gather up the events of the whole physical world along its way; and we shall then be able to eliminate the human consciousnesses that we had at first laid out at

wide intervals like so many relays for the motion of our thought; there will be nothing more than an impersonal time in which all things will pass. 47

Bergsonian metaphysics is in this sense overlapping with Husserlian phenomenology in the sense that its constitutive concern is the question of the manner in which the participation between Mode A (Mobility + Relation) and Mode C (Immobility + Relation) participates in Mode B (Mobility + Separation) (duration), but it is different from phenomenology insofar the participatorial ultimacy of Mode B in Bergson stretches to metaphysical significance, in the later works where the whole life of nature becomes a durational movement of creativity.

For Heidegger, the mundane and pragmatic aspect of being-in-the-world is more fundamental than the Cartesian or Husserlian epistemology inquiry regarding the connection of experience and consciousness with the world. The mundane practical activity of Dasein is involved in two forms of care (*sorge*) - being-amid as concern (*besorge*) for dealing with equipment and being-with as solicitude (*Fürsorge*) for other people or 'the they'. In Heidegger, the task of phenomenology as fundamental ontology is the recovery of the nature of Being as opposed to the ontic of beings, that is, the event of unconcealment of the transcendental ground of care and possibility of meaningfulness. In early as well as later Heidegger, the task is to return to the question of the meaning of being which has been forgotten and occluded in the course of western philosophy. Three different conceptions of being in his philosophy are - there are entities that have the tendency to withdraw that get unconcealed (beings), the manner of being of the withdrawing entities that get unconcealed (the being of beings or beingness), and even more fundamentally there is the very fact and event of unconcealment (Being) to human experience, the meaningful presence of things to human concerns.⁴² All these layers of the conception of being are intertwined in that being for which being is a question, namely, Dasein. The temporality of Dasein is rooted in the clearing ("*lichtung*") understood as the primal opening of intelligibility that is the phenomenological

possibility of sensefulness of world of experience, the possibility of meaningfulness of things to human concerns, Dasein is itself the clearing. Heidegger writes, "time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein which understands Being."⁴³

While it is true that *Being and Time* makes significant departure from Husserlian phenomenology in its deeper emphasis on the spatiality and relationality of being-in-the-world (thus metaphysically departing from emphasis on mode B (Mobility + Separation)) in both being-amid in concern with equipment and being-with solicitous with 'the they', but a careful reading shows that the transcendental condition of possibility of this concernful relationality which is the real existential temporal structure of being is in fact the ownmost and non-relational nature of the possibility of the impossibility of the possibility of concernful participation, that is, *being-towards-death*. Thus Heidegger's departure from Husserlian phenomenology is ontological but not metaphysical. As he writes in *Being and Time*,

The ownmost possibility is non-relational... Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the possibility of the they-self. The entity which anticipates its non-relational possibility, is thus forced by that very anticipation into the possibility of taking over from itself its ownmost Being, and doing so of its own accord. The ownmost, non-relational possibility is not to be outstripped.⁴⁴

While time is the continuing concern in Heidegger's approach to the question of being, the question of space and relationality are also raised, for instance, in the discussion on the distinction between ready-to-hand ("*Zuhandenheit*") and present-at-hand ("*Vorhandenheit*") in *Being and Time* and the discussion on 'the fourfold' in the later essays, but as Graham Harman, has noted, the question of space and relationality is always raised from the perspective of the centrality of the temporality of

Dasein, “the lingering priority of Dasein in his philosophy”⁴⁵, and not from the perspective of the mutual relation and interaction between nonhuman entities and processes in nature. Thomas Sheehan writes, “Underlying all of his work is a phenomenological reduction of things to their significance to human beings. *Being and Time* first focused on meaningfulness as the relation between what we encounter in everyday praxis, on the one hand, and our world-shaping interests and concerns on the other.”⁴⁶ But even more fundamentally, the transcendental condition of possibility of this concernful relationality which is the temporal structure of Dasein is the ownmost and non-relational nature of the possibility of the impossibility of the possibility of concernful participation.

What was at stake in early continental philosophy was most fundamentally the syntheticity of experience, but by the middle of twentieth century, this project seemed to have been overdetermined and reached a dead-end and there was felt a need to supplement the question of diachronic synthesis with a robust synchronic analytical framework.

In the subsequent period of continental philosophy, primarily the theoretical movement of structuralism based on Saussurean ideas of the structure of language and symbolic systems in theorists such as Claude Levi-Strauss and Louis Althusser, there is a reaction against the methodological primacy of mode B (Mobility + Separation) and an attempt at redressing this imbalance by foregrounding the socially objective structurality of the participation between Mode A (Mobility + Relation) and Mode B (Mobility + Separation) in mode C (Immobility + Relation) as the transcendental structure of symbolic systems and social practice, which entails, as Miriam Glucksmann has pointed out, “theoretical attention to the internal structure of social organisation and forms of thought, and an attempt to elaborate types of internal construction and interrelation between structural elements (for example contradiction, opposition, dominance, homology, inversion and symmetry).”⁴⁷ Structuralist epistemology entails spatialisation and detemporalisation of the differential systems of social signification and action. “Structure is defined... by the nature

of atomic elements which claim to account both for the formation of wholes and for the variation of their parts.”⁴⁸ “Structuralism cannot be separated from a new transcendental philosophy, in which the sites prevail over whatever occupies them.”⁴⁹ Each element or position in the freeze-frame structure is defined by a role or function on the grid of positions differentially. In a way counter to phenomenology, since not tracing the nuances of experience in the time-consciousness, duration or temporality of being, etc. but in an objective social structure where experiences and roles are distributed and segmented differentially the logic of which is internal to the constitution of the structure. In this context, Althusser develops a structuralism of participation of participation between Modes A (Mobility + Relation) and B (Mobility + Separation) in mode C (Immobility + Separation) on the materialist level in the arena as economic and political organisation, whereas Levi-Strauss develops a structuralism of the participation of participation between Modes A (Mobility + Relation) and B (Mobility + Separation) in mode C (Immobility + Separation) on a psychological or physiological level in the arena as myth-making and kinship organisation. Post-structuralism, in the works of theorists such as Michel Foucault, can be read as an attempt to discursively animate and historicise the statics of the structuralist modelling in showing that the transcendental a priori schematic is itself historical and segmented into different discursive and practical-institutional formations and systems which are in continuous interaction and mutual transformation and translation. In this sense, Foucault problematises the synchronic-symbolic transcendental structuralism of mode C (Immobility + relation) by genealogically and archaeologically tracing the ongoing genesis of the historical a priori in the mutual interactions of Mode A (Mobility + Relation) between discursive formations and practical-institutional structures, the various series of such discourses and practices combine, contest, resonate, complicate to generate meanings and concepts that links the operationality of knowledge and power in the problematic constitution of subjectivity. In this sense, in post-structuralist theorisation, participation of participation between Modes A (Mobility + Rrelation) and B (Mobility + Separation) in mode C

(Immobility + Relation) gets complicated by the dynamics of the participation of the participation between Modes B (Mobility + Separation) and C (Immobility + Relation) in the discursive and practical dynamics of Mode A (Mobility + Relation).

At the origins of the analytical tradition, the formative concern has been detachment of logic and semantics from all dependence on sensible intuitions and the purification of combinatorial mode C (Discontinuity of Process + Continuity of Extension) as the unity of the ideal extension of the linguistic forms and logical categories, that is, participation of participation between Mode A (Mobility + Relation) and Mode B (Mobility + Separation) in Mode C (Immobility + Separation). The task that Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Rudolph Carnap set for themselves is the formal neutralisation of the significance of synthetic a priori propositions and their subsumption into purely logical analytic a priori propositions. In other words, the idea was that if the linguistic forms can be formally schematised then the forms of sensibility can be bypassed through the corresponding spatiality of semantic meaning which is inherent to the organisation of linguistic syntactical forms and a theory of necessary truth deriving from the fusion of mathematical logic and linguistic conventionalism can be articulated. “The analytic tradition is an Austro-German and Anglo-American philosophical movement that got underway in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by promoting semantics and a theory of necessary truth based on mathematical logic together with a thoroughly conventionalistic construal of language to front- and-centre position in philosophy, thereby displacing to the periphery its traditional ontological, epistemological, and psychological concern.”⁵⁰ It is a theory of necessary truth deriving from the interlinking of mathematical logic and linguistic conventionalism. There is commitment to decompositional or atomistic theorizing of language—to the method of breaking something down into its ultimate logical, semantic, epistemic, or ontological parts. Analytic philosophy basically attempts to replace Kant’s doctrine that the basic truths of philosophy and mathematics are synthetic a priori, by a different doctrine that the basic truths of philosophy and mathematics are all analytic in a purely logico-

linguistic sense. Analysis here becomes purification of Mode C (Immobility + relation) as spatiality of understanding, the synthetic a priori be reduced to analytic a priori, as in a fixation of intensionality of logical semantics where meaning or empirical content itself can be schematised into a logical extensional system in language. Thus what was most fundamentally at stake in early analytic philosophy was the meaning of analyticity itself. But by the middle of twentieth century this project of pure analysis had perceivably failed and had to reckon with the inevitability of epistemological indetermination. In the subsequent generation of analytic tradition, primarily in the works of William Quine and Donald Davidson, there is a reaction against the methodological primacy of mode C (Immobility + Relation), and an attempt to reconcile logical-linguistic mode C (Immobility + Relation) with the perspectivism and variability of mode B (Mobility + Separation) (experiential in Davidson, physiological, behaviouristic, and neurological in Quine) to account for a certain indeterminacy in purely logical approach to objective knowledge by introducing experiential and discursive dynamics to the logic of mode C. To this end, Quine proposes a rational epistemology based upon the mutual adjudication of accuracy of conceptual extrapolation from variability of sensible content, while Davidson proposes a rational epistemology based upon intersubjective communication and discursiveness in arbitration of conceptual knowledge and justification. In this sense, the emphasis upon the indeterminacy of translation, and lack of difference between analytic and synthetic statements in the two are best characterised as logical pragmatism. “The label ‘logical pragmatism’ is particularly apt for Quine’s and Davidson’s approach to language. Both combine logical analysis and formal semantics with the pragmatist idea that language is essentially a form of human behaviour.”⁵¹

The second half of twentieth century philosophy has witnessed complex post-continental metaphysical attempts to ontologize and geneticize transcendental philosophy in the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou. It is only with these thinkers that metaphysics begins to make a return in western philosophy in the post-war period. Deleuze in the guise of new empiricism makes

the differential the noumenon as the limit of representation, a problematic transcendental virtual field populated with singularities and events that constitute not merely conditions of possible but genesis of real experience, whereas Badiou in the guise of new rationalism tries to stretch set-theoretical axiomatic thinking to the dialectical logic of event as stretching formalisation to the point of undecidability, and develops an account of the constitution of the subject as a function of fidelity to the event (an intellectual showdown in one sense immanent to the dense historical conflict between French philosophy of experience and philosophy of concept). Both are trying to objectivise a genetic notion of the transcendental.

Deleuze developed a metaphysics in which difference is more fundamental than identity and repetition of variation over sameness. The transcendental cannot be drawn in the image of the empirical but is different in kind, since it is not simply the conditions of possibility of experience or objects of experience but the conditions of the genesis of real experience. Transcendental is made up of pre-individual singularities and virtual multiplicities and the actualisation of qualities and sense of experience is the outcome of interaction between differentiating intensive magnitudes affecting sensibility and the modes of passive temporal synthesis of experience that are not rooted in subjectivity but in fact constitutive of subjectivity, in this sense non-representational, beyond the model of classical logic, that remains within representation and the subject-predicate structure of judgement. “an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field, which does not resemble the corresponding empirical fields... This field can not be determined as that of a consciousness”.⁵² For Deleuze, while Kant to some extent achieved desubstantialisation of the subject departing from the statics of the Cogito, the unity of apperception serving as the synthetical unity of all intuitions in forms of space and time as well the schematism of principles and analogies of experience and ultimately of the synthesis of concepts of the understanding with the sensible datum implies that Kant is relying upon an active constitutive notion of subjectivity, even though this constitutiveness is not that of substantiality but of the

modes of time-determination. For Deleuze, the organisation and sense of experience is not a function of pre-given schemata that makes objects of experience correspond to the temporal and conceptual principles inherent in subjectivity but instead phases of individuation and actualisation of the transcendental or virtual as the genetic field of problematic and problematising ideas as regulative vectors of the organisation of infinitesimal intensive magnitudes in the passive constitution of qualities and sense of real experience. The virtual is a kind of Bergsonian pure field of free-flowing differential relations, and the ethical, political and aesthetic horizon of Deleuzian metaphysics is in a sense the freeing of the power of the virtual from all its reductions to actuality, which is generally expressed in the form of emphasis upon the notion of *counter-actualisation* over that of the notion of actualisation, but more specifically, as difference in *Difference and Repetition*, pure event in *Logic of Sense*, as desiring-production in *Anti-Oedipus* and as the rhizome or lines-of-flight (or the question of making oneself into a body without organs) in *A Thousand Plateaus*. More than process of actualisation, it is the process of counter-actualisation that has ethical, aesthetic and political priority in Deleuzian-Guattarian metaphysics. As Deleuze writes in the *Dialogues*, “the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under which something new is produced (*creativity*).”⁵³ Actualisation in this philosophy has a connotation of the limitation or reduction of the power of the virtual which is the real source of intensity and richness of experience. As Deleuze writes in *The Logic of Sense*,

there is the future and the past of the event considered in itself, sidestepping each present, being free of the limitations of a state of affairs, impersonal and pre-individual, neutral, neither general nor particular, *eventum tantum*. ... It has no other present than that of the mobile instant which represents it, always divided into past-future, and forming what must be called the counter-actualization.⁵⁴

The three passive synthesis of time (and for that matter, the three passive synthesis of space) as discussed in *Difference and Repetition*, which are a response to Kant's discussion on the three modes of time-determination, are significantly linked to the three synthesis as discussed in *Anti-Oedipus*. Deleuze interprets the three Kantian modes of time-determination, namely, persistence, succession and coexistence as dependent upon the substructure of the unity of subjective consciousness, but I think there is a way to interpret the modes of time-determination as more fundamental and complex than unity of apperception, and a kind of ontological characterisation of the synthetical aspect of experience as such, especially when the three modes of time-determination as discussed in *Critique of Pure Reason* are seen in light of the earlier pre-critical metaphysical discussion in the *Inaugural Dissertation*. The first synthesis of time in *Difference and Repetition* discusses quality of time as contemplation that involves anticipation and retentions which constitute contraction of habit passively and not actively by the subject. The first synthesis itself is premised upon the second synthesis which shows the manner in which pure past in itself which is the highest degree of relaxation of the past is requisite for the present to make selections from all the different layers of the past at varied degrees of contraction and relaxation. The first synthesis of the successive structure of contraction of habit and the second synthesis of the co-existent structure of memory are more fundamentally grounded or ungrounded in the third synthesis which is the pure and empty form of time, which is the virtual or genetic transcendental, in which time is not hinged by any function of measurement of substantial movement. The connective synthesis of production in *Anti-Oedipus*, is the multiple, heterogeneous, and continual instinctual or habitual connections that desiring-production makes in a polymorphous process. The counter force to the connective production of desire is the force of anti-production, that records the connections on a recording-surface which is the body-without-organs and in this introduces a degree of dynamism, variation and improvisation to the more mechanical linear process of connective synthesis. The disjunctive synthesis of anti-production in the alternating rhythms of attraction and repulsion makes a tabula

rasa on which different satisfactions are recorded synchronically and multiply which can then be reconnected in free association in repetition. The conjunctive synthesis of consumption-consummation is the manner in which through the interplay of the attractions and repulsions recorded on the body-without-organs and the process of desiring-production, different subjectivity emerge between the extreme of connective synthesis in mechanical repetition and the extreme of disjunctive synthesis in catatonic withdrawal. The subject emerges only as an after-effect of the selections made by desire among various disjunctive and connective syntheses, not as the agent of selection. Deleuze and Guattari argue that there is deterritorialisation in the capitalist axiomatisation which is reabsorbed into deterritorialisation, and the political, aesthetic and ethical injunctive is a kind of free form flow of the conjunctive synthesis through which nomadic subjectivities as continually deterritorialising lines-of-flight can flower.

In this sense, Deleuzian metaphysics is an attempt to articulate the manner in which participation between mode B (Mobility + Separation) (second synthesis of memory) and mode C (Immobility + Relation) (first synthesis of habit) participates in mode A (Mobility + Relation) (third synthesis of pure virtuality).

The Deleuze-Guattarian critique of capitalist axiomatisation is that it frees the movement of desire from codes, which is connected to the moral and political horizon of virtualisation or counter-actualisation, only to reterritorialise within the self-valorising motion of capital. I think the deeper point is that capitalist regime keeps the subject fluctuating between separative and connective anxieties pertaining to the movement of desire, that is, vacillating between anxieties regarding realisation and potentialisation, and does not let *modal anxiety* of projective care develop, that is, anxiety regarding the mutual projective durational complementation between potentialisation and realisation. In Deleuzian metaphysics, experience involves a continuous plunging into novelty, into new connections or new disjunctions, into new vectors and becomings, in the absence of which experience seems to fall into some kind of impoverishment or

diminishment. It is unclear where the space for projective composition from the point of view of care is in the metaphysics of Deleuze or Deleuze and Guattari, since it morally and political and aesthetically emphasises novelty and freshness and devalues endurance or enduration, which gets related to the the schemas of regimentation, while the opening of the third synthesis of consumption-consummation is imagined as dynamic heterogenous improvisatory weaving of disjunction and conjunction as intensification of body-without-organs achieved on the plane of the movement of desire itself as the radical operator of counter-actualisation. But I argue that it is in the interaction between desire, sensitivity and thought that the projective compositional weaving of importance and care develops, not in a purely sensuous and affective manner, or purely on the plane of the movement of desire, but in the interaction between the affective and sensory and the ideational or conceptual (although the genesis of care is still passive) (in this sense care is both nonaesthetic and nonconceptual) which adds enduration and projectiveness to free composition.

For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is the primary concept, as in desire is the primary force of experience and thus should be the central concept of experiential philosophy or metaphysics. The horizon is in many ways the freeing of desire against what is disparagingly termed asceticism. I disagree with this fundamental idea and I will argue that care is the primary motive force of experience, and I will argue for the value of sublimation of instantaneous desire in projective work of composition and constructive and durational forms of care is individually and socially valuable, which I relate more fundamentally to the constitution of care and less fundamentally to the flows of desire. In chapter 2 (sections 7, 8), I will argue why durational projective care more fundamental than momentary desire. I think this is the reason sometimes their work ends up mirroring a kind of market liberalism is because of the ontological primacy of desire over care and the overemphasis on freshness at the expense of any possible value of enduration.

Badiou in the earlier part of his work argues for the primacy of Althusserian materialist approach over the Quinean and Carnapian idealist approaches to logic of mode C (Immobility +

Relation/ Discontinuity of Process + Continuity of Extension) to develop a set-theoretical axiomatic of pure inconsistency of multiples, and in the later work attempts to reconcile mathematics as ontology of asubjective pure being with the world-transcendental consistency conditioning variable degrees of appearance or intensities of existence in the logic of mode A (Mobility + Relation/ Continuity of Process + Continuity of Extension). The event in this context is what makes appear maximally the in-existent of a situation and ushers in new possibilities of nonconceptual formalisation. But Badiou's philosophical system suffers from an unbridgeable gap between inconsistency of pure being and consistency of being-there or between objective phenomenology (participation between mode B (Mobility + Separation) and mode C (Immobility + Relation) participates in mode A (Mobility + Relation)) and mathematics as ontology (participation between mode A (Mobility + Relation) and mode B (Mobility + Separation) participates in mode C (Immobility + Relation)) which is the gap of compositional pattern of the participation between mode A (Mobility + Relation) and mode C (Immobility + Relation) participates in mode B (Mobility + Separation).

In *Being and Event*, the first part of the trilogy, Badiou uses the set-theoretic framework to develop a concept of being as pure multiple without-One, that is, multiplicity only composed of multiplicity and not of stable unities. A situation is what supplies consistency of presentation of the inconsistent multiple by rendering them count-as-one. A situation is said to be "any consistent presented multiplicity, thus: a multiple, and a regime of the count-as-one, or structure. Badiou argues that being as such is infinite, inconsistent, and non-atomic; unity and finitude are only attributable to it presentationally through the operation of the 'count-as-one'. The 'encyclopedia' of the situation organises the elements and units of a situation that constitute the knowledge of the state of a situation in the framework of count-as-one. This is what is the aspect of mode D (Immobility + Relation). Now the truth-event is when that which does not exist in presentation and what constitutes the knowledge paradigm of the situation comes forth. Truth for Badiou is a kind of

happening, an event, a mathematical singularity of generic multiplicity that creates a rupture or veridical undecidability and indiscernability in the situational consistency. A *generic multiplicity* is a multiplicity that cannot be covered over by any of the predicates available in the language of the world in which it appears as opposed to an ordinary multiplicity that is predicable within the encyclopaedic knowledge paradigm of the situation. But the truth-event solicits a certain intervention in the indiscernability by the decision of forcing which is the process of subjectivation. The gatekeepers of the situation tend to deny the singularity of the event or to minimize its significance. And because events are intrinsically vanishing, appearing only almost immediately to disappear, to hold fast to them requires a subjective act of persistence, or fidelity. The subject in this sense is constituted in the decision to be faithful or have fidelity to the indiscernability of the infinite truth-event. This is the mode A (Mobility + Relation). Truths are eternal only because they are historical. In the second part of the trilogy, *Logics of Worlds*, Badiou deploys the mathematico-logical approach formalized by category theory to analyse the contexts of the logical or objective-phenomenological appearance of truths in particular worlds. Thus while the first is theory of being as “being as multiplicity without-One”, the second is theory of appearance, “appearing in the world as intensity of existence.” Finites Participation in the infinite “attributes of the absolute”, distinguish evental changes from simple temporal modifications. The intensity of the appearance of a being in a world is what Badiou calls *existence*. The same being exists in a more or less intense way as a function of the contexts where it appears. The major characteristic of the emergence of an event in a world: to make appear maximally the in-existent of a situation. In particular worlds at specific historical moments, while remaining “eternal,” retaining their potential to re-emerge in any world and at any time. In *Logics of Worlds*, there is a distinction between the reactionary subject and obscure subject in relation to the truth-event. In the third part of the trilogy, *Immanence of Truths*, Badiou attempts to show that while there is generic universality to truths and that truths singularly appear in particular historical worlds, there is an absoluteness to truth apart from its universality and

singularity. In this context, he argues that potentially novel infinities of the truth-event become oppressed by the mechanism of covering-over into finitude. He discusses four kinds of infinity, a hierarchy of infinity - inaccessibility, compactness, ultrafilter, proximate to the absolute. A “work” undertaken with finite materials in a specific world can produce a truth that is not only universal in applying to everybody and every situation but also timelessly absolute in its validity. A work is anything that, in touching an attribute of the absolute, is free from the power of covering-over operations. What “infinetizes” and thus absolutizes a work of truth that in its real existence is at once finite, singular (existing), and universal (generic) is its mediated link with the absolute. This mediation is assured by one of the attributes in which really-existing works in particular worlds may “participate”. The infinities are mode C (Immobility + Relation), the post-evental work of truth is A (Mobility + Relation) and absolute here is the mirroring of mode C and mode A. As Badiou writes, “we cannot separate the universality of truths, established in *Being and Event*, from their singularity, the thought of which is worked out in *Logics of Worlds*, and from their absoluteness, reflected in *The Immanence of Truths*.”⁵⁵ Thus each work in the trilogy gives an inflected perspective on the mode C (Immobility + Relation) and Mode A (Mobility + Relation), which is the truth-event and the genesis of the finite subject in relation to the infinite truth-event, from the perspective of universality of truth, singularity of truths and absoluteness of truths respectively. But the mode B (Mobility + Separation) is missing in Badiouian systematic metaphysics of the trilogy.



This compressed discussion has been a propaedeutic of how the major strains of continental, analytic and contemporary philosophy only partially and selectively addressed the interrelated complexity of the infinite compositional modes. The purpose has been to point out that the


importance and originality of Whitehead and Hegel's philosophy is how they explain adequately and coherently the interconnectedness and mutual implication between the three universal compositional modes of tension and that they are in fact different yet inseparable moments or phases of the same generic process viewed from different angles.

Even before Whitehead fleshed out his metaphysical system in *Process and Reality*, he articulated this basic insight in more intuitive and rudimentary form in *Science and the Modern World* -

In outline, my procedure is to start from the analysis of the status of space and of time, or in modern phraseology, the status of space-time. There are two characters of either. Things are separated by space, and are separated by time: but they are also together in space, and together in time, even if they be not contemporaneous. I will call these characters the '*separative*' and the '*prehensive*' characters of space-time. There is yet a third character of space-time. Everything which is in space receives a definite limitation of some sort, so that in a sense it has just that shape which it does have and no other, also in some sense it is just in this place and in no other. Analogously for time, a thing endures during a certain period, and through no other period. I will call this the '*modal*' character of space-time. It is evident that the modal character taken by itself gives rise to the idea of simple location. But it must be conjoined with the separative and prehensive characters.⁵⁶

This passage can be misleading, because insofar as Whitehead came to argue that the categories of space and time are abstractions from the more primordial reality of the passage and extension of occasions, the separative, prehensive or connective and modal characters are of the processuality and extensionality of occasions. In the *Modes of Thought*, he writes with economical clarity characteristic of British philosophy that "The nature of any type of existence can only be explained by reference to its implication in creative activity, essentially involving three factors: namely, data, process with its form relevant to these data, and issue into datum for further process - data, process, issue."⁵⁷ In light of these two passages, I will say that the way in which Whitehead articulated the universal characters of occasions are related to the three universal modes of tension we have discussed - *connective data relates to the combinatorial mode A (Mobility + Relation)*, *modal*

process relates to combinatorial mode B (Mobility + Separation), separative issue relates to combinatorial mode C (Immobility + Relation) (Fig. 1). These phases are threaded through a kind of atemporal and non-linear relationship between abstraction and synthesis in Whitehead, where abstraction is conditioned by modes of synthetical unity and synthesis itself is conditioned by forms of abstraction (Fig. 1). Synthesis is a reference to the aspect of activity or experience (ethology) while abstraction is a reference to the aspect of multiplicity of activity or experience (ecology). By reason of the mergence between facticity and factoriality in the dipolarity of fact and value, which is to say that ecology is factor in the fact of ethology and ethology is a factor in the fact of ecology, the references of abstraction and synthesis also tend to overlap and plait. This atemporal mergence is what I am terming *absynthesis*. When we say something is abstract, we mean that it lies in between that which makes synthesis possible differently. When we say something is synthetical, we mean that it has reference to the quality of determinability of operational unity. In other words, if by synthetical we mean the quality of experience, by abstract we mean something in between qualities of experience or prior to quality of experience. The whole nature of relation between activity and relation thus shows itself as relation between synthesis and abstraction. Mode A (Mobility + Relation) is the ingression and prehension of factors in the environment into the formation of an actual occasion (data); mode B (Mobility + Separation) is the phase in which the prehensions are further synthesised through conceptual reversion (process); and mode C (Immobility + Relation) is the final phase of the concrescence (issue). The actual is dipolar in process and extension or potentiality and reality but this dipolarity is integrated through infinite modes of absynthesis.



1. Modes of Absynthesis in Whiteheadian Metaphysics

The merely real in this context is actuality in attainment, basically everything in the act, the entirety of the process of concrecence. Concrecence is nothing other than the real internal constitution of an actual occasion which on its part is nothing other than the real unity of the concrecent process in question. The process of concrecence can be divided into three phases - the responsive phase, the supplemental phase, and the satisfaction. The first phase is that of pure reception of the actual world in the guise of objective datums in subjective form. In the second phase, the different feelings are further integrated in light of a private ideal; this is the incoming of appetite and propositional unity. The final phase involves the growth of propositional unity into one real and complex unity of feeling when all indetermination finally evaporates. Realisation of the conceptual valuation of potential ingression of eternal objects in the mode of propositional conceptual feeling is the newly

created fact in the universe. This defines the problematic of final causation. For the philosophy of organism, it is only an adequate balance between efficient and final causation that provides a complete account of the world as ongoing activity, since determination involves both 'definiteness' as well as 'position'.

Hegel's attempt to integrate Modes A, B and C into a coherent dynamic metaphysical frameworks is along with Kant the highest moment of western speculation, when the western episteme stretches itself as far away from itself as it is able to, in this, Hegelian philosophy is at the same time the most parochial and the least parochial moment of western thought. While the point of departure of Whitehead's philosophy is the primacy of the transcendental aesthetic over the transcendental analytic in the Kantian architectonic, the point of departure for Hegelian metaphysics is the epistemological foregrounding of the transcendental dialectic over both the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental analytic. One reason why a transcendental analytic cannot be the point of departure for Hegelian philosophy and only the transcendental dialectic can be its point of departure is because the unity between dialectic of logic and the dialectic of world history has to be *geohistoriosophically* explanatory of the sublation of the respective inadequacies and limited universality of Chinese and Indian metaphysical discussion in the culmination of western metaphysical discussion in Absolute Knowing. In Plato and Kant, there is a fundamental distinction made between a transcendental or ideal and empirical or phenomenal, and then the question is not only what third aspect mediates the distinction, but rather what is ground of the mediation of distinction, or the ultimate condition of mediation, in other words, what does participation participate in. One way to understand Hegel's unique intervention in the tradition is that he infinitises the entire question of mediation by animating not only the poles of mediation, but the unity and form of mediation itself, to the point where a pure yet reflective mediateness realises its complete and absolute nature as pure negativity. Hegel considers Kant's treatment of dialectical reason as one of his greatest achievements since Kant considered dialectical reason a necessary

though antinomic vocation of theoretical reason, and thus accorded place to dialectics in epistemology. For Whitehead, metaphysics must begin from the empirical facts of experience, and there is a rational and empirical side to the philosophy of organism. While Hegel begins from the datum of sensibility in the *Phenomenology of Experience*, in the midst of consciousness and its relationship with the sense of oppositional exteriority, the entire journey precisely entails the sublation of this opposition between subject and object towards the absolute knowing which is pure speculative thinking free from any reference to sensible intuition and externality, in the sense that the matter of absolute knowing is internal to thought itself as the determinateness of negation or notion of the notion which is the life of the concrete universal. Already in his first published text *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* (1801), Hegel had attempted to resolve the antinomies between deficiency of subjective experience in objective intellectual intuition in Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* and the deficiency of objectivity in Fichte's subjective intellectual intuition by proposing a fourfold conceptualisation of a speculative identity between a necessary and original diremption between the subjective aspect of self-consciousness or the *subjective subject-object* and the objective aspect of nature or the *objective subject-object*. As he writes,

For absolute identity to be the principle of an entire system it is necessary that *both* subject and object be posited as Subject-Object. In Fichte's system identity constitutes itself only as subjective Subject-Object. [But] this subjective Subject-Object needs an objective Subject-Object to complete it, so that the Absolute presents itself in each of the two Subject-Objects, and finds itself perfected only in both together as the highest synthesis that nullifies both insofar as they are opposed. As their point of absolute indifference, the Absolute encloses both, gives birth to both and is born of both.⁵⁸

Even though, in the later part of his career Hegel significantly develops and departs from this early work, the question of the speculative identity of the fourfold diremption is a continuing theme across both *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*. The system of reflection for Hegel becomes a questioning not only of the finite categories or principles of reasoning but in fact of all finite approaches to philosophy as stages or phases of consciousness. In the later works, Hegel rehearses the tension between two fundamental aspects - that of self-reference and opposition. But apart from this first-order otherness, there is a second-order otherness which is that of the negation of negation, that is the source of determinateness. As Dieter Henrich writes,

In his analysis, Hegel conceives of life as a structure of two elements: the first is a self-referential totality that disallows any particular element that is not fully incorporated into it; the second both requires and, according to Hegel, generates individual lives. These elements exclude one another, but they are also internally organized wholes. And they are capable of reciprocal surrender to each other. The moral aspect is this reciprocal surrendering in which individual lives make exchanges and amalgamations.⁵⁹

In the earlier period, he is experimenting with concepts of love and life as the ultimate idea of speculative identity between self-reference and opposition. But in the mature works, negation becomes the central concept that Hegel uses to demonstrate the unity of self-reference or the particularity of consciousness and opposition or the generality of the manifold. But for negation to be self-referential, there must be a negation of negation itself, in other words, the self-elimination of negation implies the self-reference of negation. But dialectically, this activity is occurring in mutuality amidst opposition, thus the mutuality of autonomous negation of negation leads to determinateness, which is the structure of the concrete universality of the Notion in Hegel's philosophy. The *Phenomenology* describes the different shapes of consciousness, both in the context of sensibility and perception, at a stage where there is an opposition and separation between

consciousness and the sensible objects of an external reality, and culminates in absolute knowing when this opposition has become sublated in the Notion of the Notion. Absolute knowing is the point of departure of the *Greater Logic*, which is a transcendental survey of all possible approaches to speculative reasoning, free of the limiting conditions of sensibility and understanding, the matter of which is internal to pure speculative conceptual thought itself, that is the negation of negation or determinateness of negation. Logic is historical insofar as it is the entire dialectical process of negation of negation and determinateness in which abstract universality becomes concrete universality which is the Notion of the Notion. Apart from this historicisation of logic, what is perhaps Hegel's greatest achievement in western philosophy is how he interrelates logical abstraction with real abstraction, in the sense that it is in fact in its social and political and economic institutions that society achieves the sublation in the opposition between individuality and community, and acquires universal consistency of abstract sociality in these real abstractions.

The concrete person, who as a particular person is his own end, is, as a totality of needs and a mixture of caprice and natural necessity, one principle of civil society. But the particular person is essentially so related to other particular persons that each asserts himself and finds satisfaction by means of the others, and at the same time simply by means of the form of universality, the second principle here.⁶⁰

In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel shows that the institutions of the modern state, market exchange and civil society collectively express the structure of concrete universality, and in this sense his philosophy must be viewed as the metaphysical rationalisation of capitalist-liberal modernity and unity of the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity. As Roberto Finelli has written in this regard,

This logic rests on the becoming a historical institution and an element of reality of that which, for Hegel, is the most fundamental characteristic of intellectual activity: abstraction. Modern socialisation, for him, is effectively synonymous with abstraction....Logical-intellectual abstraction, the outcome of a merely mental generalisation of the world of the multiple and the particular, must become for Hegel a real abstraction or, in other words, one that constructs and organises reality independently of thinking and the abstraction of the individual. ⁶¹

Whitehead prioritises the transcendental aesthetic over the logic, whereas Hegel foregrounds the transcendental dialectic over both the aesthetic and the analytic. But both thinkers are in a fundamental sense closer to Kant's account of reflective judgement in the third critique, but both want to carry out the activity and faculty of reflection judgment by turning it into constitutive or determining judgment. The metaphysical systems of both Whitehead and Hegel are concerned with the evolutionary or historical process in which abstract potentiality gains concreteness. Thus while there is an ancestry of concreteness or reality in both the systems, there is no ancestry of potentiality or abstractness itself which is metaphysically presupposed either as form of creativity or god or spirit. In Hegel there is only ancestry of concreteness but not of abstractness itself, there is end of history in the Notion of the Notion, that is, concrete universality, when pure abstract universality achieves its own nature in reflectiveness as concreteness, which is the journey of the shapes of consciousness and its relations to objects, universal determinately negates the individual, in the sense that the individual is part of its nature, but in this acquires a complete in-itself, in the same way as the manifold of individuals acquire universality via mutual determinate negation, thus there is ancestry of the absolute awakening as to its own nature of pure potentiality within the matter of pure speculative thought, but not ancestry of potentiality as such. "It is only an inference from the history of the World, that its development has been a rational process; that the history in question has constituted the rational necessary course of the World-Spirit - that Spirit whose nature is always one and the same but which unfolds this its one nature in the phenomena of

the World's existence."⁶² We begin from unreflective love and arrive at reflective love, but there is gain of ancestry no loss, thus no contingency, a unidirectional evolutionary process. Thus in both Whitehead and Hegel there is ancestry of the concreteness of actuality, but not of abstractness itself, and thus there is no real contingency and practise at the heart of actuality. This is where Marx comes in.

Hegel and Whitehead show in their unique ways all three modes of tension, that is, how participation between Mode A and Mode B participate in Mode C, how participation between Mode A and Mode C participate in Mode B and how participation between Mode B and Mode C participate in Mode B. But they reduce, in their respective metaphysics, this *participatorial triangularisation of triconditionality* to the incompositionality of mode D (Whitehead's reduction of compositionality to incompositionality to be discussed extensively in section 1.2.3). The significance of Marx's philosophy is that he integrates the modes of tension without reducing this systematisation to the incompositionality of mode D (Immobility + Separation), insofar as he sets the avoidance of the immobilism, eternism and substantiality of incompositionality the most fundamental goal of critical thinking, but in this regard the systematisation of tensionality is strictly non-metaphysical. It is only in the radical pragmatism of Marx that a genuine desubstantialisation of activity and historicity of eternity itself is achieved, and social experience comes out in its full reality and making, that is, nonrational contingency unsubsumed into formal unity of sufficiency of reason, most concrete conception of practice, that is, real activity, sensuous as well as supersensuous. But the price Marx pays for freeing philosophy from incompositionality is although not a disavowal but a practical indifference and relative aversion towards the whole question of philosophy of nature and the identification of all speculative thinking with dogmatism. But in the fourth section of this chapter (1.2.4), I will try to show from within the hidden thematic unity between the thought of early and late Marx that there is an irreplaceable aspect of universalistic

communication in social life that is neither necessarily dogmatic nor idealistic that Marx himself prefigures and yet underestimates.

1.2.3.Motive Force in Nature

Aristotle argued that Plato focused solely on the aspects of formal and material causation but lacked an account of both efficient and final causation. But indeed, as has been noted by Lloyd Gerson, the first principle of the One or the form of the good that is the unity of the mutual independence of the forms and the second principle of ‘the indefinite dyad’ are collectively to be seen both as the efficient cause as well as the final cause of the generation of the sensible reality in Platonic metaphysics. While it is true that the problematic regarding the mutuality or unidirectionality of participation or partaking between the different forms and empirical reality is at the heart of Platonism, the more fundamental concern or idea is that of problematic of participation of participation, in other words, what does participation participate in? The form of the good or the principal of the One is then to be understood as the solution to this issue. The two primary strains of Aristotelian philosophy are - one, to carve out an autonomous substantiality and formality of being in the empirical world, which is termed physics or the science of being, and two, to justify the priority of actuality over potentiality in the everlastingness of universal activity, which is termed theology or metaphysics. Aristotle criticises the cosmology of the creation of the cosmos by the demiurge in *Timaeus* and instead postulates the eternity of motion which ultimately gets substantialised in the concept of the prime unmoved mover in *Metaphysics, Lambda*. “There must then be a principle of such a kind that its substance is activity. Ergo, these substances must be without matter. For their eternity is a condition on that of anything else. They, then, must be

actuality.”⁶³ “there is a mover which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.”⁶⁴ The prime unmoved mover is for Aristotle actuality of thought, or thinking of thinking, and it is in this sense that it is the pure form of activity, “that coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually is the closest approximation to eternal being.”⁶⁵ This makes the prime mover the ultimate object of desire and thought for the entities and organisms of the empirical world which are continually striving towards eternity, although uniquely. As Jiyuan Yu writes

Aristotle makes it clear that the introduction of the Prime Mover is to account for the everlastingness of motion. Taken together, we can infer that the formal cause and the Prime Mover are causes at different levels, and they have different explanatory forces. The formal cause accounts for the generation and function of each particular natural substance. The Prime Mover does not provide a blueprint for the development and function of each thing. ⁶⁶

The original intervention of Aristotle in this regard is that he partly disentangles efficient causation from the One and renders it entirely spatiotemporal, although, as Yitzhak Melamed has noted, substance is independent not yet in terms of causation as in Cartesianism but primarily in terms of predication.⁶⁷ For Aristotle, whatever moves and can be moved is natural substance, and all substances are engaged in natural teleology - human activity and divine activity are involved in thoughtful teleology while the inanimate physical world is involved in unthoughtful teleology. This is the side of naturalism of Aristotelian metaphysics in comparison to Platonic idealism. But it is important to note that Aristotle makes only temporal efficient cause function of physical interactions between substances, the temporality of motion is a function of interaction between sensible and perishable substances, but the eternal productive as well as teleological cause of the eternity of motion is the eternal substance of the prime unmoved mover. This difference gets articulated in medieval Aristotelianism as the difference between primary and secondary causality. Plato makes efficient cause subject to transcendent demiurge, but for Aristotle the efficient cause

are natural substances themselves in temporal and accidental physical world. But the eternal substance of prime unmoved mover is the productive cause of the eternity of motion, but final cause for both Plato and Aristotle is transcendent. Prime mover is the unmoved mover and physical motion are moved movers. Moreover Aristotle retains the transcendence of final causation in the idea of the unmoved mover as thinking of thinking, which is the eternal object of love and thought for natural teleological processes.

Thus for both Plato and Aristotle, the question of participation between the ideal and the material is central to the metaphysics, but I argue that the more fundamental and deeper issue is that of participation of participation, what is the nature of participation of participation? That is, what does participation participate in? Now even though the speculative instinct in Platonism of holding together unity and duality is rhythmically potent, but their bundling into the ultimate efficient cause and the resultant *unidirectionality of participation* is tantamount to substantialisation which paradoxically Neoplatonists such as Plotinus and Proclus seem to charge Aristotle with. Aristotle is vaguely critical of metaphysical unidirectionality of participation in terms of temporal efficiency but clearly posits the same in terms of eternal efficiency and teleology. In Plato's metaphysics, potentiality as formal eternity has efficient as well as teleological metaphysical priority over sensuous actuality while in Aristotelian metaphysics, actuality as unmoved eternity has teleological and eternal if not temporal efficient metaphysical priority over dynamic sensuous potentiality. Thus Platonism makes the forms or ideas primary and the rest of his philosophy is an attempt to reconcile this primacy with spatiotemporal sensuousness. Aristotelianism makes actuality as eternity primary and the rest of his philosophy is an attempt to reconcile this with the aspect of potentiality as changing spatiotemporality. The metaphysical construction of the impetus of activity must be explanatory of both the eternity of motion as well the historicity or temporality of motion, but the nature of activity cannot be substantialised into incompositionality, but must precisely be the object of demonstration in the very nature of motive force.

The reason why Cartesian occasionalism simultaneously marks the beginning of modern western philosophy but also bears the brunt of some of the harshest criticisms of having led western thought astray is that he is the first thinker to develop the logics, although mutually exclusively, of both the physical or extensional side of reality and the ideal or intensional side to very high degree and depth, but in doing so, he carves an abyss of interaction between extended substance (*res extensa*) and thinking substance (*res cogitans*) and is not able to show the possibility of participation between the two convincingly. Descartes claims that there is only a distinction of reason between a substance and its principal attribute, and that we cannot have a clear idea of a substance apart from its principal attribute. Descartes famously rejects teleological explanation in natural philosophy, asserting that "That we must not examine the final causes of created things, but rather their efficient causes. And so, finally, concerning natural things, we shall not undertake any reasonings from the end which God or nature set Himself in creating these things, (and we shall entirely reject from our Philosophy the search for final causes)"⁶⁸ Interestingly, Descartes transposes the entire drama of Neoplatonism and Aristotelian 'thought thinking itself' as substance of pure activity to human consciousness in the dialectic of western philosophy. Thus the schema of the ontological and metaphysical prioritisation of individuality over and above relationality is fully expressed in the Cogito. The great metaphysical expression of modern liberal individualism, although still grounded in the goodness of God's will, a strain of thought that in a sense culminates in Kant's notion of the unity of apperception as the unity of experience completely secularised from any function of the unity of God's will or reason. Descartes individuates in consciousness the entire problematic of the Aristotelian God while mathematising and mechanising the dynamics of physical interaction between bodies. Descartes replaces the multiplicity of Aristotelian substances, each with its own form and distinct characteristic behaviour, with one kind of body which fills the entire universe and behaves everywhere in accordance with the same mechanical laws. He distinguishes between two sorts of efficient causes, a *causa secundum fieri*, a cause of becoming, and a *causa*

secundum esse, a cause of being, which is related to the difference between primary and secondary causality. As Daniel Garber notes, "While finite things may be able to stand as the efficient causes *secundum fieri* of things in the world, only God can stand as their cause *secundum esse*." ⁶⁹ Thus he maximises the mutually independent logics of both Mode B (Mobility + Separation) and Mode C (Immobility + Relation) but there is severance between the world of extension or bodies and the world of intension or minds, which is of the conflict between the primacy of thought over pure physics or that of physical mechanism over thought. Nicolas Malebranche argues that each time body and body, body and mind, or mind and mind connect, its via God. Descartes bifurcates reality into thinking and extended substance but to unite the two Descartes does not rely on God like Malebranche but still incoherently and unconvincingly maintains that mind and body can interact. Descartes categorically denies teleological explanation and final causation in physical dynamics of motion, space, matter, but retains divine teleology, but god is indifferent to any end or good and has an indifferent selection process and incomprehensible to human understanding, that is, "incomprehensible power of God". Leibniz acknowledges that the teleological principle is beyond human understanding but he critiques the idea that there is randomness in divine selection and that god does not act according to goodness and beauty. The part of Cartesian thought where he develops the distinction and tension between the mental and physical without prioritising one over another, even though lacking an account of interaction or participation, are most interesting and potent. "There is thus a kind of tension between Cartesian science, which all but dispenses with substance, and Cartesian metaphysics, to which the notion is integral."⁷⁰ Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia is the one to stress problem of interaction and philosophical dualism in Cartesian philosophy. Descartes' formulations of the idea that everything must have a cause or reason has the notion that ideas should be clear and distinct but not necessarily sufficient. The requirement of sufficiency, over and above clarity and distinctness, is introduced by Spinoza and Leibniz.

For Spinoza, God is the efficient cause of all things, because god or nature is the only substance which is self-caused and self-conceived (We move from multiplicity of Aristotelian substances to duality of Cartesian substances to monism of Spinozist substance). For Descartes, a substance must be independent of all other things, but a non-self-caused thing that depends on its existence on god counts as substance. Spinoza in this light modifies the Cartesian notion of substance and considers only that which is self-caused as substance, therefore there is only one substance, which is god or nature. For both Descartes and Spinoza, the distinction between substance and attributes is a distinction of reason, while the distinction between attributes is a real distinction in Spinoza whereas in Descartes the difference between substances is a real distinction. For Spinoza the difference between modes is a modal distinction. The doctrine of parallelism is that the order and connection between things is the same as the order and connection between ideas. In other words, there are two separate streams of causation which are the two attributes of thinking and extension but there is parallelism of the order of causation in the two separate streams.

Spinoza allows for teleology in human action and in the physical nonhuman world but he denied teleology in divine action. While in Leibnizian metaphysics, the world that god creates is the best of all possible worlds, for Spinoza the world that god creates is the only possible world out of rational necessity. “Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than they have been produced”⁷¹. In a paradoxical sense, God does not have free will since it can only act according to necessity of its own nature, but God is purely free in the sense that as self-caused substance it is only subject to the necessity of its own nature and free of the necessities of attributes and modes. Therefore the notion of freedom in Spinoza essentially entails being subject to only immanent internal necessity and independent of transcendent and external forms of necessity. God acts purely from the laws of its own nature, the active immanent intelligibility of which is termed *natura naturans* while the modal manifestation is termed *natura naturata*. Thus he develops a fairly necessitarian naturalist monism in which god or nature acts according to very strict

parameters of the principle of sufficient reason. “In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way”⁷²

Spinoza denies Descartes’ attempts to show interaction between thinking and extension, and rejects interaction, but this is why he develops the account of parallelism to show how the intellect can control the passions. He is not dualist because what are more fundamental are the common notions or common properties between things and ideas which are in the comprehension of the infinite intellect of god. There is an idea of the essence of each finite mode in God’s comprehension or infinite intellect. Now the fundamental limitation of finite modes is that the order and connection between ideas and affections is determined externally by the interactions. Certain affections increase the power of activity of the body or finite mode while others reduce the power of activity. The ideas of freedom in both Spinoza and Leibniz are similar, in the sense that from necessity of god's vision, the interaction between bodies and should have pre-established harmony, in Leibniz freedom is the windowlessness of monads, while in Spinoza, freedom is when the necessity internal to the attribute of mind or thinking, in the finite modes such as humans, extricates itself from entanglement with necessity internal to the attribute of extension or body, and achieves unity with necessity of its own nature freed from externality, which is the essence in the idea of god regarding modes, eternally comprehended by God in the infinite intellect; more adequate ideas more mean activity, more joy and love for god. Clear and distinct conceptions inevitably serve to weaken the force of an affect. As Beth Lord writes,

As we have more adequate knowledge of the affects – which *are* bodily changes – we determine them ourselves, and they become *actions*. To the extent to which we adequately understand the affects and become their adequate cause, they are necessarily joyful and good. In gaining adequate knowledge, we have ‘unconfused’ our idea of how our body is affected. This process

of clarifying an inadequate idea into an adequate one is the clarification of passivity into activity, sadness into joy, evil into virtue, enslavement into freedom.”⁷³

“Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being.”⁷⁴ Curley⁷⁵ rightly notes that the terms *conatur* and *conatus*, which he translates as "strives" and "striving," can mean simply "tends" and "tending" and need not be understood to involve *conscious* effort. Singular things have telos but god or nature as a whole do not. As Henry Allison writes, “Thus, in opposition to the Cartesian appeal to the limits of human cognition, an appeal that was undoubtedly motivated by theological considerations, Spinoza affirms an absolute rationalism. Given the proper method, reality as a whole is intelligible to the human mind, and Spinoza claims in his *Ethics* to have done nothing less than demonstrate this truth.”⁷⁶ In Spinoza, it is to maximise the affects that increase the body’s power of activity thus to organise the order and connection of immanent ideas in thus manner.

The entire project of Leibnizian physics and metaphysics is to reconcile the principle of sufficient reason with both divine and human contingency and freedom. Leibniz questioned what he perceived to be blind mechanical as well as logical necessity and causation in Descartes and Spinoza respectively, but generally prevalent in seventeenth century philosophy and wanted to rehabilitate the harmony between final and efficient causation in Plato and Aristotle in natural philosophy compatible with modern sciences. For this purpose, the task he set up for himself was to make contingency, primarily conceptual if not ontological, compatible with the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz differentiates between the “kingdom of power or efficient causes” which is physical world of interaction between composite bodies which are subject to continuous change by the cause of derivative forces and the “kingdom of wisdom or final causes” which is the ideal world of non-interaction between monadic atoms that are also subject to continuous change by the cause of primitive forces. The question of the relationship between the world of bodies and the

world of monads is a highly complex question in Leibnizian philosophy, that he attempts to resolve in a variety of ways. As Daniel Garber notes, “There are texts that suggest that extended bodies are aggregates of monads, and others that suggest that bodies are just the common coherent dreams of an infinity of monads.”⁷⁷ But the consistent idea across these variations is that everything in nature happens mechanically and at the same time metaphysically but that the source of mechanics is in metaphysics, in other words, the world of monads is metaphysically fundamental to the world of bodies.

Leibniz wanted to hold on to occasionalism such that each monadic atom is completely independent of external influence and not causally determined by other monads, thus the doctrine of the windowlessness of monadic occasions, but he was not satisfied with the Malebranchian account of a wear and tear god that continuously has to intervene to make its poor and dysfunctional creation work. Thus he suggested that in its perfection god considers all possible alternatives of worlds and only creates the best of all possible worlds as compossibility between greatest richness or diversity from the greatest simplicity. In this way he attributed not only goodness of teleological purpose but also free will to divine action as well as monadic occasionality. Leibniz has contradictory views about whether there is real physical influence between bodies in the physical world or not, but this combinatorialism was subsidiary to the conceptuality of god’s infinite comprehension. In other words, there is a pre-established harmony between souls and bodies and souls and souls which never interact but there is correspondence between the compossibility of the different conceptual entities subject to primitive forces in the infinite analysis of the principle of sufficient reason and the efficient-mechanical interactions between bodies subject to derivative forces. Even though the monads are windowless and independent, the conceptual combinatorialism regarding monadic essences in the god’s infinite analysis is explanatory of the entire relational activity of bodies and implicated monads. But for him there is ontological and metaphysical primacy of the ideal realm of souls over the physical realm of bodies. Thus Spinoza uses pre-

established harmony and the principle of sufficient reason to develop a *naturalist monism of necessity* whereas Leibniz uses different renditions of the same principles to develop a *conceptual combinatorialism of contingency*.

In Spinoza and Leibniz, the conception of freedom is to be subject to the necessity of one's own nature free from external influence in relational independence, which is the essence of a finite mode or monad in God's infinite comprehension. The fundamental project of Kant's critical philosophy, and also the project of Whitehead's philosophy of organism, is to reconcile contingency or freedom with real combinatorialism or naturalism as opposed to Leibnizian conceptual combinatorialism of contingency and Spinozan naturalist monism of necessity. Kant, following in the footsteps of his teacher Martin Knutzen, tries to show that in order for the monads to produce properties of extended bodies, pure conceptual combinatorialism would not suffice and must also imply real ontological causal combinatorialism between occasions. This is the idea of *influxus physicus*. He also critiques the idea in Spinoza that "Nothing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way."⁷⁸ The necessity of substance precludes physical influence since the relation between substance and modes is not one of real causation but of logical inherence or ontological subsistence. The categorical rejection of teleological causation whether as a requirement of the systematicity of nature or human cognition's requirement of attributing systematicity of nature reduces nature to blind mechanical necessity. The movement of Kantian philosophy from the *first Critique* to the *third Critique* is to make space for contingency in reflection. As he writes, "...the particular by its very nature contains something contingent with respect to the universal."⁷⁹

As I have discussed in section 1.1, In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the appendix 'On the amphiboly of concepts of reflection', reflection only served the function of analogically comparing the representations to judge whether they pertain to the faculty of the understanding or the faculty of sensibility. But the categories of subsumption of particulars into universals were a priori given in

the categories of the understanding. By the time of writing *Critique of Judgement*, the givenness of the universals in cognition seems to have become problematised for Kant, and in natural organisms he discovers particulars for which the universal concepts are not given a priori but must be in fact found or speculated. Here reflection acquires a very new meaning for Kant, not merely pertaining to transcendental reflection or to aesthetic judgement of art, but of the very question of the systematicity and purposiveness of nature. Which is a broader question than the objective schemata of time-determinations in the analogies of experience (constitutive/ regulative). In this context, he differentiates between determining and reflective judgement. While determining judgement is based upon a constitutive principle which is a priori and necessary and determinately objective, reflective judgement is based upon regulative principle of purposiveness which is not a priori and necessary and it is asymptotically objective.



In Plato and Aristotle, despite the differences in their metaphysics, the form of the good as the form of perfection served as the unity or harmony between efficient or mechanical causation and final or teleological causation.⁸⁰ While in Plato the form of the good or the One is the unity of eternity of efficiency and teleology, Aristotelian naturalism partly disentangles efficiency from the unmoved mover by distinguishing between eternal efficient causation and temporal efficient causation. Thus the notion of the unity of efficiency and teleology in both philosophers is different in the sense that for Aristotle this unity in the unmoved mover is to be explanatory of both eternity as well as temporality of motion or activity. The notion of the unity of final and efficient causation served the function of anti-Manicheanism in medieval scholastic as well as Neoplatonic Christian theologies. In seventeenth century philosophy, teleological explanation was generally discarded, and the

questions of efficient causation and that of the conservation of motion were accorded metaphysical and scientific primacy. Descartes fundamentally rejected teleological explanation, firstly, in giving primacy to mechanical explanation in the physical world, and secondly, as the unknowability of God's will and vision. Spinoza repudiates any attribution of finalism to God or nature as a whole as anthropocentric fictions, but each singular thing is driven by the force of conatus, which is the tendency of each finite mode to realise the immanence of the necessity of its own monadic nature ultimately grounded in God's conception of the essence of it. Leibniz, as the conciliator of the ancient and modern epistemologies, is unique in affirming the perfection of harmony between the 'kingdom of wisdom' and the 'kingdom of power', although the unity of perfection more fundamentally conceptual than naturalist. As Don Garrett has written,

Teleological explanations—typically expressed in the terminology of "ends" and "final causes"—played central roles in Aristotelian and scholastic conceptions of natural philosophy (that is, of what we would now call *natural science*). However, the growing prominence of mechanistic explanation in seventeenth-century natural philosophy demanded a complete rethinking both of the role of teleological explanation in scientific methodology and of the nature and scope of teleology itself. In the vanguard of this rethinking were Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz—each of them a defender, in his own way, of the importance of mechanistic explanation in natural science.⁸¹

Kant in a sense makes the problematic of the unity of efficient and teleological causation a function of the faculty of reflective judgment, beyond the purview of determining judgement. The great achievement of Whitehead is not simply a reanimation of the spirit of Greek philosophy beyond both transcendental idealism as well as seventeenth century metaphysics, but also a sublation or transduction in the tension between Platonic idealism and Aristotelian naturalism. In other words, not only is the reemphasis upon the Aristotelian problematic of the unity of efficiency and teleology

as explanatory of eternity and temporality of motion or activity given a modern inflection in that the unity is not grounded in any conception of God but rather in the impersonal and non-divine ultimate category of creativity, but what complicates matters more, this while retaining a function of God in the metaphysical system, although, most interestingly, not a categoreal but derivative one, that is, not included in the categoreal scheme. Therefore, the central problem in Whiteheadian metaphysics is that of the relationship between creativity as category of the ultimate, God as non-temporal actual entity, and temporal actual entities constitutive of the ontological principle.

For Whitehead, the philosophy of organism is based upon the consistency of the 'ontological principle' or 'principle of efficient and final causation' according to which any process of activity can only be conditioned either by subjective occasions teleologically undergoing this process of concrescence or the objective occasions efficiently involved in the process transitively. In other words, only actual occasions can be reasons organising actual activity of occasionality and combinatoriality and nothing else.

That every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance has its reason *either* in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, *or* in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence. This category of explanation is termed the 'ontological principle.' It could also be termed the 'principle of efficient, and final, causation.'... This ontological principle means that actual entities are the only *reasons*; so that to search for a *reason* is to search for one or more actual entities. It follows that any condition to be satisfied by one actual entity in its process expresses a fact either about the 'real internal constitutions' of some other actual entities, or about the 'subjective aim' conditioning that process.⁸²

He articulates the ontological principle in *Religion in the Making* in a more fundamental manner:

"we cannot discover anything not included in the totality of actual fact, and yet explanatory of it"⁸³

This can be understood as the metaphysical naturalism fundamental to the method of metaphysical

schematisation Whitehead undertakes. Naturalism is generally understood to entail that causation can only be traced within the connectedness of spatiotemporality and any postulation of reasons beyond the order of spatiotemporality is unwarranted. But for Whitehead, since the categories of space and time are in themselves abstractions of the more immediate mutual factoricity of extension of events (relation and separation) and passage of events (activity and inactivity), that is, processuality and relationality, each of which as I have tried to show has both an abstract and a synthetic side, the ontological principle in this sense is better interpreted as a proposition for naturalistic metaphysics. Now God in the philosophy of organism is the non-temporal actual entity, which is a primordial accident of the ultimate principle of creativity. As he writes, "In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed 'creativity'; and God is its primordial, non-temporal accident."⁸⁴ And after a few pages: "'Creativity' is the universal of universals characterising ultimate matter of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively."⁸⁵ Whitehead says that this initial category "expresses the general principle *presupposed* in the three more special categories" of existence, explanation, and obligation⁸⁶. "the reasons for things are always to be found in the composite nature of definite actual entities—in the nature of God for reasons of the highest absoluteness, and in the nature of definite temporal actual entities for reasons which refer to a particular environment"⁸⁷. Creativity is "that ultimate notion of highest generality at the base of actuality"⁸⁸ While the non-temporality of God as actual entity is a deeply complex issue, even if this is considered compatible with the axiom of the ontological principle, the ultimate category of creativity is clearly beyond the ambit of the ontological principle, since it is the universal of universals that the world of actual occasions presupposes since it cannot be reduced to any specific occasions or God but is rather the real togetherness and consistency of processes. Robert Hanna has drawn attention to this contradiction between the ontological principle and the category of creativity,

by the criterion of coherence, creativity ought to be presupposed by all of the other basic principles of the categoreal scheme. But the eighteenth "category of explanation", or the "ontological principle" (PR, 24) seems to stand out as fundamentally incompatible with creativity.⁸⁹

The ontological principle can be seen to pose a great difficulty for the interpretation of creativity. For creativity is not an actual entity."⁹⁰

When Whitehead compares creativity with Aristotelian matter, he is trying to imply that creativity inheres in each entity which conditions creativity, thus as an immanent existence. For this reason, William A. Christian has argued that in fact creativity is a *pre-systematic* category in the Whiteheadian schema and to maintain the coherence and systematicity of the Whiteheadian categoreal scheme of the ontological principle with the other categories of existence, obligation and explanation and its derivative notions. This has made Christian argue "all that can be said about creativity can be put into systematic statements about the concrescences of actual entities."⁹¹ But, at the same time, as William Garland shows in his critique of Christian, it is not merely in actual entities but is the mutuality, coherence and systematicity between the process of concrescence by which the disjunctively many becomes one actual occasion conjunctively as actuality in attainment and the process of transition and the complete fact of satisfaction of conjunction join the many disjunctively as attained actuality.⁹² Creativity constitutes the impetus of this ongoing activity. Therefore I argue that the notion of creativity is not merely serving the function of the notion of matter in Aristotelian metaphysics but also the function of the prime unmoved mover. As Ivor Leclerc writes,

'Creativity' is therefore 'ultimate' in the sense, first, that it constitutes the generic metaphysical character of all actualities; and secondly it is the 'ultimate' in the sense that the actualities are individualizations of it.⁹³

Whitehead achieves this by conceiving the 'ultimate' as 'creativity', a universal process of creative activity which, while transcending each individual actual creature, is not itself actual, but is instantiated in the individual actualities.¹ Thus is secured the conception of a connected 'universe' And thus is secured the character of the universe to be perpetually 'going on': for its 'ultimate' character is that of self-creating activity.⁹⁴

God is the primordial accidental instantiation of creativity, and is the sole non-temporal actual entity: "The non-temporal act of all-inclusive unfettered valuation is at once a creature of creativity and a condition for creativity."⁹⁵ God and actual entities are accidental creatures of creativity that condition creativity. Creativity is the force of creative advance of novelty through which the primordial nature of god, deficient in actuality, assimilates the efforts of temporal concrescence and thus acquire physical multiplicity, and at the same time the disjunctive multiplicity of entities, deficient in everlastingness, acquires a unity of everlastingness. In this sense, creativity is explanatory in the ultimate sense of this mutuality of requirement between God and World or permanence and fluency. "Actuality in perishing acquires objectivity, while it loses subjective immediacy. It loses the final causation which is its internal principle of unrest, and it acquires efficient causation whereby it is a ground of obligation characterising the creativity."⁹⁶ "God and the World are the contrasted opposites in terms of which Creativity achieves its supreme task of transforming disjoined multiplicity, with its diversities in opposition, into concrescent unity, with its diversities in contrast."⁹⁷

But I will argue that the purpose of the metaphysical demonstration of activity and tension is not to ground it in a separate constitutive concept of the system but rather to demonstrate the nature of tension and activity in the mutual presupposition and requirement as well as irreducibility of function between primary and fundamental concepts of the system. The issue is that without the dynamic concept of creativity, God and World in the Whiteheadian system would fall into static

equilibrium, either via collapse into final synthesis or via splintering off into non-interaction, and this is precisely what the ultimate category of creativity is attempting to avoid and resolve, but backhandedly or extra-systematically, that is, this inexhaustibility or impetus of activity should be an internal character of the nature of mutual interaction between God and World, or perhaps between temporal actual occasions themselves, without having to smuggle in a pre-systematic or extra-systematic component concept to ground the metaphysics. “A mere system of mutually prehensive occasions is compatible with the concept of a static timeless world. ⁹⁸” I am in full agreement with Stengers when she makes the ultimate in the Whiteheadian sense an essentially pragmatic issue connected to the *technical* construction of problems:

The ultimate, in Whitehead’s sense, cannot, as we recall, by any means be identified with any form of transcendence, in the sense that any kind of sublime or intrinsically unthinkable character would be attached to it. If there is transcendence, it is a ‘technical’ transcendence. The ultimate is not the judge of problems and opinions, but is relative to the way the problem is framed and therefore liable to change along with the problem.⁹⁹

But I disagree with Didier Debaise when he writes that since creativity is at the beginning or end of Whitehead’s demonstration, it is itself not the object of demonstration but the arbitrary ultimate of metaphysical demonstration:

In this reasoning, the ultimate is the limit – the first or final term – of an explanation or demonstration. When Whitehead speaks of an ultimate he is referring to a technical concept in argumentation: in every demonstration there is a first element that is not the object of that demonstration but which must first be *posed* if a succession of reasons is to follow. One must, in short, *begin by accepting the arbitrariness of all beginning*, that is, by accepting that something must be posed that has meaning only as the ‘impulse’ of a series. ¹⁰⁰

We can say that the fact that experience is of the nature of activity or tension, this cannot be demonstrated as such, it is an axiomatic-empirical point of departure. But activity and tensionality is precisely the fundamental object of speculative demonstration of metaphysics of activity. To render the problem of the ultimacy of activity into a component category of the architectonic is to turn a reflective judgement in the Kantian sense into a determining judgement. While determining judgement is based upon a constitutive principle which is a priori and necessary and determinately objective, reflective judgement is based upon regulative principle of purposiveness which is not a priori and necessary and it is asymptotically objective. But Kant does not relate reflective judgment with metaphysical demonstration. I argue that the demonstration of activity or tension is not determinately objective and necessary, but asymptotically objective and contingent, in the sense the requirements can be fulfilled divergently. Methodologically this has to be demonstrated in the systematicity of the primary of concepts of the metaphysical architectonic. The ultimate is not categorizable although it is thinkable and reflectible. This is in Kant in the sense that real tension is *nonconceptual* as well as *nonaesthetic*. Making a principle or category is to intellectualise in Leibnizian sense of principle of sufficient reason, and reduce to incompositionality, force of compositionality is precisely not principle but force. Moreover, since god is the force of attraction of all concrescent actual occasions, there is merely repulsion in the sense of negative prehension in the interaction between temporal synthetical processes, but there is no repulsion of the abstract from the abstract.

The notion of the ultimate as creativity is a determining judgement and not a reflective systematic metaphysical demonstration. The interaction between God as pure potentiality and World as reality should be able to immanently demonstrate the inexhaustibility of activity and not require an external principle. The irreducible inseparability between permanence and fluency should show the force of tension. God is an accident of creativity, and the primordial nature of god is the unconditional envisagement of pure potentiality of eternal objects. All temporal actual entities are

also accidents of creativity, not derivate from god, but prehensive of God both as the initiatory subjective aim and decision of emphasis in the conceptual reversion. All the concrescent satisfactions conjoin into the consequent nature of god. In this process god gains physical multiplicity while temporal occasions gain everlastingness. "Creation achieves the reconciliation of permanence and flux when it has reached its final term which is everlastingness-the Apotheosis of the World."¹⁰¹ But in what sense are the primordial and consequent nature of god really different? The paradigm of ancestry of actuality is purely that of real but not of the potential which is the unconditioned envisagement. "This doctrine applies also to that primordial nature of God, which is his complete envisagement of eternal objects; he is not thereby directly related to the given course of history. The given course of history presupposes his primordial nature, but his primordial nature does not presuppose it."¹⁰²

Maybe in the Whiteheadian schema, derivative notions can be explanatory of paradigmatic loss or gain of ancestry of potentiality, but there is no categorical schematisation of loss, but only of gain solely in the sense of reality. The reason why creativity is substance is because it is accretionary and no real historical contingency of gain and loss. Conceptual reversion, that is central to novelty, and this conceptual contrast requires the concept of god as the store of general or pure potentiality, which is the primordial nature of god. Thus Whitehead fails to demonstrate tension requisite for ultimacy of processuality activity.

The notion of the impetus of modalisation that I am developing as the motive force of nature is meant to demonstrate the irreducible inseparability between the abstract and the synthetic, since it is the force of the deepening of intersection between the divergent continuity of the abstract and the divergent continuity of the synthetic, that is, of projective mutual complementation between potentialisation and realisation that is explanatory of both the force of attraction and repulsion as

well as both the eternity and temporality of motion or activity, and the unity of efficient and teleological causation.

1.2.4.Limits of Anti-metaphysics and the Inextinguishability of Universalistic Discussion

In his essay ‘Metaphysics and the Critique of Metaphysics’, Alain Badiou writes that

“Anti-metaphysics is thus to be found in four guises: critique, positivism, dialectics, and hermeneutics. If, against the vacuity of the metaphysical concept, it functions through a discipline of limitation, it is the essence of critique; through a discipline of mathematized experimentation, it is positivism; through the overcoming of the principle of identity that grounds metaphysics, it is dialectics; finally, if it functions through a deciphering of the history of being that culminates in an epochal diagnosis, it is hermeneutics.”¹⁰³

While each of these strands of anti-metaphysics are rich and highly complex in their own ways and highlight the limitations of traditional metaphysics in important ways, the total rejection of universal thinking and its conflation with dogmatism has led to more problems than solutions. The different lines of attack of these critical perspectives can be articulated in a unified manner thus — metaphysics is the ontotheological unidirectional grounding of active experientiality (Heidegger) based upon an unwarranted and non-empirical (Comte) overstepping of the sensible conditions of experience through situating the unconditioned condition or systematic unity (Kant) in the immobilism, eternism and substantiality of incompositionality or mode D (Marx). Such a characterisation of traditional metaphysics is indeed accurate but a rigorous and non-dogmatic natural metaphysics of contingency can overcome these criticisms. The arguments made by anti-

metaphysics regarding the dispensability of metaphysical speculation are utterly misplaced. For a genuine philosophy of activity, it is requisite to posit some kind of infinite potentiality, without which an ontology would remain in empirical finitude or energetic equilibrium. Therefore the essentiality of metaphysics does not dwell in the stakes of the ultimacy of inactivity but in fact in the stakes of the ultimacy of activity which, as we have shown, is always already the issue of relation. The essentiality of metaphysics lies in the fact that the difference between potentiality for separation and potentiality for relation cannot be sustained by a more fundamental separability but by a fundamental inseparability, and isomorphically, the difference between potentiality for mobility and potentiality for immobility can only be sustained by a deeper mobility and not a deeper immobility.

The forced concession and surrender of all speculative thinking about the relationship between the nature of experience and nature of the universe or the relationship between the moistest quality of synthesis and the driest level of abstraction, of the compositional togetherness of all potential compatibilities and incompatibilities, on the one hand, to theological and mythic or cinematic discourse that can only address the intensive aspect of reality and, on the other hand, to modern physics and cosmology that can only address the extensive side of reality, has led to an impoverishment of individual and social experience. In the hectic work-a-day lives that people lead, we sometimes take a pause and slow down and disengage ourselves from all exigencies of immediate action to just reflect and contemplate and discuss about what holds everything together in a continuity, all the frictions and openings, all the activities and resistances, attractions and repulsions, what holds together in continuity all the disparate and sectorised aspects of our lives, our thoughts, feelings and actions being pulled from entirely different directions away from each other. It is in the interest of regime to rob people of access to such nondimensionality of survey, and the potential for such repose in day to day life has almost been accorded a certain antisocial character. The utter banishment of metaphysicians from this eternal public discussion in the modern world at

the behest of critical theory and social sciences (theory in the sense that any thought that is not visibly or directly linked to action is unwarranted and discouraged) has meant that this speculative universalistic communication only operates under the constraints and enablements countenanced by mythologists and physicists, both of whom are thoroughly incapable of communicating with each other, operating within the separation between primary and secondary qualities. As a result, colloquial universalistic discussion is both unaddressed and unsupplemented by systematic universalistic discussion. Either the state and the market are to be given enough control that they can totally abolish these speculative pauses in day to day life, which is in their interest of regime to keep people blocked off and sectorised in specific unrelated domains of life. But as long as the infinite universal search of the human soul has not yet been totally abolished and neutralised by the state or the market or by critical theory and the social sciences, until then systematic metaphysics will remain inextinguishable and essential. There is absolutely no reason to say that this discussion can only be dogmatic, it can be non-dogmatic and improvisatory and rigorous in a paradigm of rigour that is specific to metaphysics and more fundamental than the paradigms of rigour of mythology, science and production.

For Heidegger, traditional metaphysics has already culminated in modern technoscience and planetary cybernetics, but this opens up a possibility for an entirely new beginning for thinking. As he writes in 'The End of Philosophy and Task of thinking',

The matter of philosophy as metaphysics is the Being of beings, their presence in the form of substantiality and subjectivity...The end of philosophy proves to be the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of a scientific-technological world and of the social order proper to this world. The end of philosophy means the beginning of the world civilisation that is based upon Western European thinking."¹⁰⁴

In contrast to Heidegger's assessment, I think the end as in planetarisation and culmination of philosophy does signify the end of metaphysics, because philosophy as universal conditional thinking is simply one paradigm of metaphysical thinking, the end as in planetarisation and culmination of which can mean the opening towards an entirely new paradigm of metaphysical thinking, which is universal unconditional or compositional thinking. In this sense, a new non-dogmatic recommencement of speculative thinking, as discussed by Eduardo Viveiros De Castro and Yuk Hui¹⁰⁵, shall be a post-western speculative thinking, since western metaphysics has fully culminated and ended in the western technoscientific social order. Heidegger writes,

We are thinking of the possibility that the world civilization which is just now beginning might one day overcome the technological-scientific-industrial character as the sole criterion of man's world sojourn. This may happen not of and through itself, but in virtue of the readiness of man for a determination which, whether listened to or not, always speaks in the destiny of man which has not yet been decided. It is just as uncertain whether world civilization will soon be abruptly destroyed or whether it will be stabilized for a long time, in a stabilization, however, which will not rest in something enduring, but rather establish itself in a sequence of changes, each of which presenting the latest fashion.¹⁰⁶

Auguste Comte's assessment of the generalisation of western technoscientific order is quite different. For him, the form of universal praxis of human intelligence passes through three stages - the theological or fetishistic stages with its practical counterpart in worship, the metaphysical stage with its practical counterpart in contemplation and finally the stage of positive knowledge, the practical counterpart of which is technology. The metaphysical stage is the transitional stage between supernaturalism and naturalism which is when human intelligence becomes capable of basing all its knowledge and action purely upon empirical observation. But what has been missed in this picture of Comtean thought is that despite the claim that in the naturalist period, human society

is ready to shed all its speculative skin and move towards positivism and observational and mathematical science, he nonetheless feels that this secularisation of social life requires to be supplemented with a 'religion of humanity' that can absorb the instincts for metaphysical thinking and provide a platform upon which to mutually interweave thought, feeling and will in individual and social experience. As Martha Nussbaum has noted,

What Comte is after is not really a philosophical academy, a place of investigative critical argument, dissent, and exploration. It is, instead, a replacement for the pervasive social influence of the Roman Catholic Church and its clergy. the new spiritual guides, in virtue of their acumen and their lifelong study, are the only citizens who will really understand the more abstruse points of positivist doctrine... On this basis the philosophers are to propound for the common people a total scheme of thought and practice that organises their moral lives in their smallest details...the general goal of the new religion will be to extend human sympathy by cultivating the spirit of universal brotherhood.¹⁰⁷

For Kant, the challenge was not to overcome or abandon the project of metaphysics altogether, but to overcome the dogmatic procedures of Leibnizian and Wolffian metaphysics and to inquire as to whether a critical and non-dogmatic metaphysics is possible, and if so, in what manner and procedure. The need for metaphysics, Kant emphasizes also in the *Prolegomena*, is linked to the 'interest of human reason in general' for which it is necessary to admit that "a complete reform or rather rebirth of metaphysics, *according to a plan completely unknown before now*, is inevitably approaching"¹⁰⁸. His attempt to do metaphysics properly by rescuing it from dogmatism effectively became "the justification ... for renouncing (*entsagen*) speculative thought"¹⁰⁹. The reason why he considered Leibnizian and Wolffian metaphysics as dogmatic is because they were founded upon the principle of pre-established harmony, which was not demonstrated to be derived from within the limits of the sensible conditions of experience. But a similar critique can be made of

Kant's own arbitrary deduction of the categories of the understanding in the *Transcendental Analytic*, where he effectively transposes the function of the principle of pre-established harmony from the cosmos to the human mind in the same way that Descartes effectively transposed the function of the Aristotelian immovable mover as thinking of thinking to the human mind in the *cogito*. But as I have argued, there is primacy of synthesis over analysis in the *first Critique* insofar as it is the system of temporal principles and the three analogies of experience of persistence, causation and interaction which in the schematism are the ultimate organising factors of spatiotemporal experience and the possibility of interaction between forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding. In other words, there is primacy of a transcendental synthetic over the transcendental analytic. The concerns of pre-critical period where Kant attempts to transform the Leibnizian conceptual combinatorialism derived from pre-established harmony into a real genetic combinatorialism through the concept of *physicus influxus*, that is, physical influence between monadic occasions, are not entirely absent from the critical and post-critical period. I have shown how this relates to the universal modes of tension.

But Kant never questioned the conceptual compossibilism in Leibniz in order to propose an account of *real genetic compossibilism*. Whitehead hints at the potential for such an account of real genetic compossibilism in the chapter on 'The Order of Nature' in *Process and Reality*. Whitehead argues that a certain complexity of order is requisite for richness and depth of relational experience. There has to be *relative regional consistency* to overcome the inconsistency of pure occasionality. This means a certain degree and quality of mutual genetic derivation between members of a society or world. The greater the complexity of this mutual genetic derivation, the more complex and rich will be the compositional possibilities, in other words, epochal loss or flattening of complexity of order means enervation of complexity of compositional possibilities. Insufficient order would imply wholesale rejection of incompatible data and the consequent streamlining of creativity whereas lack of complexity of order would compel unoriginal reproduction of dominant patterns and ideals and


the resultant suffocation of creativity. Disorder is lack of coordination in the factors of the datum, so that no feeling arising from one factor is reinforced by any feeling arising from another factor. Incompatibility has predominated over contrast. At the level of pure occasionality, there is no endurance hence no acquired complexity of social character, a kind of formless indifference. But more complex the social character of a regional consistency, the more complex and differentiated will the characteristic forms of organisation or patternings of experience. This is the ancestrally gathered sociality of abstractness of extensiveness of compossibility between occasion and processes that form a *world-transcendental* or *region-transcendental*. In this sense, I will argue that both processuality or objectivity of inner sense and extensiveness or objectivity of outer sense have an abstract and synthetical side complemented by tension between force of attraction and repulsion, that is, difference between compatibility and incompatibility, conditioned by and conditioning the dynamic between compossibility and impossibility. For Kant, speculation becomes uncritical if it transgresses sensible limits of spatiotemporal determination, which is the fate of substantialisation of activity in Spinoza or deoperationalisation of activity in Leibniz. But since in Whitehead space and time are themselves categoreal abstractions of processuality of occasions and extensionality of occasions, we can say that speculation becomes non-critical if it oversteps limits of tensional modes of processuality and relationality. But processuality and extensiveness both have an abstract as well as synthetic side. The ancestral nonsensuous forms of texturisation of experience is the abstractness of sociality of mutual genetic derivation of the complexity of social character of the order. Thus the genetic transcendental includes not just forms of ingression but qualitative and intensive character of ingression as potentialities of interaction within regional consistency, a certain determinability of character of ingression can be schematised in the transcendental particular to a world. This is a genetic and contingent synthetic apriority or real genetic compossibility. But it is not merely that there is no necessity to synthetic apriority but in fact the contingency of accrued consistency specific to worlds of experience must itself be shown to diverge otherwise the metaphysical

tensionality of activity cannot be sustained. In other words, pure occasionality must parse into divergent ancestrally acquired relative consistencies. These are some essential steps towards non-dogmatic metaphysical naturalism of contingency.

Kantian philosophy captured the tension between the sensuous and supersensuous or nonsensuous aspects of constitution of experience. Hegelian philosophy as a reaction to Kantianism was the philosophy of the primacy of supersensuousness over the sensuous *in thought*, which, as I have discussed, is the point of departure of *Science of Logic* continuing over from the culmination of *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the final chapter on 'Absolute Knowing'. Ludwig Feuerbach reacted to Hegelian idealism by developing a philosophy of sensuousness though, as Marx pointed out in 'Theses on Feuerbach', sensuousness *in thought*. Friedrich Nietzsche reacted to Hegelianism by developing a reverse dogmatism of the sensuous over the supersensuous *in practise*. What makes Marx perhaps the greatest thinker of the western tradition is that only with him did a philosophy of interaction between the sensuous and the supersensuous *in practise* develop, fully rid of the principle of sufficient reason and pre-established harmony, that is, freeing philosophy from substantialisation, subjectivisation and deoperationalisation of real activity. As Gavin Kitching writes,

For Marx then, a focus on the total of human activity was a way to escape both Hegelian idealism (since if one does not start by defining human beings as those creatures which think one does not end up obsessed by the categories of thought) and Feuerbachian materialism (since human beings do not, as it were, 'sit around' passively receiving sense impressions and combining them into ideas and concepts). In so far as they do this 'combining' - and note that this too is an act - they do it only as part of actively doing other things. So, if Marx had to pick an essential definition of human beings it would not be 'those creatures which think' but 'those creatures which act.'¹¹⁰

Marx develops a conception of human activity as fusion of sensuousness and supersensuousness but not primarily in thought but in practice, in other words, the interspersion of the sensuous and supersensuous in thought is itself not primarily a question of thought but of practice. The real social practice of production entails the composition of the entire world of experience. Materialism for Marx does not mean the primacy of matter over ideality, as Evald Ilyenkov has pointed out, it means primacy of social sensuous productive practice where materiality and ideality intersperse.¹¹¹ Wang Nanshi and Xie Yongkang have argued that Marx’s account of social activity is better understood as divided into productive activity, communicative activity and theoretical activity — “Different from the labour tool system from which productive activity seeks help; and also the help of normative system in communicative activity, the medium from which theoretical activity seeks help is the conceptual system of logic.”¹¹²



2. Complexity of Roundedness of Social Activity

The three modes of activity, namely, productive, sensuous/ symbolic or communicative and theoretical, which can be related to three aspects of experience, namely, thought, feeling and action make up the roundedness of actual social activity. These modes of activity are the work of actionability, the work of sensibility and the work of intelligibility which are intertwined and yet distinct. Each of the modes of activity have a sensuous and supersensuous side or synthetic or concrete and abstract side (Fig. 2).

The capitalist social process is riddled with what Marx calls ‘real abstractions’ such as socially necessary labour time, exchange-value and use-value in the commodity-form. In the capitalist system, the social relations between humans become subjugated to the social relation between commodities which is mediated by the form of money as the universal equivalent of exchange.¹¹³ Marx writes, “in the circulation M-C-M both the money and the commodity function only as different modes of existence of value itself, the money as its general mode of existence, the commodity as its particular or, so to speak, disguised mode. It is constantly changing from one form into the other, without becoming lost in this movement; it thus becomes transformed into an automatic subject.”¹¹⁴

The categorial real abstractions of commodity and capital which are effects of social practice then come to haunt and dominate social practice in the capitalist social formation as the historically transcendental schema of social mediation of mutual interdependence and reciprocity. The abstract character of productive activity in the capitalist system in Marx’s diagnosis is precisely the organisation and schematisation of production and distribution unconnected or abstracted from the roundedness of social compositional activity and social being, that is, the schematisation of political-economic activity around the contradiction between the principle of private property in the means of production and the motivational principle of profit or valorisation of capital and the singularity of labour-power in its surplus generating function (premised upon being free in the dual sense, that is, free to sell labour-power and free from access to means of production). Capitalism

comes about when the commodity form becomes socially generalised — in other words, when all production in society, including that of one's own labor-power, comes to take place for the sake of exchange. Marx uses Hegelian dialectics to show the nature of capital, separates itself then sees itself in the opposite then brings in genuine infinity, and the substanceless negative subjectivity of the proletariat in this dynamic. As Moishe Postone explains,

Marx, then, explicitly characterizes capital as the self-moving substance which is Subject. In so doing, Marx suggests that a historical Subject in the Hegelian sense does indeed exist in capitalism, yet he does not identify it with any social grouping, such as the proletariat, or with humanity. Rather, Marx analyzes it in terms of the structure of social relations constituted by forms of objectifying practice and grasped by the category of capital (and, hence, value). His analysis suggests that the social relations that characterize capitalism are of a very peculiar sort—they possess the attributes that Hegel accorded the *Geist*. It is in this sense, then, that a historical Subject as conceived by Hegel exists in capitalism.¹¹⁵

A central hallmark of capitalism, then, is that people do not really control their own productive activity or what they produce but ultimately are dominated by the results of that activity. This form of domination is expressed as an opposition between individuals and society, which is constituted as an abstract structure. Marx's analysis of this form of domination is an attempt to ground and explain what, in his early writings, he referred to as alienation.¹¹⁶

What is interesting is that while critiquing the commodity fetishism under the capitalist organisation of social production, Marx celebrates the historical secularisation of the regime of social fetishism from deities and gods in religion to the purely economic money form in modern capitalism. As the universal equivalent, money materialises the essence of value as power of social cooperative activity and in this precise sense make universal history from the perspective of the gain of self-consciousness of social cooperative compositional power possible only retrospectively. As Marx writes in the *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy Of Right'*,

It is the task of history, therefore, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world. It is above all the task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, to unmask human self alienation in its secular forms, once its sacred form has been unmasked. Thus, the critique of heaven is transformed into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of law, the critique of theology into the critique of politics.¹¹⁷

But the purpose of Marx's analysis was to show that the abstractness of productive activity or work of actionality under the capitalist system of commodity production dominates the other modes of activity, that is theoretical activity or work of intelligibility and communicative or sensible activity or work of sensibility and thereby the totality of social activity. Some Marxist scholars have taken this to mean that abstractness as such is the cause of estrangement in social and individual experience from some originary syntheticity of human experience. But I think the point of Marx was that overcoming of the domination of abstract side of production upon the totality of social life can create the conditions for a free and open interaction between both the abstract and synthetic or concrete sides of productive, theoretical and sensuous activity. Capital schematises discontinuity or asymmetry of interaction between different modes of activity but the possibility of relative integration of these activities that especially early Marx wrote about does not mean complete concretisation of the nature of social activity but freeing of the sociality of the abstract and the sociality of the synthetical and improvisatory interaction between different modes of activity hence not reduction to the abstractness or syntheticity of a select mode of activity. The reason why late Marx methodologically prioritises the analysis of production and distribution (from the standpoint of exchange) is because under commodity production there is no mutuality of interaction between the different modes of activity constitutive of general experience. In this regard, there is only methodological discontinuity between early and late Marx but no fundamental thematic

discontinuity. Alfred Sohn-Rethel argues that “[I]t is the action of exchange, and the action alone, that is abstract”¹¹⁸. In this sense, under the capitalist system, the exchange value as the abstract side of productive and distributive or consumptive activity dominates over the factor of the use-value of commodities. In Marxist theory, Sohn-rehel and Althusser’s works have tried to investigate the relative autonomy of work of intelligibility, while Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt school thinkers have tried to investigate relative autonomy of work of sensibility and culture.

Seen from the perspective of this differentiation between the three modes of social activity constitutive of roundedness of social activity, Hegel’s diagram of the concrete universality as the sublation of the contradiction between individuality and sociality in modernity in *Philosophy of Right* involves the real social abstraction of the institutions of civil society as constitutive of the work of intelligibility, the state as factor of the work of sensibility and the capitalist economy and market as the work of actionability. *Philosophy of Right*, is meant to be a defence of the rationality of an interconnected web of modern institutions. The state institutions in civil society, the Administration of Justice and the Public Authority, are viewed as mere instruments for achieving personal aims involve codification of law, which I’m calling work of intelligibility. For Hegel capitalist market economy unavoidably creates a detachment from the only available social bases of self-respect and mutual recognitive status; the labor process. “Since particularity is inevitably conditioned by universality, the whole sphere of civil society is the territory of mediation where there is free play for every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and fortune, and where waves of every passion gush forth, regulated only by reason shining through them. Particularity, restricted by universality, is the only standard whereby each particular individual promotes his welfare.”¹¹⁹. This is the notion of estates or work associations or corporations which for Hegel can be the mediator between particularity and universality and tie a sense of meaning to workers of participation in the objective spirit. In this sense, this is an account of the essentiality of labor to human sense of worth. As Robert Pippin writes,

Capitalism, generalized commodity production that everywhere assumes a profit motive and the constraints of competition, are inconsistent with what I have been calling an ethical standing that counts for Hegel as the basis of mutual respect and so the experience of one's own worth. .. His general standard for achieving freedom is that one must be able to see oneself in one's deeds, to experience them as one's own, another dimension of that general notion of being-with-self-in-an-other This in turns requires a version of self-knowledge that he does not treat as a result of any complete transparency of the self to itself, but which is mediated by what one experiences one's deeds have come to mean and how they have come to matter to others.¹²⁰

While Marx thinks that Hegel's assessment of the nature of alienation in modern society is crucial, his own diagnosis of the nature of estrangement goes beyond the question of mutuality of recognition of worth derivative from participation in social labour but much deeper into the very being and meaning and authenticity of the labour process as compositional activity itself, which is what the capitalist social schema of commodity, value and capital fundamentally impoverishes. Marx's answer is that the free interaction between three works of intelligibility, actionality and sensibility , and the contradiction between individuality and community in modern society, that Hegel diagnoses but fails to resolve, can be resolved by displacing the hegemony of the abstract of production.

Now the horizon of Marx's resolution of the contradiction between the domination of abstractness of productive activity in commodity production and the complex roundedness of improvisatory social activity is the abolishment of private property and the commodity-form and money-form, and the revolutionary transformation of relations of production. In this framework, if private property is abolished, the free and open mutuality of interaction between the abstract and concrete aspects of productive, theoretical and sensuous or communicative activity of can be

realised, as opposed to hegemony of abstractness of productive activity under the capitalist social process.

Marx criticizes the system of capitalist production as a power that has taken on its own life in opposition to the interests of productive freedom, of the producers. Through the private form of appropriating socially produced goods, the technical process of producing use values falls under the alien law of an economic process that produces exchange values. Once we trace this self-regulating character of the accumulation of capital back to its origins in private property in the means of production, it becomes possible for mankind to comprehend economic compulsion as an alienated result of its own free productive activity and then abolish it. Finally, the reproduction of social life can be rationally planned as a process of producing use values; society places this process under its technical control. ¹²¹

But I am arguing that heterogeneity between theoretical, sensuous and productive activity is relatively irreducible and that speculative universalistic communication or universalistic discussion is also required for constructive freeing of mutual interaction and mutual translation between them in social and individual experience. In order also to sublimate or transduce the specific forms of parsing between three works that modern liberal capitalist formation has afforded. But this will require a reassessment of Marxian historical teleology of the progressive secularisation and rationalisation of social fetishism.

Seventeenth century *metaphysics*, driven from the field by the *French Enlightenment*, notably, by French materialism of the eighteenth century, experienced a *victorious and substantial restoration* in *German philosophy*, particularly in *the speculative German philosophy* of the nineteenth century. After *Hegel* linked it in a masterly fashion with all subsequent metaphysics and with German idealism and founded a metaphysical universal kingdom, the attack on theology again corresponded, as in the eighteenth century, to an attack on *speculative metaphysics* and *metaphysics in general*. It will be defeated forever by *materialism*, which has now been perfected by the work of *speculation* itself and coincides with *humanism*. But just as

Feuerbach is the representative of *materialism* coinciding with *humanism* in the *theoretical* domain, French and English *socialism* and *communism* represent materialism coinciding with *humanism* in the *practical* domain.¹²²

The key to the political praxis of the overcoming of the capitalist schema for Marx is the alternative concrete universality of the figure of the proletariat as the substanceless negativity of the capitalist categorial system, that which holds the potentiality to break the hegemony of the abstractness of productive activity over the whole of abstractness and syntheticity of social activity. But in a sense Marx underestimates Hegel's theorisation of the complexity of interweaving between the work of actionability, sensibility and intelligibility in the social and political institutions of modern society, in the sense that the dominance of abstractness of productive activity under capital schematisation not only would involve a rearticulation and recarving of the different modes of social activity constitutive of totality of social activity, but also novel paradigms and strategies of the mutual threading and integration of the different irreducible registers of social practice. This is the role of metaphysics that Marx underestimates. Religion not only served the role of the concealment of social cooperative potentiality but also of the threading function of symbolic socialisation, reciprocity and integration of the different modes of social practice. The reason why Marx does not accord importance to the the social activity of universalistic discussion is because he believes that, apart from the secularisation of social fetishism countenanced by the generalisation of the commodity form in the capitalist schematic, the progressive generalisation of the secular-atheistic worldview of natural science will further create the conditions for the crystallisation of self-consciousness of the real character of species-being, that is, the substanceless character of mutual cooperative power in composition and production of the world. But this is a flat, homogeneous and depoliticised conception of species-being.

Marxian humanism is premised upon the outsourcing of all metaphysical work to physics and natural science, outside the public domain, as the real source of secularisation of the self-

consciousness of the cooperative potential of species-being. This is related to the fact that the focus on the critique of political economy in the second part of Marx's career is premised upon the work of the critique of religion in first half of his career. The inadequacy of Marx's analysis here is that the social function of theological and mythological holism in the primitive and feudal systems was not solely epistemological concealment and repressive extraction of the real power of social cooperative activity but also universalistic communication as possibility of mutual interaction between theoretical, sensuous and productive activity. With the advent of modern science in the domain of theoretical activity and modern industry in the domain of productive activity, theological and mythological abstraction became subsumed within the domain of sensuous activity, and now the function of speculative universalistic communication can only be served by critical metaphysical naturalism. The trope of the complete secularisation, delocalisation, and globalisation of social life and human social and individual identity is mistaken. This is because new universalistic discussions that are exigent for free mutual interaction between theoretical, productive and sensuous activity constitutive of the roundedness of social practise cannot be completely delocalised and globalised, but subject to the limits and thresholds between densities, intensities and depths of ontological entanglement and interdependence, the principle of minimisation of incommunicability and stories of belonging.

Therefore Marx, in the conflation between theology and metaphysics in general, is operating within the schema of the possibility of planetarisation of communism which is premised upon the planetarisation of the atheistic secular view of life which itself is premised upon a planetary control of universalistic communication by physics and natural science. I argue that postcapitalism, if anything, means cosmological enrichment and rediversification against cosmological singularisation, that is continuation of thinking after the end of philosophy. Thus new diversity of both located and planetary interaction and contestation between natural metaphysics as

nonrationalism bridging rationalism and irrationalism, but divergence in actual demonstration, while dialogue regarding requirements of demonstration.

1.2.5. Compositionality and Incompositionality

In Plato's metaphysics, potentiality as formal eternity has metaphysical priority over sensuous actuality while in Aristotelian metaphysics, actuality as unmoved eternity has metaphysical priority over dynamic sensuous potentiality. Platonism makes the forms or ideas primary and the rest of his philosophy is an attempt to reconcile this primacy with spatiotemporal sensuousness. Aristotelianism makes actuality as eternity primary and the rest of his philosophy is an attempt to reconcile this with the aspect of potentiality as changing spatiotemporality. In early modern philosophy, this division continues in the sense that while rationalist dogmatism (Leibniz and Spinoza) makes ideality primary and tries to reconcile with sensuousness, empiricist scepticism (Locke and Hume) makes spatiotemporality primary and attempts to reconcile with the possibility of generality and ideality. The search for the nature of triuniconditionality or totality of conditionality in the structure of the participation of participation, whether from the side of conceptuality or from the side of experientiality, has set the horizon for metaphysical thinking in western philosophy. I have argued that there has been a canonisation of Kant's critical response to this dilemma in terms of the search for an epistemological a priori necessity structuring possibility of interaction between sensibility and conceptuality in the constitution of experience as cognition, but if the thematic continuity between pre-critical, critical and post-critical phases is studied imaginatively, a search for nonconceptual and nonsensuous transcendental synthetic free from pre-established harmony and principle of sufficient reason can be extrapolated which is tied to the


project of non-dogmatic naturalist metaphysics. But systematicity and adequacy of construction of a genetic transcendental synthetic is not a function of pre-ordained constraints of rational necessity but that of nonrational constraints of demonstration of the nature of tension of compositionality. This fundamental shift in function of requisiteness is the central to non-dogmatic natural metaphysics. I have tried to show that in post-Kantian philosophy, the different strands and different thinkers have enquired the nature of the modes of tension constitutive of participation of distinction selectively, not in their dynamic togetherness, and when the modes of tension have been integrated systematically in their mutuality, this systematicity has been reduced to the incompositionality and distension. Therefore the task of natural metaphysics is to integrate the three modes in mutuality of abstraction and synthesis without reducing to incompositionality of Mode D.

I began this demonstration with with four localised and strained tenses of the general sense of activity - mobility, immobility, relation, separation. I argued that just as the difference between potentiality for separation and potentiality for relation cannot be sustained by a more fundamental separability but by a fundamental inseparability, the difference between potentiality for mobility and potentiality for immobility can only be sustained by a deeper mobility or processuality and not a deeper immobility. This directed our thinking towards the question of the nature of universal tissue and weave of connectedness of mobile irreducible inseparability as nature of activity that holds in real togetherness all differences between mobilities and mobilities between differences. Dogmatic metaphysics, that is, conditional universal thinking, in the analytic move, carves real conceptual distinction and then, in the synthetic move, tries to show participation between distinction for which it proposes *mode or modes of tension* constitutive of manner and structure of participation. It integrates by tracing participation either unidirectionally, mediately, statically or in fact the reducibility of participation to distension. The universe is a mobile irreducible inseparability, which cannot be reduced to principles of unity, duality, nullity or dialecticity, but must be thought as nonrational tension of *diconditionality*, through real dynamics of attraction and repulsion, push and


pull. In non-dogmatic metaphysics, distinction and participation have to be shown to be the same operation viewed from different angles, which is irreducible inseparability, for the modes of tension constitutive of manner of participation have to be mutually systematised and integrated without getting reduced to distension. The distinction between potentiality or abstraction and reality or synthesis is the same operation or activity as participation between potentiality and reality. The mutually sensitive phases of three universal combinatorial modes of tension or absynthesis constitute the integrative speculative pattern of the four generic tenses of activity that constitute the irreducibility and inseparability between potentiality as abstraction and reality as synthesis. Now we are in the position to propose that the universe is neither pure potentiality nor pure reality but *compositionality*, universal patterns of compositional efficacy, systematic enough for conformal absynthesis and energetic enough for propositional absynthesis. The irreducible inseparability between the infinite absynthetical modes is termed force of tensionality or diconditionality. The whole nature of compositionality is united in the tissue of cosmos, and beyond it there is incompositionality, that is, mode D (Immobility + Separation). In this manner I have tried to replace the requirement of principle of sufficient reason with the requirement of demonstration of tensionality and force of compositional efficacy for metaphysical naturalism that does not entail substantialisation, deoperationalisation and subjectivisation of activity. Compositionality in this naturalistic usage is opposed to the concept of creativity which is a theological mystical idea with ultimate reference to ex nihilo creation. The three universal modes of tensional absynthesis are the infinite modes of participation of activity as actual distinction such that distinction and participation are one and the same operation viewed from different aspects. Irreducibility and inseparability are fully mutually implicated as in inseparability makes irreducibility not split into total separation while irreducibility makes inseparability not collapse into total unified immobility. This mutuality of push and pull, mutuality of constraint and enablement, constitutes tensionality of force as diconditionality.

Whitehead distinguishes between pure potentiality and real potentiality. While real potentiality comprises of potentials of determination or forms of definiteness or sociality of abstractness present as ingredients for concrescent occasions and endurances in a specific region or scope of activity, pure potentiality is the complete primordial envisagement of eternal objects as pure potentials for the specific determination of fact. Real potentiality constitutes a conditioned indetermination subject to regionally or circuitously specific sociality of abstractness as patterns of organisation of experiential datum, pure potentiality is the purely unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. Here my interpretation diverges from that of Whitehead. I propose that there is a third aspect to potentiality that Whitehead misses which I will call *ancestral potentiality*. Pure compositionality is empty, formless and indifferent, it is the popping in and out of existence of pure inconsistent occasionality which is the infinite heat motion of atoms devoid of meaningful combinatoriality. The characteristic forms of organisation or patterns, qualities and intensities of texturisation of relational experience develop and get differentiated with the diagrammatic and cosmogrammatic complexification of abstract social character of mutual genetic derivation constitutive of relative regional and circuitous consistencies. This is the ancestrally gathered sociality of abstractness of extensiveness of actual genetic compossibility between occasions and processes that form a world-transcendental or region-transcendental. Qualitative and intensive forms of definiteness are functions of acquired consistency of worlds and mutual adjustments, paradigmatic losses and novelties between divergent ancestral consistencies of worlds and diagrams. Textures, patterns and degrees of potential determination in the sociality of synthesis accrue in the complex genesis of a nexus of mutual reactions as the sociality of its abstractness or weave of dynamical compossibility. Real potentiality is the regionally or environmentally prehensible or encounterable selection of ancestry whereas ancestral potentiality is the whole depth and complexity of real potentialities. Pure potentiality is distilled compositionality.


Extensiveness is nothing other than multiplicity of processuality but multiplicity of processuality acquires coherence and absynthetical relatedness only through extensiveness. Each relative extensive coherence is premised upon the mediation or regulation of the infinite heat motion and inconsistency of pure compositionality which can engulf all endurances and bondings and reduce to pure occasionality. The ozone layer serves this homeostatic function for the complexity of activity on the earth. On the other hand, if extensive coherence is to neutralise all disorder in favour of a particular ergodic paradigm of order, there will not be any force of tension in the system and all activity will become reduced to incompositionality. Therefore the task of objective demonstration that natural experientiality undertakes is to compose without getting engulfed or distilled by pure compositionality, that is, pure potentialisation, and also without becoming reduced to incompositionality, that is, pure realisation. This fine and intricate act of objectively demonstrating concrete requirements of efficacious or functional tensionality constitutes the defining or dominant absynthetical characteristic organising interaction and friction between the sociality of the abstract and the sociality of the synthetic in a specific coherent integral extensiveness. Ancestrality of natural composition is the ancestrality of successes and failures in such localised objective demonstration. According to modern physics, there is an ultimate legal and nomological structure to pure compositionality, but the problem with this perspective is that, if there is an abstract unified dominant character of the universe, in other words, totality of conditionality, then all the different occasions and processes would finally mutually adjust and ergodically equilibrate into fixed positions and roles. This would entail deoperationalisation of activity. *This is why we must think of the universe as actually differently demonstrable. The actuality of universe is precisely actual difference of universal demonstration. Universality in this sense is always already transuniversality.*



Processuality



Multiplicity of Processuality
or Extensiveness



Multiplicity of Extensiveness

3. *Processuality and Extensiveness*

Cosmos is the weave of compositionality, the capacity to compose, the capacity to contract habits and laws and nomological consistency, not a determinate and given set of laws or principles. Thus there is not only multiplicity of processuality but also multiplicity of extensiveness (Fig. 3). Otherwise the multiplicity of processuality mutually equilibrate in the sociality of extensiveness. “A mere system of mutually prehensive occasions is compatible with the concept of a static timeless world.”¹²³ In other words, there is disjunctive overlapping of multiplicity with multiplicity. In a sense, this claim can be seen as being redundant insofar as multiplicity already includes the power of multiplication in itself, but we are trying to speak of divergence in the very sense of multiplicity in the form of sheets of relatedness. The notion of multiplicity has no meaning without an internal divergence in the sense of relatedness. The divergence in synthetic continuity of processuality acquires relative coherence in abstract continuity of extensiveness.


But this dynamics would eventually collapse into equilibrium or inactivity. Thus we must say there is also divergence in abstract continuity of extensiveness, cohering different divergences of synthetic continuities. In the next chapter, we will term the mutuality of pulling of syntheticals into

abstract constraints and pulling of abstracts into synthetical constraints *modalisation*, in other words, complementation between sociality internal to abstraction and sociality internal to synthesis. The push and pull between divergent continuity of the abstract and divergent continuity of the synthetical is going to be proven to be the crux of the demonstration of irreducible inseparability. Complexity of universal divergence in this complementation adds to the the complexity of ancestry, which means more improvisatory potential for compositional activity in the universe. Any loss or flattening of ancestral complexity is loss of improvisatory capacity and complexity.

If there is one relational weave of metacompositional consistency, it would gradually subsume all heat motion of atoms in its order, and lead to incompositionality. This is why there must be metacompositional divergence, this metadiversity or metadivergence is crucial for demonstration of tension of compositionality, that is inexhaustibility of activity and motion. This *metaphysical argument* (in Chapter 1) on the physico-chemical level translates into the *geohistoriosophical argument* (in chapter 3) about why there must be divergence in societies of cosmocomportment, that is, consistency of social metaphysical discussion, mere diversity on diagrammatic level is not explanatory of tensionality, since that achieves equilibrium with order of extensiveness, it has to be metadiversity on cosmogrammatic level.

The three infinite modes of absynthesis constitute universe as compositionality, but only if it can be shown that the third abstraction actually diverges from the first synthesis (Fig. 4). If there is unity of extensiveness then the occasions and processes would mutually adjust and equilibrate and segment into fixed positions and functions. This is when third abstraction can be fully mapped onto the first synthesis, the dynamics would be shown to be equilibrated and disactivated. Irreducible inseparability between the universal modes or between abstraction and synthesis is crucial to show that distinction and participation are the same operation viewed from different aspects. If there was a unified set of regularities as dominant characteristic of the universe, the processes would be mutually equilibrate. If there was no such thing as set of regularities or patterns there would not be

enough stability for processes to compose in endurance, there would be no endurance, only infinite heat motion of pure atomicity. Thus the universe must entail attraction and repulsion, push and pull between divergence in continuity of extensiveness and divergence in continuity of processuality. Irreducible inseparability (compositionality at the limit of incompositionality) is between the sociality of the synthetical (genesis of compatibility and incompatibility) and sociality of the abstract (genesis of compossibility at the limit of impossibility). The nature of tensionality is neither within pure extension nor within pure intension but between intensive tension and extensive tension.



4. *Cone of Compositionality*

1.3. Discussion in the Context of the History of Indian Metaphysics

1.3.1. The Neglected Naturalist-Pragmatic Problematic of Indian Metaphysics Independent of Indian Theology and Religion

The schematisation of the history of Indian philosophy in *āstika* and *nāstika* terms is suggestive but is beset with several fundamental problems. Firstly, loyalty to the Vedic *śruti* (that which is heard) can be the determining criterion for differences between traditions in Indian theology but not in Indian philosophy and metaphysics. Moreover, the ultimate of one school cannot become the criterion of differentiation between schools. Therefore, even from the perspective of the history of Indian theology, it would have to be studied whether all the significant strands of theology have had a common ultimate or different ultimates. But none of this matters for the study of the history of metaphysics which is an inquiry into the nature of the shared and overlapping problematic between different schools, thinkers and traditions, inquiry into the nature of the genetic consistency of discussion, contestation and communicability between divergent philosophies and thinkers. The distinction between *āstika* and *nāstika* is inadequate for this purpose because, firstly, the ultimate of one school cannot be the criterion of assessment and definition of other schools, secondly, loyalty to the authority of *śruti* is a theological and not metaphysical question, and thirdly, it downplays the intensity and potential significance of differences between one *āstika* strand and another or one *nāstika* strand and another, and most importantly, by strict criterion, this schema helps to only differentiate the Carvaka from all others school of Indian metaphysics. Firstly, the meaning of the terms is disputed. The philosopher G. C. Pande has pointed out that one of the meanings of the term

āstika was belief in life after death, according to which criterion all the schools except the *lokāyatika* or materialists would be considered *āstika*.

Originally, however, *Nāstika* could properly apply only to the materialists, In a well-known sutra Panini says ‘*Astinastidistam matih*’ (4.4.60). As Patanjali explains, the words *Astir*, *Nāstika* and *Daistika* should be understood to mean ‘one who believes that it exists’, ‘one who believes that it does not exist’, and ‘one who believes that it is fated’ respectively, Pradipa and Kasikaa both explain that the subject of existence here is the other world or life after death. ‘*Paralokostiti matir yasya sa āstikah tadviparito nāstikah*’. Although the Mahabhasya and the Kasika analyse the words *Āstika* etc., differently, the net result is the same, The Padamanjari identifies *Nāstika* with *Laukayatika*.¹²⁴

While in the *Paninian* grammarian tradition, the terms are used in the context of belief or non-belief in survival, in the *Dharmaśāstric* tradition, Medatithi, the commentator on Manusmriti, extrapolates in an orthopraxic sense that denial of survival would imply rejection of the very meaning of sacrifice. Medhātithi defines a *nāstika* as one who says, “there is no other world; there is no [purpose in] gift-giving; there is no [purpose in] sacrificing.” In the Jaina doxographic tradition, for Haribhadra and Manibhadra, the term *āstika* means the ones that affirm the existence of *paraloka*, *punya* (merit), *papa* (demerit), and *punarjanman* (transmigration). The intellectual historian Andrew Nicholson writes in this regard, “For both Haribhadra and Manibhadra, these two designations have to do with ritual/ethical action (*karman*).... the stripped-down definition from the grammatical tradition omits the belief in the efficacy of ritual action found in Medhātithi, as well as the belief in merit and demerit found in both Manibhadra and Medhātithi.¹²⁵

From this perspective, Buddhism and Jainism are not *nāstika* since these schools affirm survival (in the form of *punarjanman*) and *karman*. The fact that Buddhists and Jains considered themselves *āstika* and opposed Carvaka as *nāstika* is highly suggestive and significant for Indian intellectual history, and cannot be ignored or glossed over under any circumstances. Buddhism is

nāstika in the sense that it rejects *ātman* and *brahman*, but *āstika* insofar as it believes in survival (although it is involved in the transformation the of Vedic schema of survival to to the new *karma* and *punarjanman* schema). Jainism is *nāstika* insofar as it denies the reality of *brahman*, but is *āstika* insofar as it believes in *Karman* and *punarjanman*. In the medieval Vedantic tradition, Madhvacharya in *Sarva-darśana-sangraha* uses the term *nāstika* to refer only to Carvaka¹²⁶, while Madhusudan Sarasvati implies that the *nāstika* thought is ultimately useless to even indirect attainment of human moral and soteriological ends, much less direct attainment. As Sararvati writes, “To sum up, the *nāstikas* have six sources (*prasthānas*). We disregard them because, like the teachings of the barbarians (*mlechhas*), they are external to the Vedas (*vedabāhya*), and because they are useless even for the indirect attainment of human moral ends.”¹²⁷ We can say Buddhism is moderate or soft *nāstika*, but not genuinely *nāstika*. Moreover, there are varying degrees of *nāstikism* in all the Brahmanic schools as well (traditionally considered unproblematically *āstika*)—Samkhya and Vaiśeṣika downplay scriptural authority¹²⁸, Samkhya and Mīmāṃsā deny any notion of *Ishwar*, and Vedanta, especially Advaita Vedanta strongly downplays and denigrates orthodox Vedic ritualism. By strict standards, only the Carvaka, and some of the isolated heterodox figures (such as Ajita Kesakambili), qualify as genuinely *nāstika*, since they completely reject survival in any form, *ātman*, *brahman*, *Karman*, *punarjanman*. All other schools have both *nāstika* and *āstika* components in different proportions.

From this perspective, only the Carvaka are metaphysically *nāstika* and all other schools are metaphysically *āstika*, with varying degrees of *nāstika* elements, most strongly expressed in the Buddhist categorical rejection of *ātman*. The fundamental critique of naturalistic *nāstika* thought in Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism has been that naturalistic metaphysics is incompatible with an aspirational and axiological approach to existence. It is one of my tasks to disprove this dogmatic assumption prevalent in Indian metaphysics. The most insightful statement and hint made regarding the Carvaka in Indian scholarship is by Jawaharlal Nehru:

Among the books that have been lost is the entire literature on materialism which followed the period of the early Upanishads. The only references to this, now found, are in criticisms of it and in elaborate attempts to disprove the materialist theories. There can be no doubt, however, that the materialist philosophy was professed in India for centuries and had, at the time, a powerful influence on the people. In the famous *Arthashastra*, Kautilya's book on political and economic organization, written in the fourth century BC, it is mentioned as one of the major philosophies of India. We have then to rely on the critics and persons interested in disparaging this philosophy, and they try to pour ridicule on it and show how absurd it all is. That is an unfortunate way for us to find out what it was. Yet their very eagerness to discredit it shows how important it was in their eyes. Possibly much of the literature of materialism in India was destroyed by the priests and other believers in the orthodox religion during subsequent periods.¹²⁹

The *prakritivadi* (naturalistic) perspective has almost always been straw-manned and lampooned in the history of Indian metaphysics. No medieval and modern thinker has attempted to develop a systematic consistent *Nāstika* naturalistic metaphysics, whether to oppose it or to support it. My attempt is to develop the *prakritivadi* (naturalistic) *nāstika* position into a complete metaphysical system. To develop a moral, axiological, aspirational metaphysics from the point of view of the axiomatic rejection of *karma*, *punarjanman* and *ātman*, *varna*, *mokṣa*, *brahman*. The point is that naturalism is not homogenous but itself can be metaphysically different and of different metaphysical heritage.

Since the *āstika* and *nāstika* schema ultimately only help to differentiate all the school of Indian metaphysics from Carvaka, a much more astute and useful schematisation of indian metaphysics is between *ātmavāda* and *anātmavāda*, as has been discussed by T.R.V Murti and Dharmendra Nath Shastri. As Murti writes, "Indian philosophy is basically divided in two camps:

the Vedic orthodox camp owing its inspiration to the soul-theory (*ātma-vāda*) of the Upaniśads, and the heterodox Buddhist camp owing its inspiration to the no-soul-theory (*anātma-vāda*) of the Buddhist scriptures.”¹³⁰ But even this divide glosses over the differences between schools of *ātmavāda* and *anātmavāda*. Therefore, there is need for a criterion that illuminates the individuality of not only each school but also each thinker. There is a need to articulate the constitutive problematic of Indian metaphysics in a different way or different ways. The philosopher P. T. Raju has expressed this need in the following manner:

Pure metaphysical ideas in Indian thought have to be thrown together into a perspective, their direction studied, and their possibilities understood. Indian philosophy has to be turned into metaphysics proper. Then will the strain and seriousness of original thinking appear, and Indian thought will develop from within. This development means the reaction of the Indian mind to contemporary problems....Then will Indian philosophy appear as pure metaphysics, in the light of which sciences that pertain to social life may be developed. ¹³¹

All the different schools and thinkers of Indian philosophy have conceptualised *prakṛiti* (nature) as eternal or ceaseless activity, but they have metaphysically and axiologically interpreted the structure and significance of the continuous activity of *prakṛiti* and also the relevance and universality of different modes of comportment or modes of *śrama* towards this natural reality in very different ways. This is the fundamental problem that metaphysical discussion, contestation and seeking in the Indian subcontinent has organised itself around. This shall be the point of departure of *prākṛitik tattvamīmāṃsā* (naturalist metaphysics) in the context of Indian philosophy. And since the dogmatic assumption amongst all schools has been that a genuinely *nāstika prakṛitivadi* (naturalistic) metaphysics is incapable of axiological, moral, aspirational notion of existence, it is my aim to disprove this assumption by developing precisely such a metaphysical system from within the history of Indian metaphysics. Moreover, in relation to the ceaselessness of *prakṛiti*, there is a

continuous attempt in the major strands of Indian metaphysics to not only propose the universal modes of *śrama* but also to tie and integrate the different modes of *śrama* into a systematic cosmo-sociology or meta-anthropology. This is a great clue and a secret key to reactivating Indian metaphysical speculation along newly rigorous and non-dogmatic lines .

1.3.2. Vedism and Śramanism

The Vedic corpus is composed of four parts - *Rig Veda*, *Yajur Veda*, *Sāma Veda* and *Atharva Veda*. Each of these itself has four divisions - *Samhitas*, *Brāhmanas*, *Āranyakas*, and *Upaniśads*. The first two parts of each Veda are connected to ceremonial, ritualistic concerns, and these are termed the *karma-kānda*, whereas the last two parts have more contemplative and meditative concerns, which are termed *jnana-kānda*. The period in which in which each Upaniśad was composed is debated, but roughly between 800BCE to 200CE. There are several Upaniśads, out of which twelve are generally considered to be the principal ones.

Philosophically, for those who think that active life is the ultimate aim of man and that it alone accords with reality, the first two parts of the Veda, and of these two especially the second, or Ritual Texts (*Brahmat:tas*), are important, and the other two parts are secondary. But for those who accept contemplative life as the highest aim of man, the other two parts, and of them especially the Upaniśads, are of primary importance. And the conflict between a philosophy of active life and that of a contemplative life, and the various attempts at reconciliation are an interesting feature of the philosophical development of India.”¹³²

The Vedas express a pre-metaphysical and pre-philosophical universal thinking regarding the productive activity of nature, of the gods and human beings. Vedic literature envisions nature as ceaseless productive activity and the sacrifice is meant to enact creation and the compositional mutual bond between gods and humans, performing the ritual cycle of giving and receiving. The philosopher Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya has argued, “in spite of all the idealistic grandeur with which the Vedic world-outlook was eventually characterised, its subsoil, too, was formed by some kind of primitive proto-materialism, which for all its differences from the original *Lokayata*, resembled it in representing a stage of pre-spiritualistic consciousness.”¹³³ Pande writes that “it cannot be gainsaid that early Vedic literature is clearly marked by the belief that divinity is, above all, creativity.”¹³⁴ But there are hints of an abstract schematisation of the structure of significance of the universe or nature in the quasi-concepts of *Rta*, *Sat*, *Satya* and *Dharma*. *Rta* in the Rg Veda refers to the unity or harmony of the cosmological order and moral order. *Sat* has meaning of the being and existence of things while *satya* has connotations of truth which is both subjective and objective in the unity of *Rta*. Jeanine Miller has written, “*Satya* (from *sat*), refers to that which is, the being-ness so to speak of anything; *rta* (from (‘to move, rise, go’)) refers to the “course of things”; it expresses being in manifestation, in activity, hence the visible order, the universal structure which is cosmic harmony.”¹³⁵ In the creation stanzas of the Rig Veda, “*ṛtaṃ ca satyaṃ cābhīddhāt tapaso 'dhy ajāyata*”¹³⁶, the idea is that *rta*, universal order, and *satya*, truth, were born out of the heat of *tapas* (penance). The term *dharma* has the meaning ‘support’ or ‘upholding’ of the cosmic order by the gods but acquires the meaning of the maintenance of social order thus connecting the cosmological, sacrificial and ethical planes.¹³⁷ P. T. Raju writes, “For a time the concept of *rta* as moral law given by Varuna remained important, but later, when the Aryans became more metaphysical and interpreted the gods as principles of the cosmos, the word *rta* yielded to the word *dharma*, which originally meant 'abstract law'. *Dharma* became not only the law of the universe, but also moral law, thus governing both the conduct of man and the behaviour of the

universe. In the Mīmāṃsā philosophy, which was based on the first two parts of the Veda, *Dharma* became the central concept, just as the Brahman became the central concept of the Vedānta philosophy, which was based upon the other two parts of the Veda.”¹³⁸

The other set of quasi-concepts that in the Rig Veda are more closely tied to the technical and energetic aspects of the sacrificial ritual but then gradually gain cosmological significance to the point of becoming the central categories of post-Vedic metaphysical struggle are *brahman* and *śrama*. In the Rig-Veda, the term *brahman* has meanings of ‘hymn, ‘poetic formula’, ‘the holy word’, which refers to the magical efficacy of the sacrificial techniques and formulas (*mantra*) both derivative of the power of the gods but also reciprocally animating or mobilising divine and sacred potency. There is an apotheosis or personification of this power of sacred formulas into the figure of *brihaspati* and then the figure of *prajāpati*. “The contribution of the Vedic hymns to the genesis of this meaning consists (a) in the development of the notion of the power and efficacy of *brahman* 'the sacrificial formula,' and (b) in the apotheosis of this notion under the name of *brahmanaspati*. The third meaning of *brahman* came naturally, since *brahman* finally took the place of *purusha* and *prajāpati* and so fell heir to their connotation.”¹³⁹ The sacrifice, then, is the source of immortality for humans as it was for gods. The obligation to imitate gods is grounded in a practical concern: humans seek to be like gods, to attain the world of gods (or divine space: *loka*). This is tantamount to becoming immortal.


The Indologist Patrick Olivelle has discussed two meanings of the verb $\sqrt{\text{śram}}$ and its nominal derivative *śrama* - "to labor, to toil, or to exert oneself." and "to become weary, tired, or exhausted.”¹⁴⁰ In the early Vedic literature, “As the toil inherent in the sacrifice, *śrama* is associated in a special way with three primordial and archetypal activities: the gaining of heaven by the gods, the discovery of sacrificial knowledge by the vedic seers, and the creation of the world.”¹⁴¹ “To create the world Prajapati toiled (*asramyat*) and tortured or heated himself (*tapo* ‘*tapyata*).”¹⁴² “In the legend of Sunahsepa *śrama* is associated with a life of wandering away from human habitats, a

meaning that may be a precursor of the later association of *śramana* with wandering ascetics.”¹⁴³ In the Vedic usage, the term has the connotation of effort or activity that has religious, ritual and sacrificial significance. Romila Thapar writes, “The terms *śramana* and *aśrama* in both cases derive from the root *śram*, to labour or make an effort. The *śramana*, therefore, is one who labours towards an objective and *aśrama* was the process of doing so. Eventually the place where the *śramanas* gathered was also called *aśrama*.”¹⁴⁴

The Vedic literature do not have in them the theory of *karma* and *punarjanman* that develops in the post-Vedic period in the Indian subcontinent. The Vedas have the idea of survival, but of single after-life. Depending upon the moral quality of the life led on earth, either one gets access to spiritual immortality in *devaloka* or in the *pitraloka*. S. Radhakrishnan writes, “The suggestion is that there is only one life after this, and its nature is determined by our conduct here.”¹⁴⁵ Even though the concept of *ātman* as soul-substance is not yet fully developed, there are hints of the substantiality and essentiality of what survives death.

This was the structure of eternal activity of nature, and the modes of comportment, but on the Vedic conditions of *varna*, *rta*, *satya*, *ātman*, *brahman* (Fig 5). The hierarchical ideology of *Varna* is not yet rationalised via theories of *karma* and *punarjanman* but are evoked in cosmogonic contexts at various places as extensively documented by B. R. Ambedkar¹⁴⁶. The Vedas are only addressed to twice-born (*dvija*) males insofar as only they can aspire for immortality and participate in the *yajña* or sacrifice. Although every twice-born man had the obligation to sacrifice, yet not every man was entitled or qualified to perform it. Only a married man accompanied by his legitimate wife was qualified to be a sacrificer; the husband and the wife constituted a single sacrificial persona. The obligation to sacrifice, therefore, implies the obligation to get married. Thus the theory of *varna* fundamentally limited even the premetaphysical universality of Vedism. Daya Krishna has argued in this respect that,

“The *yajña*-centric view of life, also saw human life as centred in desire, but did not think that there was anything essentially wrong with it. Rather, it prescribed various types of activities known as *yajña* to attain these desires. The procedure of performing these *yajña* was, however, not only prescribed by a transcendental authority and known only to specialists who alone could perform them on behalf of people on payment of the prescribed fee, but by a strange twist of logic, *yajña* were not allowed to be performed for everyone and thus lost their universality just when they could easily have become widespread. The denial of the right to *yajña* by the orthodox interpreters of the Vedas to *śūdras* deprived the so-called *śruti* of that universal claim which it had made for itself and which was made on its behalf by others. The *varna*-centric theory of society as derived from the Vedas and its construal in such a way as to make it totally and exclusively *yajña*-centric and deprive the *śūdras* the right to them, gave a permanent disabling twist to Indian thought about man and society which myriad attempts at rectification by outstanding personalities could hardly succeed in healing, then or later. Even the ‘knowledge-centric’ thought of the Upaniśads failed to include the *śūdras* as, in spite of his *brahman*-centric interpretation of the texts, Badarayana, as much as Jaimini, stuck to the view that according to the *śruti* itself, the *śūdras* could not be allowed access to it. The two divergent streams of Vedic interpretation, thus, concurred on the central fact of the social exclusion of the *śūdras* from the crucial Vedic performances, whether conceived of in terms of knowledge or action.”¹⁴⁷



5. Vedism

By the time of the later Upaniśads, the ideas of *ātman* and *brahman* begin to acquire an abstract conceptuality. The context of these discussions is generally the metaphorical isomorphism between the structure of the cosmos and the structure of the body. The cosmos is the macrocosm and the body is its microcosmic representation or encapsulation. The senses of the body are isomorphic to the five cosmic elements and the deities associated with the senses. Patrick Olivelle writes, “While in the earlier vedic texts the focus is on the connections between the ritual and cosmic spheres, the concern of the Upaniśadic thinkers shifts to the human person; the connections sought after are between parts of the human organism and cosmic realities.”¹⁴⁸ The notion of *ātman* is used to mean the self or the spirit, the ultimate essence or substance of a human being, but these usages are not purely idealistic but generally related to the physical aspect of the body. “These are but the chief manifestations of the highest, the immortal, the incorporeal Brahman. . . . “Brahman, indeed, is all this, and a man may meditate on, worship or discard also those which are its manifestations.”¹⁴⁹

The notion of *brahman* becomes of the very summit of the hierarchical scheme or the very foundation of the scheme of all things, the node of integration of the ritual, bodily and cosmic realities and principles. “That from which these beings are born; on which, once born, they live; and into which they pass upon death—seek to perceive that! That is *brahman!*”¹⁵⁰ In the Upaniśads, there is an idea of the equation between the *ātman*, the essential I, and *brahman*, the ultimate or absolute. But there are a diversity of the accounts and themes of this relationship in a variety of different ways, not of some distilled conceptual structure.

The early Vedic society in the upper Gangetic plane was basically a village-centred tribal organisation based upon an economy of animal husbandry and agriculture. The period between 600 BCE to 350 BCE has been termed the period of second urbanisation in northern India after the first

urbanisation of the Indus Valley civilisation. Large-scale use of iron tools in agricultural operations, rapid rates of population growth, emergence of state apparatus, intensification of production and craft specialisation or growing division of labour are the factors that led to the rise of cities in the Gangetic plains.¹⁵¹ Thus this period is characterised by radical social, economic, political and cultural transformation which gets reflected in fundamental changes in the epistemic and metaphysical contours of thinking. With the complexification of urban society and the division of labour and the rise of a significant merchant class that contributed to the growth of individualistic sentiment, there is growing resentment against the ritual hegemony of the priestly Brahmin caste, the sacrificial organisation of social life begins to lose meaning and the ritualism and ceremonialism of Vedic culture are subjected to questioning. This questioning of orthodox ritualism is taking place both within Brahmanism and outside Brahmanism. On the one hand, in a reflective process partly immanent to the logic of interiorisation of the sacred meaning and individualisation of the subject of *yajña* (ritual sacrifice), the premetaphysical abstractions in the Vedas are acquiring mature philosophical form in the conceptions of *brahman*, *ātman* and *sat* in the Upaniṣadic literature, on the other hand, in the non-Brahmin and non-Vedic sections of particularly eastern Gangetic society, a variety of Śramanic schools and thinkers of naturalistic thinking are developing with completely different visions of reality organised around the idea of *asat* (non-existence) as rejection of the Vedic-Upaniṣadic episteme. The materialists school of Cārvāka and wandering ascetics such as Ajīta Kesakambali denied survival after death and any possible moral and soteriological culmination of being (in this sense, only the materialist have been *nāstika* in the deeper sense of the term).

The three major anti-Vedic Śramanic as well as anti-materialist philosophies to develop in this period in the Magadha region were Jainism, Ajivikism and Buddhism. These philosophies shared the image of *prakṛiti* as ceaseless activity with the Vedic and Upanishadic view of nature, but the manner in which they parsed and organised the moral and cosmological significance of this fact was

completely different. They rejected the cosmogonic principles of *rta*, *brahman* and *varna* and instead proposed a theory of reality based upon new concepts of *karman* and *punarjanman*. According to this new cosmology, existence is most fundamentally suffering, and each mental and physical action and the moral quality of each act adds to the *kārmic* accumulation. The soul or ‘stream of impressions’ takes birth again and again in different strata or position corresponding to the moral value of its *kārmic* accumulation. Rebirth organised around the law of *karma* is called *samsāra*. The soteriological aim in this cosmology is to exit the *sāmsāric* cycle of rebirth and be liberated from the infinite activity of nature into pure inactivity. But the three schools of philosophy fundamentally differ in their beliefs and theories about the interrelation between *karma*, *punarjanman* and *mokṣa*. In Jain metaphysics, *jīva* or soul-substance is subject to a beginningless chain of *kārmic* accumulation, which crates *bandha* or bondage. In order to exit the cycle of *samsāra*, the *jīva* cannot merely aspire to die but must through arduous penance and ascetic practice first free itself of all acquired *kārmic* mobilisation in the process termed *nirjara*, after which it can achieve *mokṣa* or ultimate immobilisation. Ajivika thought is similar to Jain thought in the belief that the soul is subject to *kārmic* bondage in a beginningless series of previous births and actions, but unlike in Jain thought, where the *jīva* can aspire towards *mokṣa* by undoing all acquired *karma*, in Ajivikism there is no such possibility of retrospective erasure and the soul must simply wait for the time when *kārmic* accumulation will naturally fade away on its own after numerous rebirths.

Buddhist metaphysics is fundamentally different from the other two traditions and in the sense of being more radically anti-Brahmanic. In the *Kaccānagotta Sutta*, Buddha criticises the two dominant absolutistic theories in Indian philosophy at the time, namely, *sassatavāda* or the belief in permanent existence (*atthita*) propounded in the Upaniśadic literature, and *ucchedavāda*, the belief in non-existence (*nathhita*) and annihilationism propounded by the materialists or naturalists, and sets forth the philosophical ‘middle path’. Thus Buddha rejects the notion of soul-substance in Upaniśadic as well Jain thought and sets forth the primary concepts of *anattā* or non-substantiality

and *anicca* or impermanence, but at the same time he disagrees with materialists in their rejection of survival and rebirth, significance of morality and the possibility of liberation. The middle path is that of the principle of *pratītyasamutpāda* or ‘dependent arising’ or ‘dependent origination’, according to which all *dhammas* (objects) arise through dependence on other *dhammas*, in other words, everything arises in conditionality, and there is nothing that arises or originates unconditionally or non-conditionally. As the Buddhologist David Kalupahana writes, “This theory of causation has been called the ‘middle path’ because it steers clear of the two extremes with regard to causation; self-causation, which leads to a belief in eternalism, and external causation, which leads to a belief in annihilationism.”¹⁵² The question is - if Buddha denies substance of soul, then how come he continues believing in *karma* and *punarjanman*, in the sense that what is the entity that is subject to the law of *karma* and the cyclicity of *samsāra*? Here Buddha’s answer is that even though there is no soul or self, but there is still a continuity of the stream of impressions that is subject to *karma* and *punarjanman* because of the continuation of desire and craving (*taṇhā*). On a deeper metaphysical level, from the perspective of *pratītyasamutpāda*, since there is no entity in-itself that exists, there cannot be a notion of the death of an in-itself existence as well. Therefore, Buddhist soteriology is distinct from Jain soteriology in that the purpose of meditation and renunciatory practice and the eightfold path is not the erasure of *kārmic* accumulation because that is not the real source of continuation of the cycle of *punarjanman*, but in fact the *nirodha* or cessation and extinction of the *taṇhā* or desire and craving for *samsāra* and to be reborn itself which is the route to *nirvana* (liberation). *Tilakkhaṇa* or the three marks of existence are *anicca* or impermanence, *dukkha* or suffering of existence, *anatta* or insubstantiality. The *ariyasaccāni* or the four noble truths in this context are *dukkha*, that is the suffering of being, *samudaya*, that is the origin or cause of suffering due to attachment to the transient world of *samsāra*, *nirodha*, that is the cessation or end of this craving or *taṇhā* and attachment, and *mārga*, that is the path towards *nirodha* and ultimately *nirvana*.

The origins of the post-Vedic episteme of *karman*, *punarjanman* and *mokṣa* absent in the Vedic literature are not entirely clear. But, as the Indologist Johannes Bronkhorst has argued, in the Upaniṣadic literature, these ideas are sporadically mentioned as esoteric forms of knowledge in the *Kshatriya* clan, whereas in the earliest texts of Jainism and Buddhism these ideas form the entire axiomatic and doxic framework of speculative thought, hence these ideas must have originated with the latter and are overtime adopted by the former.¹⁵³ I would like to make three points in regard to the extraordinary and mysterious development of this new episteme in Indian thought. One, as the society is getting more urbanised and complexified, there is a consolidation of, on the one hand, anxieties regarding death on the part of the individual especially in sections of the society that the Vedic framework excluded from educational and ritual operations, but even generally since the Vedic culture approached matters of life and death from a relatively pre-individual lens, and, on the other hand, questions and needs for justification of social and economic inequalities and hierarchies in society and the sheer asymmetries between circumstances and conditions of birth, again, especially amongst sections of the society excluded from Vedic structuring of aspiration and sociality. Thus there are curiosities and appetites for more universal models of theodicy, soteriology and also *thanatoneiosis* (meaning of death), beyond the fetish of the *yajña* which was theoretically and practically under the *brāhminic* priestly control. Two, even though to the modern secular eye these ideas come across as mythological and irrationalistic, in the historical context of their genesis, these concepts were paradoxically naturalistic, rationalistic and empiricist interventions in metaphysical thinking. In both the Brahmanic and Śramanic strands of philosophy in this initial period, *prakṛiti* is conceptualised as ceaseless activity and there is categorical rejection of any ex-nihilo creationistic conception of the universe as having a beginning or an ending, *anāditva*. In Buddhist and Jain epistemologies, all existing phenomena belong to the realm of causation and conditionality and which implies that there can be no uncreated or uncaused grounding of reality such as the cosmological principle of *rta* and *brahman*, which itself would be subject to change and

causal transformation. It is in drawing the complete implications of strict adherence to naturalistic and rationalistic principle of *pratītyasamutpāda* that makes Buddha raise the question of the origin of suffering and also to conceive of death without survival as not naturalistic enough an idea. Thirdly, the new schema of *punarjanman* and *Karman* in the Śramanic philosophies is targeted to displace the notion of single after life in Vedic Brahmanic ritualism insofar as the centrality of the *yajña* ritual in Vedic social and soteriological organisation was its power to inform the quality of the single after-life, or of survival, in *devaloka* or *pitraloka*, based upon accumulation *punya* (merit) and *paap* (demerit), in other words, if there is no final soteriological reward and punishment structure to survival, and survival itself is infinite and endless, then the horizon of liberation becomes the escape from this endlessness of survival, to which Vedic *yajña* can hardly serve any function at all.


In relation to this new understanding of the structure and significance of the activity of *prakṛiti* and meaning of liberation, the *śramanic* traditions invent a completely new mode of *śrama* of renunciation and monasticism with an altogether novel aim and universality. There is no consensus about whether renunciatory practices in South Asia developed in the Vedic or Upaniśadic traditions, the Śramanic traditions or even possibly in non-Aryan Harappan traditions. In some sense, a degree of withdrawal from social life into forest life seems to exist in the earlier period, particularly for older people who were not expected to contribute to economic and social production beyond a certain age. I also want to point out that unlike in the western or Chinese society, there has not been a historical logic of the *complete* assimilation of tribal peoples into the mainstream feudal-monarchical organisation in the history of the subcontinent, or we can say that the tribal peoples of the subcontinent successfully warded off and negotiated attempts at their assimilation until the modern period, and thus the significance of forest-dwelling has been a continuous concern for Indian speculative sociology or philosophical anthropology. But what is clear is that it was only in the Śramanic movement that renunciation and monasticism was given, firstly, central religious and

metaphysical importance in strong opposition to Vedic paradigms of domestic and ritual life, and secondly, a new motivation and purposiveness of liberation from the cycle of *saṃsāra*, that is infinite survival. Even if the Brahmanic tradition had practices of forest-dwelling before, there was never any serious conflict with the Vedic ideals of domesticity which crystallised in Buddhism and Jainism. Buddha categorically opposed Brahmanic rituals and sacrifices and discouraged people from participating in or donating to these practices and instead encouraged laity to give *dāna* to the *bhikkus* and the *sangha*. One of the logics of the theory of *karma* was to encourage individuals to imagine natural and moral causation from the perspective of the causal efficacy of their own actions and question the alleged causal powers of the priestly class or the Vedic gods and deities.

By the time of the Buddha, the term *śrama* acquires a particularly non-Brahmanic connotation. “It appears that at least by the time of Aśoka (middle of the third century B.C.E.) *śramana* was used principally, if not exclusively, with reference to non-Brahmanical ascetics.... An examination of early Brahmanical texts, several of which in all likelihood predate Asoka, however, indicates that the clear distinction and even opposition between *brahmana* and *śramana* may have been a later semantic development possibly influenced by the appropriation of the latter term by non-Brahmanical sects such as Buddhism and Jainism.”¹⁵⁴ Since Buddha did not profess any belief in god or Brahman or the Vedic *śruti*, and unlike in the Vedic usage where the universality of *śrama* in its ritual significance was limited by the exclusion the *śudras*, *avarnas* and women, Buddhism makes the four noble truths and the eightfold path universal for all castes and genders (*sārvavarnika*). The association of the term with Buddhism gives it a non-theological universality (*sārvabhaumata*), the philosophical meaning which can be expressed as ‘universal activity or effort or tension or weariness, activity or effort of universal significance.’ The *Śramana* movement frees the meaning of *śrama* from its attachment to Vedic ritualism and sacrifice and gave it an autonomous end of its own, a telos and finality of its own, which is of exiting *saṃsāra*. This maximised tension between domesticity and renunciation.

It is important to note that in its radical opposition to the Vedic organisation of domestic life towards constitution of a new monastic path, early, that is, *nikāya* Buddhism did not attribute any real metaphysical significance and universality to the life of the laity, that is, the domestic and productive life of the *upāsakas* (householder), except, one, of providing new entrants (*samanera*, *samaneri*) to join the *sangha* (monastic community), and two, of providing material and economic support to the *bhikkus* and *bhikkunis* seeking *nirvana* from *samsāra* (Fig. 6). The śramanic traditions made access to soteriology universal (*sārvavarnika*), but it was never worked out what the actual form of lay society is going to be. Ritualist Brahmanism initially opposes renunciation and foregrounds *grahastāśrama* (householder) as the *aikaśrama* (single āśrama) but fail to include *śūdras*, *avarnas* and women in ritual life and education and hence never achieves universality of scope. Pande writes,

“As against this positive outlook of the Vedic tradition, one notices the powerful current of *Nivṛiti* which was popularised by Buddhism and Jainism and which was in course of time accepted by the Brahmanical tradition. The Dharmasastras and the Smṛtis included the renunciation of life within the Vedic scheme of life as the Fourth Āśrama. The second Āśrama continued to be held the most important since on it depended the performance of Vedic religious duties as also the continuance of the social tradition. The challenge of the Nivṛtti dharma led to a transformation of the Vedic tradition through a new synthesis. This interactive synthesis was, however, not confined simply to the Vedic tradition; it affected the Buddhist, Jaina and other traditions of ascetic and other worldly spirituality. They developed elaborate forms of monastic life where educational, literary and artistic activities found ample scope. Not merely this, these ascetic sects had to create adequate attraction for the laity. They had to develop large systems of plastic and ritual symbols. Images, temples and monasteries, Puranic myths and legends, devotional cults with holy names and mystic charms became the common repertoire of all the sects, orthodox and heterodox.”¹⁵⁵



6. *Nikāya Buddhism*

1.3.3. Contestation Over The Structure and Significance of Incessant Activity of *Prakṛiti* and Corresponding Significance and Universality of Modes or Phases of *Śrama*

From the time of the Buddha (circa 500 BCE) till the demise of Buddhism in India at the turn of the first millennium CE, there are four primary fault-lines of distinct yet overlapping metaphysical contestations and tensions regarding the cosmological structure of *prakṛiti* and the nature of relevant modes or aspects of *śrama* capable of engaging this structure — (i) between orthodox Vedic ritualism and Buddhism (which metaphysically takes the form of debate between Purva Mīmāṃsā and Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist theory) (ii) between orthodox Vedic ritualism/realism and Upaniṣadic-Vedantic monasticism (which metaphysically takes the form of the confrontation

between different schools of *satkāryavāda* and schools of *asatkāryavāda*) (iii) between Vedāntic renunciation and Buddhist renunciation (iv) between the Buddhist clergy and Buddhist laity, which is related to though not identical with the tension between Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism. In other words, there is both internal strife within Buddhism, that is, *anātmavāda*, and external tension with Brahmanism, that is, *ātmavāda*, similarly there is internal friction within Brahmanism as well as external contestation with Buddhism. This long period is lush with philosophical and metaphysical activity of all different shades and hues, different thinkers and schools in the tradition are trying to accelerate, resolve or buttress these tensions from their respective vantage points, but the real stakes of this activeness cannot be fully grasped unless all these frictions are taken into consideration. With the disappearance of Buddhist theory by 10th century, the entire complexity and rigour of philosophical discussion gets reduced and Vedānta begins to enjoy uncritical dominance and progressively subsumes all strife within and between strands of Vedic ritualism and Upaniṣadic monasticism within its episteme. The scholarship on Indian philosophy has skilfully captured the individual metaphysical importance of these fault-lines, but it has failed to articulate the metaphysical importance in their complex mutual togetherness.

The new autonomous end of *mokṣa* given to monastic and renunciatory mode of life in the Śramanic movement was a challenge to the Vedic *yajña*-centric organisation of social life. “A defining characteristic of this form of asceticism was its rejection of the very values that formed the cornerstone of Brahmanical ethics: home, marriage, family, fire, and ritual activity. The new ascetics were wandering mendicants, without home, property, family, or ritual fire. They were called *anagni*, fireless men. They were committed to celibacy, not as a temporary vow such as that prevailing in the Brahmanical institution of studentship, but as a lifelong commitment. The significance of procreating a son was devalued with the emerging notion of personal salvation through individual effort.”¹⁵⁶ But this new idea of *śrama* also had an appeal for a section in the Brahmanical society that was already emerging in the immanent dialectic of the abstraction,

interiorisation and individualisation of significance of sacrifice in the Upaniṣadic literature. The Upaniṣads and early Vedānta propounded a more philosophical and knowledge-based approach (*jñāna mārga*) to soteriological and metaphysical problems towards the praxis of personal liberation. The issue in this knowledge-centric approach becomes to understand the relationship between *ātman* or self or soul-substance and *brahman* as the ultimate and attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*) by the overcoming of the ignorance (*avidya*) regarding the nature of this relationship, to which the ritualistic and sacrificial approach (*karma mārga*) are deemed fundamentally inadequate. Since such an approach threatened the centrality of *yajña* and the prestation economy revolving around it, it was opposed by ritualistic and sacrificial Vedism. For example, the exponents of the *aikaśrama* theory in the Dharmasūtras, Gautama and Baudhāyana, opposed renunciatory and knowledge-centric mode of life on grounds that it promoted celibacy and did not have any direct sanction in the Vedic scriptures.¹⁵⁷ As Baudhayana declares, "But the Venerable Teacher (prescribes) a single *aśrama*, because one does not beget offspring in the others."¹⁵⁸ The historian of Indian philosophy Hajime Nakamura writes regarding the ideological confrontation between Jaimini and Bādrāyana thus:

...the life centred about the rituals of the Aryans and advocated by Jaimini, and that of the religious mendicant idealised by Badarayana were directly opposite in nature...among these four stages, Jaimini particularly placed stress on the life of the householder, while Badarayana valued more the life of the wandering mendicant.¹⁵⁹

According to Jaimini, the objective is to attain for oneself, by means of the rituals, a well-being equal to that of the gods. The clear knowledge of Brahman is no more than an aid in attaining this objective. Accordingly, he may well have thought that the wisdom of Brahman was useless for the gods. However, on the other hand, according to Badarayana, the union with the absolute, who transcends even the gods, is the final objective. Accordingly, even the gods must meditate on Brahman in order to transcend their own state.¹⁶⁰

It is in the context of this conflict that the *aśrama* theory developed as an attempt to absorb the renunciatory impulse within Brahmanism and glue the ritualistic and renunciatory modes within Brahmanism to isolate the more radical renunciatory modes of Buddhism. As Olivelle argues, "The conflict between the Brahmanical mainstream and the various ascetic institutions, such as Buddhism, Jainism, and even ascetic movements within Brahmanism itself, that emerged in India around the middle of the first millennium BCE, therefore, should be viewed not so much as a conflict between the man-in-the-world and the ascetic in the wilderness but as a battle between diametrically opposite ways of understanding and institutionalising the ascetic impulse."¹⁶¹ Pande writes, "It is true that the first three *aśramas* must have, in fact, evolved by the later Vedic age. The first two *aśramas* are implied in the whole of Vedic religion while the third *aśramas* was obviously a resultant of the practice of pondering and meditating over the significance and symbolism of sacrificial ritual. The acceptance of a fourth state, however, was a revolution which changed the significance of the other three also."¹⁶²

There are four modes of *śrama* or universal activity that Buddhism and the ritualistic and renunciatory strands within Brahmanism were contesting on and attempting to synthesise into entirely different cosmological, axiological and soteriological frameworks (Table 1). Mode A (Mobility + Relation): This is the concept of the student or educational phase or aspect which in Buddhist sociology is given the term *śramanera* and in Brahmanic sociology is termed *brahmacarya*. In metaphysical terms, this is the mode of activity in which there is a sense of mobility (*cāla*) in experience along with a sense of relatedness (*samyoga*). Mode B (Mobility + Separation): This is the concept of the wandering mendicant or monastic phase, which in Brahmanic terminology is called *vannaprastha* and in Buddhist perspective is termed the *Bhikkhu*. In metaphysical terms, this is the mode of universal activity in which there is a sense of movement (*cāla*) coupled with a sense of relative separation from the relational field (*viyoga*). Mode C

(Immobility + Relation): This is the concept of the phase or aspect of the householder, which takes the name of *upāsaka* in Buddhist sociology and the term *grahasta* in Brahmanic sociology. In metaphysical terms, this the mode of *śrama* or universal activity in which there is a lack of movement (*acala*) but there a sense of imbrication in the relational field (*samyoga*). Mode D

(Immobility + Separation): This is the concept of the aspect or phase of renunciation and enlightenment, which in Brahmanic soteriology is termed *saṃnyāsa* whereas in *nikāya* Buddhist terminology is called *arhat*. In metaphysical terms, this is the mode of *śrama* or universal activity in which there is a sense of immobilisation (*acala*) along with sense of separateness (*viyoga*). *Aśrama* theory is an attempt to formalise this diversity into a Brahmanic framework premised upon the fundamentality of the Vedic *śruti* and *smṛiti*, different formalisations within Brahmanic sociology organise the diversity differently, either formulating temporal succession or spatial simultaneity between the modes, or a sense of choice for the upper caste males to select a path of life. Buddhist sociology never attempts to theoretically formalise or systematise this diversity, but a broad idea of the temporal succession between the modes exists in the practical and theoretical culture in that there is a necessary period of education an individual undertakes in order to join the monastery as a *bhikkhu* which can possibly lead to the path of attaining the highest stages of enlightenment.

Mode of Śrama		Buddhism	Brahmanism
Mode A	(<i>Cāla + Samyoga</i>) (Mobility + Relation)	<i>Sāmaṇera/Sāmaṇerī</i>	<i>Brahmacārya</i>
Mode B	(<i>Cāla + Viyoga</i>) (Mobility + Separation)	<i>Bhikkhu/ Bhikkhunī</i>	<i>Vannaprastha</i>
Mode C	(<i>Acala + Samyoga</i>) (Immobility + Relation)	<i>Upāsaka</i>	<i>Grahasta</i>
Mode D	(<i>Acala + Viyoga</i>) (Immobility + Separation)	<i>Arhat</i>	<i>Sannyasa</i>

2. Modes or Phases of Śrama

Here I will introduce two new concepts to our discussion to elucidate the difference between how this contested diversity of modes of śrama and modes of life are integrated and threaded with the distinct cosmologies of Buddhism and Brahmanism respectively. These two concepts are — *amūrtana* or abstraction, and *sans̄leśana* or synthesis. In Brahmanic cosmo-sociology, the educational phase involves gaining knowledge of Vedic scriptures, thus it involves abstraction or *amūrtana* from the nature of the ultimate as encapsulated in the *śruti* and *smṛiti*, and its synthesis or *sans̄leśana* in the pupil's knowledge and practice. The household mode involves abstraction from the knowledges, skills and techniques gained in the *brahmacarya* mode towards the synthesis of

social symbolic exchange between humans and gods, and humans and humans, via sacrificial ritual ceremonialism. The forest-dwelling mode involves *amūrtana* or abstraction from all social relationality and the *sansleśana* or synthesis of self-meditative and ascetic practice, and the renunciatory mode involves synthesis with the ultimacy of *brahman*. Nikāya Buddhist cosmology or meta-anthropology proposes a fundamentally independent dynamics of abstraction and synthesis between the modes in the context of a different understanding of nature and significance of *prākṛitik* or natural reality. It fundamentally complexifies the relationship between abstraction and synthesis by rendering it non-linear in its emphasis on direct renunciation, both in the sense of complexifying the linearity of stages, but even most importantly, it universalises the dynamics by including all individuals in its fold, irrespective of caste and gender. Thus Buddhism blows open the whole meaning, distribution and scope of abstraction and synthesis which is in many ways the central moment of Indian intellectual history, which the rest of Indian intellectual history can be seen as a search for an adequate response to. The educational phase does not include the Vedic *śruti* but in fact involves gaining the knowledge and techniques of the teachings of Buddha (*buddhavacana*) along with philosophical discussions between different schools of thought which gets synthesised as the students' knowledge and skills. The phase of monasticism involves abstraction from the acquirements of the educational mode and its *sansleśana* or synthesis in the theoretical and practical activities of the eightfold path possibly leading to the attainment of enlightenment. The source of abstraction of the *upāsaka* are the path of *buddhavacana* and also the spiritual merit and demerit they receive in exchange for *dāna* to the monks and monastery which gets synthesised in the social and individual lives of laity.

The real stakes, liveliness and concerns of the different schools of philosophy that develop in this period both in Brahmanism and Buddhism cannot be understood if only analysed through the lens of one particular mode of *śrama*, but only in the mutual tensions and harmonies between different modes of universal activity and their metaphysical and axiological schematisation. The

scholarship on Indian philosophy has studied the different schools of Brahmnic philosophy — Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Prūva-Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta or Uttara Mīmāṃsā — and the debates between them and the different schools of Buddhist philosophy - Sarvāstivāda, Vaibhāsika, Sautrāntika, Mādhyamaka, Yogācāra, and the Dignāga school — and the debates between them predominantly from the lens of *mokṣa*, which is only one aspect of the tensionality of *śramyata* as I have outlined. Krishna has raised this issue in the following manner:

The basic trouble about the view that Indian philosophy is concerned with *mokṣa* is how to make intelligible its multifarious other concerns in terms of this supposedly central perspective, which alone is presumed to give it meaning....There seem to be a host of problems in Indian philosophy which do not appear to have any direct or indirect relation, even in the remotest way, to *mokṣa*”¹⁶³

Yet, though the facts are obvious, it is surprising that for millennia none should have asked himself the simple question as to how the author of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* can be taken seriously when he asks us to believe that the knowledge of his various categories such as *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (activity), *śabdnya* (generic qualities), etc., would lead to *mokṣa*. Or, for that matter, when the author of the *Nyaya-sūtra* tells us that a knowledge of the various *pramāṇas* (means of knowledge) and the logical fallacies would lead us to the same goal. Or how, for example, the controversies between the various schools of Buddhism are supposed to lead to *nirvāna*.¹⁶⁴

These discussions express concerns and curiosities that cannot be understood solely from the lens of *mokṣa* but are also about other *puruṣārtha* (*kama*, *artha*, *dharma*) and different aspects of life ranging from epistemology, problems of perception, philosophy of language and grammar, ethics, etc. As B. K. Matilal writes, “The Vedic scriptures along with the Upaniṣads, undoubtedly, constitute the *mokṣa-sāstra*. But the *darśanas* followed a distinct methodology, and formed an entirely separate discipline. Thus, my point is that the classical texts of *darśanas* were not

therapeutics for *nirvana* but dealt with philosophy properly and in all seriousness that their time, society and environment allowed.”¹⁶⁵ Particularly Vaiśeṣika school which was staunchest defender of *asatkāryavāda* (theory of novel causation) and evolutionary atomic combinatorial realism, had the notion of *abhyudaya* as material progress and happiness, and also was accused of seminihilism by Sankara, and several of Vaiśeṣika ideas like enumeration (*padartha*) were criticised by Nyayaiyikas for not being soteriologically relevant. Jadunath Sinha writes regarding Vaiśeṣika conception of liberation, “Kanada says: ‘Dharma is what accomplishes happiness (*abhyudaya*) and liberation (*nihsreyasa*)’. *Abhyudaya* is interpreted as happiness (*such*), heaven (*svarga*), true knowledge of reality (*tattvajnana*) and welfare (*mandala*). It should be taken in the sense of world happiness and happiness in heaven. Kanada regards happiness as the end of positive actions (*pravrtti*) and liberation as the end of negative actions (*nivrtti*).”¹⁶⁶ Nyaya, Vaiśeṣika and Purva-Mīmāṃsā are realist schools of thought, and Purva-Mīmāṃsā is against renunciation and foregrounds ritualism. Samkhya is also a quasi-realist school of thought since, unlike the *satkāryavāda* of Vedanta, which is based either upon *vivartavāda* or *Brahman-parinamavāda*, the *satkāryavāda* of Samkhya is based upon *Prakriti-paranamavāda*. There is intense debates and tensions between Samkhya and Vedanta, Nyaya and Samkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedanta, Nyaya and Samkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Yogacara, Vedanta and Madhyamaka, Nyaya and Dignaga school, etc. Ultimately, this intense debate is between individual thinkers. All this complexity gets reduced in the subsequent period of uncritical doxographical hegemony of Vedanta and Gita that not only homogenise Buddhist intellectual diversity but also homogenise Vedic-Upaniśadic intellectual diversity as well.

1.3.4. Strategies of Metaphysical Systematisation in Buddhism and Brahmanism

One of the ways in which the friction between different modes of *śrama* or universal activity or modes of life manifested itself in doctrinal and metaphysical terms is the doctrine of two truths regarding the real cosmological and soteriological structure of *prakṛiti* in Buddhist and Brahmanic philosophy. In Buddhist philosophy, there was a crucial distinction between *samvṛtīsatya*, that is, conventional truth, and *paramārthasatya*, that is, ultimate truth. *Samvṛtīsatya* is basically the epistemological commitments and beliefs regarding the ontological nature of reality, it is an everyday phenomenal awareness of the conditional nature of reality. It is constituted by *prapañca*, that is, the rational and metaphysical representations of the objects of experience that lead to endless irresolvable debate between mutually contradictory philosophical positions, and by *vikalpa*, which is constructive imagination at play in organising the object of experience into a seemingly coherent yet distorted picture of reality. *Paramārthasatya* is the ultimate truth that is attainable by sufficiently following the path laid out by the Buddha, of eradicating and dissolving all the coverings of conventional language and knowledge, that is, *niśprapañca* and *nirvikalpa*, and seeing that there is no essential nature underlying either the sensation of self or the appearance of unity of *dhammas*. The *dharmas* are also in perpetual flux, 'in a beginningless state of commotion', and *nirvana* is posited as the ultimate cessation of this 'commotion' for a person. Nirvana is also said to be the ultimate reality, the ultimate nature of things, to be contrasted with the phenomenal existence of *dharmas*.

Similarly, in Brahmanic philosophy, as we have already discussed regarding the ideological confrontation between Jaimini and Bādrāyana, there was a difference between the truth of *ātman*

and the truth of *brahman* and the *jñāna mārga* (knowledge-based approach) and *karma mārga* (ritualistic approach). From the perspective of orthodox ritualistic vedism and Purva-Mīmāṃsā, *karma*-centred understanding of the world was primary, whereas in the Vedantic and Upanishadic or Uttar-Mīmāṃsā school, the *karma*-centred approach was inferior to the *mokṣa*-centred understanding of the world. This difference has been articulated as the difference between *jñānakāṇḍa* and *karmakāṇḍa*. In the Mundukya Upaniṣad the teacher, Angiras, distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge and refers to these as higher knowledge (*parāvidyā*) and lower knowledge (*aparāvidyā*).

It is only when seen in this context can the the metaphysical interventions of Nāgārjuna and Śāṅkara in the history of Indian metaphysics be seen in their complete significance and efficacy. They are the great systematisers of their respective traditions in the face of both internal and external incongruities. Both thinkers are trying to resolve the problems of incongruity and friction that the cosmo-sociologies or meta-anthropologies of their respective traditions are faced with and attempting the systematisation and integration of mutually incompatible modes of universal activity (along with the aspects of *amurtan* or abstraction and *sansleśan* or synthesis of the different modes of activity) and mutually contradictory truths. The important point to note is that in both Brahmanism and Buddhism, there is an ongoing attempt to thread the incompatibilities between the day to day this-worldly household and productive social being and the renunciatory other-worldly personal liberation-oriented individual being into a consistent metaphysical systematicity. The philosopher T. R. V. Murti has written regarding the project of systematisation in both Vedanta and Madhyamika as follows :

It must not be forgotten that the Vedanta and the Madhyamika belong to two different traditions - the *ātman* tradition of the Upaniṣads and the *anātman* tradition of the Buddhists. The Vedanta is a complete and consistent formulation of the *ātman* doctrine of the Upaniṣads which conceive

reality as pure being, as not subject to change and as one identical universal being. *Brahman* is the soul or spirit of things, their essence or reality. Change and particularity are taken as appearance of the underlying *ātman* or *Brahman*. This I have called the substance view of reality. As opposed to this, Buddhism began with the rejection of the soul or substance and conceives the real, as becoming, as a continuum of momentary entities. The Vibhāyavāda of Buddhism is the critical analysis of concepts and linguistic usage. It rejected and relegated soul, substance, the universal and the whole as mere words without any backing in fact. The Madhyamika philosophy is the complete and consistent formulation of the sceptical attitude that was born with Buddhism.¹⁶⁷

In the scholastic period of Buddhist philosophy following the death of Buddha, there was a philosophical and doctrinal debate between Sarvāstivāda school (based upon the Abhidharma canon) and the Sautrāntika school regarding the nature of causality, the problem of perception, the syntheticity of experience and the path of abstraction out of both syntheticity and causality. In earlier Buddhism, the fact of the *dharmas* (phenomenal objects) being conditioned was considered different from the principle of dependent arising. *Dharma* are momentary elements, the units of suffering because they are impermanent. *Skandha* (aggregates of clinging) perish immediately at end of this life and new *skandha* emerge immediately at the beginning of new life. Thus there is no eternity or continuity of substance which would imply annihilationism. There is neither permanence nor continuity, thus the theories of *anātman* (soullessness) and *anicca* (impermanence). A thing (*dharma*) has two aspects: the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) which is temporal (*kalika*, *kṣaṇika*) and the substance (*dravya*) which is eternal. But in the Sarvāstivāda, there was a conflation of the conditioned phenomenal reality with *pratityasamutpada* (dependent arising). It was argued that the conditioned *dharmas* carry four characteristic marks of existence, which are themselves conditioned factors. For the Sarvāstivāda school, *nirvana* was the substance of unconditioned, which was beyond the conditioned and the three marks of existence, subject to *satkāryavāda*, that is, identity


theory of causation. There was also the momentary theory of static time (*kshanakavada*) in the Abhidhamma, which was synthesised experientially by a notion of *svabhava* (own-becoming).

The Sarvastivadins recognized four moments, the nascent (*jati*), the static (*sthit*), the decaying (*jara*), and the cessant (*mnSa*). The Sautrāntikas differed from all of them in accepting two moments only, the nascent (*utpada*) and cessant (*vyaya*), and rejecting the static moment (*sthitiksana*). The Sautrāntika school believed in *asatkāryavāda*, the non-identity theory of causation, because for them *nirvana* was non-substantiality of unconditioned, in this sense they rejected the momentary notion of time since that would imply a *dravya* (substance) of syntheticity, and tried to show how the three marks of existence are real and interpenetrate the succession of time-moments independent of substantial syntheticity. Sautrāntika school argued that there is not even one moment when a phenomenon (*dharma*) remains in order to be cognized in direct perception. Thus they were advocates of what came to be popularly known as “a theory of representative perception.” They feared that the conceptions of duration and identity would necessarily rule out any notion of change or impermanence. Therefore they were compelled to accept the theory of *asatkāryavāda* (novel production) regarding every momentary existence while at the same time rejecting the idea of static moment. Thus the entire theorisation of the causality of *dharms* is important to distinguish them from the unconditioned *dharms* since *nirvana* and space (*akaśa*) are also *dharms*. This is at stake in the characteristic marks of conditioned *dharms* and whether the marks are themselves conditioned ad infinitum. Sarvāstivāda believe past present future as the marks of conditioned *dharms*, Sautrāntika only allow for present whereas Nāgārjuna negates all and also negates realism regarding time. As T. H. Stcherbatsky writes,

When the Sarvastivadin maintains that “everything exists”, it means that all elements exist, and the emphasis which is put on the reality of elements refers to the conception that their past as well as their future transition represents something real. From this fundamental tenet the school

derives its name. Since the conception of an element answers rather to our conception of a subtle force than of a substance, the reality, i.e. effectiveness, of the past is not so absurd as it otherwise would appear. The Sautrantikas denied the reality of the past and the future in the direct sense, they admitted the reality only of the present.¹⁶⁸

The Sarvāstivāda conflate *samskrta* (conditioned) and *pratityasamutpada*, thus *nirvana* (asamskrta) is beyond *pratityasamutpada*. But for Nāgārjuna *nirvana* is conflated with *pratityasamutpada*. For Nāgārjuna, *nirvana* is neither substantiality of unconditioned nor non-substantiality of the unconditioned, the *nirvana* is precisely *pratityasamutpada*, because emptiness is empty not in the sense of nothingness or inexistence, but in the sense unconditioned abstractness as such. In this sense, there is identification of *lokasamvrtisatya* and *paramarthasatya*, and *saṃsāra* and *nirvana* in his philosophy (Fig. 7). “For Nagarjuna, it is a mistake to distinguish conventional from ultimate reality—the dependently arisen from emptiness—at an ontological level. Emptiness just is the emptiness of conventional phenomena. To perceive conventional phenomena as empty is just to see them as conventional and as dependently arisen. ... their ultimate nonexistence and their conventional existence are the same thing. Hence the deep identity of the two truths. And this is because emptiness is not other than dependent arising and, hence, because emptiness is empty.”¹⁶⁹ Therefore, Madhyamaka is an account of the path towards abstraction from the syntheticity of experience (*anubhava*), which is one and the same as insubstantial natural causation (*pratityasamutpada*), into aconditionality (*nirupādhiyata*) of pure non-temporal potentiality (*śūnyata*).



7. *Madhyamaka*


In Brahmanic philosophy, the traditional distinction between two levels of knowledge, *paravidya* and *aparavdiya* had, by the time of Vedanta Philosophy, become known as the distinction between *pāramāṛthikadṛṣṭi*, that is, ultimate or final point of view and *lokvyāvahārikadṛṣṭi*, that is, pragmatic or conventional point of view. Sankara's Advaita Vedanta is the most metaphysically consistent articulation of the concept of *dravya* or substance central to Brahmanic thought. For him, the ultimate or the absolute is the substance of *brahman*, and all manifestation of difference or multiplicity is simply the form of appearance of the unity of *brahman*. For the notion of absolute substantiality of *brahman* to hold water, it has to be shown metaphysically that even while engaging in the apparent creative manifestation of a sensible and differential world, *brahman* as the absolute

does not undergo any modification (*vritti*) or transformation whatsoever, and this is the core task Sankara sets up for himself. To this end, he develops the concepts of *māyā*, *adhyāsa* and *avidyā* or *ajñāna*. *Māyā* is the voluntary power of creation of *brahman*, through which it manifests a world of difference and multiplicity simply as an act of its freedom, which is illusory in the sense that it does not arise out of the necessity of the nature of *brahman* and yet is not unreal or inexistent (Fig. 8). There is a three-tiered structure to the relationship between *māyā* and *brahman - prātibhāsika-satta* or the truly illusory, *vyavahārika-satta* or the empirical, and *pāramārthika-satta* or the supreme. As the philosopher Rasvihary Das has explained, “Nothing is absolutely unreal. The illusory object is less real than the ordinary object which is its substratum; and the ordinary object is less real than Brahma which is the substratum of all objective existence^ Every experience has its characteristic object which cannot be altogether unreal, because if it were absolutely unreal it would not be given in experience.”¹⁷⁰ *Adhyāsa* (superimposition) is the inclination to break up the nature of absolute consciousness into a subject-object reaction and the process of the imaginary attribution of something to where it does not exist. Concealment (*āvaraṇa*) of reality and distortion (*vikṣepa*) of it into something else in our mind are then the two functions of an illusion-producing ignorance (*avidyā* or *ajñāna*). “Ignorance thus in the case of illusion functions in two ways; first, it prevents the knowledge of the real object and, secondly, it makes us see something else In the place of the object. Objectively considered, ignorance may be said to hide the real object from view (*avarana*) and to display a different object in the place of the real one (*viksepa*).”¹⁷¹ *Vivartavāda* and *pariṇāmavāda* both agree, however, in holding that the effect is already contained somehow in its material cause and, therefore, both come under *satkāryavāda* or the theory that the effect (*kārya*) is existent (*sat*) in the material cause, and is not a new thing. The Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā belong to the *ārambhavāda*, an atomistic theory of creation *asatkāryavāda*. While Sankara shares the perspective of *satkāryavāda* with the Samkhya philosophy, he disagrees with Samkhya’s doctrine of *pariṇāmavāda*, since if the effect is already logically and materially contained in the

cause, then that cannot be any real modification. He finds that the Śāṅkhya does not realise the full implication of *satkāryavāda*. These difficulties are avoided by *vivartavāda* according to which change is apparent. The difference between Rāmānuja and Śāṅkara, then, is that while, according to Rāmānuja, the matter or *prakṛti* which is an integral part of *brahman* really undergoes modification, Śāṅkara holds that *brahman* does not undergo any real change, change is only apparent, not real.

Śāṅkara also speaks of *māyā* as the power of *brahman*, but this creative power, according to him, is not a permanent character of *brahman*, as Rāmānuja thinks, but only a free will which can, therefore, be given up at will. For Śāṅkara, the self or *ātman* is pure consciousness that mistakenly sees itself in conjunction with bodily attributes and phenomenological datum, and he identifies this pure consciousness of the *ātman* with the pure consciousness of *brahman*. The soul appears as the limited, finite self because of its association with the body which is a product of ignorance. Between *ātman* and *brahman* is a *real* identity between terms which *appear* as different. Thus Vedānta is an account of the path towards synthesis of soul-substance (*ātman*) into abstractness of experience that is a conditionality of pure non-spatial reality (*brahman*).

Sāṅkara is in a way faced with the same problematic of two incompatible conceptions of truth in Brahmanic philosophy that Nāgārjuna was faced with in the context of Buddhist thought, and also he broadly follows the Nāgārjunic template of resolving this tension by mutually harmonising the different soteriological and metaphysical understandings of *prakṛti* and the different modes of universal activity adequating this ultimate structure. Therefore, Nāgārjuna and Śāṅkara are the two great systematisers of the *anātman* and *ātman* traditions of Indian metaphysics. The reason for this is that their attempt at reconciliation of the transcendental and the empirical and of different modes of *śrama*, or *marga* or *artha* constitutes the template of the theological and theistic innovations in the consequent periods of Buddhist and Brahmanical history. The question can be asked that both the thinkers are liberation-centric and renunciation-centric thinkers, then in what sense could they be said to be said to have provided the template of reconciliation between the domestic, productive



8. Advaita Vedanta

and this-worldly approach to the real structure of *prakṛiti* and the renunciatory, knowledge-based other-worldly approach to the real structure of *prakṛiti*? The central reason for this is the identification between the ultimate and the conventional in their metaphysics, an identification that in both thinkers has a curiously mixed character of both epistemological and anti-epistemological aspects. T. R. V Murti writes, “The Madhyamika absolutism is an *advayavāda*. *Advaya* is knowledge free from the duality of the extremes (*antas* or *drstis*) of 'is' and 'is not', being, becoming, etc. It is knowledge freed of conceptual distinctions. *Advaita* is knowledge of a differenceless entity - *Brahman* (Pure Being). *Advaya* is purely an *epistemological* approach; the

advaita is *ontological*. The sole concern of the Madhyamika *advayavāda* is the purification of the faculty of knowing. The primordial error consists in the intellect being infected by the inveterate tendency to view Reality as identity or difference, permanent or momentary, one or many, etc.”¹⁷² In Nagarjuna, while the entire project is to realise the *nirvikalpa* nature of the non-duality of *śūnyata* and *pratityasamutpada*, the entire derivation of this nonconceptual unity is paradoxically deeply epistemological and logical. Similarly, in the case of Śankara, as the philosopher K. C. Bhattacharya has pointed out, while the entire project of gaining understanding of the non-duality between *ātman* and *brahman* involves overcoming the *avidya* and *adhyasa* of *Maya*, the deeper Advaitic soteriological horizon entails the pure cessation of epistemological and philosophical curiosity as such. Therefore the entire soteriological path prioritises the lifestyle of monks and renunciates, a life fully committed to reflection and meditation. The Sankaran framework effectively is addressed to a select group of twice born males, and the *śūdras*, *avarnas* women and laity in general are excluded from the path, a problem that Sankara poorly attempts to resolve with the concept of *adhikāra*. Only *sannyasins* can access *sadyomukti*, others are involved at the level they can be involved in *saguna* *brahmana*, thus not escaping karmic cycle but there is the concept of *kramamukti*. The Nagarjunan framework is more democratic in the sense that there is no demarcation of *Adhikara*, yet the laity in day to day productive domestic life cannot involve itself in a purely meditative and contemplative monastic life. Nevertheless the subsequent flowering of devotionism in medieval Hinduism and worship in Mahayana Buddhism that variously attempted to create a deeper role for excluded sections and the laity in general in a mode of participation with the ultimate reality compatible with active day to day life were significantly based upon the metaphysical demonstrations of Sankara and Nagarjuna respectively. In Nagarjuna and Sankara, as metaphysical systems, there is prioritisation of the overcoming of ignorance as central to liberation, which involves identification of the empirical and the transcendental, but this identification soteriologically is presented as epistemological in character, thus in a way delimited to the monks, and excluding laity or the non-

dvija, who are not involved in epistemological learning, but the reason why these thinkers are crucial for the synthesis of different *śramas*, *margas*, *arthas*, is that the key or route to liberation is the identity of ātman and brahman or saṃsāra and *sunyata*, this idea of the real identity is then utilised by the theologians of respective traditions to propose and foreground a non-epistemological, nonconceptual, aesthetic and devotional bridge between empirical and transcendental.

In the Mahayana tradition, philosophers from the school of Madhyamaka and Yogacara such as Atiśa, Śāntideva, Kamalisila and Asanga develop ideas and concepts to further bridge the relationship between *nirvana* and *saṃsāra*. The ideal of *arhat* is deemed as inferior to the greater ideal of *bodhisattva* who, instead of seeking personal liberation, is someone who never entirely passes over into *nirvana* but helps all fellow creatures to better *samsāric* life and also to achieve *nirvana*, by the principle of *karuna* (compassion) which becomes the central principle in Mahayana Buddhism. This principle emerges from another principle called *upekshā* or equanimity, which emerges from meditation on *bodhicitta*. *Apratishthita nirvana* is a nonabiding *nirvana*, an unrestricted, or not-fixed *nirvana*, which is to say that it is a *nirvana* which embodies two dimensions – the upward movement away from *saṃsāra*, away from greed, hatred and delusion, and a downward movement returning out of compassion to the maelstrom of *samsaric* institutions and persons. In this context, the mythology of different *Amitabha Buddha* organising different *buddhakṣetra* (Buddhfield) develops. The Buddhist historian Akira Hirawaka has written in this context:

Laymen were unable to strictly observe the precepts or to devote much time to meditation and thus could not put the Buddha's teachings into practice in the traditional ways. Instead, they had to depend on the Buddha's compassion for their salvation. While monastic Buddhism emphasized the Buddha's teaching, lay Buddhism emphasized the role of the Buddha in salvation. Teachings concerning the saving power of the Buddha appeared in response to the

religious needs of laymen. Beliefs in the Buddhas Amitabha and Aksobhya reflected the layman's desire to depend on someone greater than himself.¹⁷³

For Hinayana Buddhists, *nirvana* was the final goal, characterized by some Mahayana- nists as the extinction of body and mind. In contrast, Mahayana Bud- dhists argued that the practitioner was to attain "active *nirvana*" (*apratisthita-nirvana*) in which he did not remain quiescent. Bodhisattvas such as Manjusri, Samantabhadra, and Avalokitesvara had more powers than Buddhas, but continued to devote themselves to saving sentient beings instead of attaining Buddhahood. Buddhas such as Amitabha or Sakyamuni (as an eternal Buddha) never entered extinction (*parinir- vana*). They continued to help sentient beings. Entering *nirvana* was seen as nothing more than an expedient means to help save sentient beings.¹⁷⁴

The different strands of Vedanta — Ramanuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita, Madhva's Dvaita Vedanta, Vallabha's Śuddhādvaita and others — while conceding the ultimacy of nonduality, try to emphasize the non-epistemological, nonconceptual and aesthetic character of the identification between *ātman* and *brahman* to make space for more devotional, personal, and *bhakti*-based relationship between the two, thus they try to reconcile absolute nonduality with relative difference and modification (*vritti*) which makes them metaphysically weak but theologically strong interventions. *Bhakti* as selfless and non-instrumental love and devotion to personalised form of the ultimate is in this manner posited as the more fundamental *mārga* than both *karma-mārga* and *jnana-mārga*, which are considered inferior and self-serving forms of ritualism or dry gnosis. "In *nirguna brahman* all distinctions are obliterated and are overcome; in *saguna brahman* they are integrated: a duality in unity is present here, and, consequently, the power of love. *Nirguna brahman* is a state of mental-spiritual enlightenment (*jndna*); *saguna brahman* is a state of vital loving awareness (*bhakti*). *Nirguna brahman* is conceptually an objectification of spiritual experience without distinction or determination (*nirvikalpa samadhi*); *saguna brahman* is an objectification of determinate spiritual experience (*savikalpa samadhi*)."¹⁷⁵ *Bhakti-mārga* is shown to be connected to the central concept

of *niṣkāmakarma* (desireless action) in the Bhagavad-Gītā, which separates itself from the instrumentality and selfishness of *karma-mārga* and the denial of *karma* and *pravṛtti* in the *jñāna-mārga*, but simultaneously also bridges the gap between *karma* and *mokṣa* in a unique way (although within *varṇasrama* schema). The sixteenth century doxographers, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Vijñānabhikṣu, continue the attempt to integrate the conception of substantiality of the absolute with the difference and multiplicity of its phenomenological experience. As Nicholson has written, “Madhusūdana, who understood the highest truth of these sages to be the monistic doctrine of Advaita Vedānta, not Vijñānabhikṣu’s Bhedābheda Vedānta, shared with Vijñānabhikṣu a concern for reconciling the diverse systems of the *āstikas*.”¹⁷⁶

1.3.5. *Pradarśana* of *Racanātmaktā Tanāvīyatā* and its Unfastening from *Niracanātmaktā*

The enduring question of Indian metaphysics has been regarding the structure and significance of the incessant activity of *prakṛiti* (nature) or *samsāra* (universe) and the different modes of universal activity or *śrama* reflective or adequate of the complexity of this structure. The search of metaphysical systematisation in this regard in the different schools of Indian thought has been of coherence between the real cosmological and soteriological structure of incessant natural activity and the mutuality or non-mutuality of participation of diverse mode of universal activity or modes of absynthesis with the cosmological structure of reality. The different contested modes of *śrama* or universal activity make the tension of activity but each attempt at their integration in Indian thought reduces the tension to the incompositionality of mode D (*Acala + Viyoga*) (Immobility + Separation). There is another way to integrate the diverse modes of activity in light of a conception

of nature by unfastening their mutuality from different forms of *niracanātmaktā* (incompositionality). I am proposing that the nature of the universe is *racanātmaktā tanāvīyata* (tensionality of compositionality), which is irreducible inseparability between potentiality and reality, that is, distinction and mutual participation between *amurtan* (abstraction) and *sanslesan* (synthesis). Compositionality or *racanātmaktā* in this naturalistic usage is opposed to the concept of creativity (*sriṣṭi/ srijanaśilata*) which is a theological mystical idea. The modes of tension — mode A (*Cāla + Samyoga/ Mobility + Relation*), mode B (*Cāla + Vīyoga/ Mobility + Separation*) and mode C (*Acala + Samyoga/ Immobility + Relation*) unfastened from *niracanātmaktā* (incompositionality) constitute the manner of participation of distinction. The primacy of mode D (*Acala + Vīyoga/ Immobility + Separation*) as the efficient, teleological and formal unity of absynthesis reduces the *racanātmakta* of Modes A, B and C to *niracanātmaktā* (incompositionality) and banishes the power of participation of the abstract and synthetical aspects of the other modes and neutralises the generative tension between the modes. The search for *nirupādhiyatā* (aconditionality) in Indian metaphysics reduces tension of nature and makes it dogmatic. Non-dogmatic metaphysics will mean to demonstrate the nature of tension and the tension between modes of activity both at the temporal and eternal level. I propose that the modes of absynthesis are the manner of participation between the *vrittupādhiyatā* or diconditionality of abstraction and synthesis. The coherence of absynthetical efficiency and teleology cannot be posited in incompositionality beyond tension, but must be conceptualised in the immanent mutuality of interaction between the modes of activity constitutive of compositionality of *prakriti*. Pure compositionality (*mulaprakriti*) comprises of interaction between processes and occasions, but it lacks the relational consistency and stability for complex and sustained composition. In the combinatorial interaction between processes and occasions, relative regional consistency (*āpekṣika kṣetriya sangatata*) develops which enables more complex compositional possibilities. I will call this *ārambhita śakti* (ancestral potentiality) as different from *mulasakti* or *mulaprakriti*, the loss of

which distills compositionality. The relative regional consistency (*āpekṣika kṣetriya sangatata*) is the regional transcendental *ksetriya prāganubhav*, the nexus of mutual reactions that genetically organises the qualities, intensities and forms of social experience, the sociality of abstractness. There is not only *prakriya* (processuality), but *anekaprakriya* (multiplicity of processuality) which make *sambandhita* (relatedness), but there is also *anekasambandhita* (multiplicity of relatedness) or different *ksetriya sangatata* (extensiveness). The motive force of natural experience is not *mukti* or *nirvana* but it is *racanāgaharī* (modalisation), which is the force of deepening of intersection (*miśrangaharikaran*) between *upasārī amurtiya avichhinnita* (divergent continuity of the abstract) and *upasārī sanślesaniya avichhinnita* (divergent continuity of the synthetical). *Racanāgaharī* is neither pure potentialisation nor pure realisation, but durational complementation between potentialisation and realisation, deepening of intersection between pulling of abstracts into fullness of synthetical constraints and pulling of syntheticals into fullness of abstract constraints. Dogmatic metaphysics proceeds according to the requirements of *darśana* (vision) of *nirupādhiyatā* (aconditionality) but non-dogmatic naturalist metaphysics proceeds according to the requirements of *pradarśana* (demonstration) of *vrittupādhiyatā* (diconditionality). *Racanatmakta tanāva pradarśana* (demonstration of tensionality of compositionality) of *prakriti* can be done differently and divergently. In this sense, the *sārvabhaumta* (universality) of *racanatmakta pradarśana* (demonstration of compositionality) in *prakritik tattvaMīmāṃsā* (naturalist metaphysics) is in fact *tiryakasārvabhaumtā* (transuniversality).

The three modes A, B, C are modes of real tension and activity while the fourth mode D is oriented towards pure inactivity (*atyanta nivṛtti*) and cessation of tension. The different contested modes of *śrama* or universal activity make the tension of activity but each attempt at their metaphysical integration in Indian thought reduces the tension to the *niracanātmaktā* (incompositionality) of D. The philosophical schools, primarily Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā, that have invested in the significance of the first three modes (A, B, C) have tended to foreground

asatkāryavāda, that is, contingency of causation, since the aspirational framework to experience is understood to function in the world of incessant activity and *pravṛtti*, whether in a present birth or between rebirths. The philosophical schools, primarily Samkhya and Vedanta, which have tended to invest in the last stage of D have foregrounded *satkāryavāda*, that is, necessity of causation, since the aspirational framework entails *mokṣa* from the degenerate reality of *prakṛiti* into absolute substance. In Buddhism, there is stress laid upon middle path of investing neither in *satkāryavāda* nor *asatkāryavāda* because the central aim is the cessation (*nirodha*) of epistemological curiosity and aspirationality or craving as such.


The modes A (*Cāla* + *Samyoga*/ Mobility + Relation), B (*Cāla* + *Viyoga*/ Mobility + Separation), and C (*Acala* + *Samyoga*/ Immobility + Relation) are the modes of tension and compositionality while mode D (*Acala* + *Viyoga*/ Immobility + Separation) is the mode of incompositionality and inactivity. *Prakṛiti* is neither *dravya* (substance), nor *śūnyata* (pure insubstantiality), but *racanātmaktā* (compositionality). There is no fact of pure incompositionality in tensional experience. The difference between potentiality for mobility and potentiality for immobility can only be sustained by a more fundamental mobility, and the difference between potentiality for separation and potentiality for connection can only be sustained by a more fundamental inseparability. Nature is mobile irreducible inseparability, because pure immobility and pure separation cannot account for the nature of tension. Thus nature is *prthaktvayabhayasamavāya* (irreducible inseparability) between *amurtan* and *sanślesan* in which *vibhaga* (distinction) and *sahabhag* (participation) are the same operation viewed from different sides. *Prākṛitik TattvaMīmāṃsā* (naturalist metaphysics) has to show the mutuality of interaction between the modes as the tension of *racanātmaktā* of *prakṛiti* without reducing to dogmatism of *niracanatmakta* (Fig. 9). The first requirement of non-dogmatic naturalist metaphysics will be to demonstrate the tensional nature of experience, the tensional factoriality. This cannot be achieved by positing some purely non-tensional inactive aconditionality, as some traditions have tried which leads to

dogmatism and anti-communication (*samvādaheentā*) in metaphysical production. The nature of *prakṛiti* is neither *dravya* (substance) nor *śūnya* (nothingness), but *racanātmaktā tanāvīyata* (tensionality of compositionality). *Dravya* and *śūnya* are *niracanatmakta*, because they are the efficient and teleological formal unity of aconditionality of absynthesis, thus no mutuality of participation between the modes, between the abstract and synthetic aspects of the different phases of activity or modes of tension, modes of śrama, only mode D is made primary which leads to neutralisation of tension of other factors of activity and experience. The three modes of activity can be integrated or shown to have consistency by the motive force of *racanagaharāi* (modalisation). The third synthesis diverges from first abstraction and is demonstrative of both the force of attraction and the force of repulsion both on the processual plane between multiplicity of processes and the extensive plane between multiplicity of relatedness.

The compositional possibilities are as complex and rich as complex and as rich ancestral potentiality (*ārambhita śakti*) is. The meaning of freedom is neither *nirvana* nor *mokṣa* but *racanāgaharāi*, that is, deepening of participation in the genesis of care as power of composition.

Madhyamaka is an account of the path towards abstraction from the syntheticity of experience (*anubhava*), which is one and the same as insubstantial natural causation (*pratityasamutpada*), into aconditionality (*nirupādhiyata*) of pure non-temporal potentiality (*śūnyata*). Vedānta is an account of the path towards synthesis of soul-substance (*ātman*) into abstractness of experience that is aconditionality of pure non-spatial reality (*brahman*). Nagarjuna systematises the diversity of modes of absynthesis into aconditionality of pure abstractness which is deoperationalisation of the tension of activity, while Śāṅkara systematises the diversity of modes of absynthesis within aconditionality of pure syntheticity which is substantialisation of the tension of activity. Nagarjuna and Śāṅkara integrate the modes of activity in aconditionality which negates or reduces the tension of modes of absynthesis and results in *niracanatmakta* of *sunyikaran* (incompositonality of

9. *Racanātmaktā Tanāvīyāta*



deoperationalisation) and *niracanatmakta* of *drayikaran* (incompositionality of substationalisation) respectively. Instead I argue that the modes of absynthesis are manner of participation between diconditionality of abstraction and synthesis, which is irreducible inseparability of compositionality. The future of Indian metaphysics lies in the possibility of systematising the different modes of absynthesis without reducing the tensionality of activity of nature to incompositionality. The modern philosophers of India did understand this problem and issue in Indian thought and engaged with it very differently. The Neo-Brahmanic thinkers of the *ātmavāda* tradition such as Vivekananda, Aurobindo Ghose, M. K. Gandhi, S. Radhakrishnan critiqued the Vedic-Brahmanic as well as Buddhistic-Śramanic encirclement of *racana* but failed to question the Vedantic-Gītic encirclement of *racanatmakta* and *śrama* in *ātman* and *brahman*, while the primary and exceptional Neo-Śramanic Neo-Nāstika thinker of the *anātmavāda* tradition, B. R. Ambedkar, (Nāstika in the sense that while axiomatic rejection of *ātmavāda* in Navya-yāna is in continuation of Buddhism, the axiomatic rejection of *karma* and *punrjanma* has more Carvaka heritage than Buddhist) strongly critiqued both the Vedic-Brahmanic and Vedantic-Gītic encirclement, but did not adequately question the Buddhistic-Śramanic encirclement of *śramic racanatmakta* in *śunyata* and *nirvana*. Jawaharlal Nehru, Bhagat Singh, Periyar, MN Roy, and others as genuinely *nāstika* thinkers did question all of this, in the Carvaka vein of thought, but they tended to conflate naturalism (*prakritivād*) with modern scientific naturalism, and don't attempt to show how naturalism itself have metaphysically uniqueness. Other philosophers such as Daya Krishna, P. T. Raju, B. K. Matilal, Surendranath Dasgupta, D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Dharmendra Nath Shastri in their own way hinted at and expressed frustration at this impasse but they did not give it the particular articulation I am giving by building upon their work.

The key to systematising the different modes of absynthesis without reducing the tensionality of activity of nature to incompositionality is that the abstract and synthetic aspects of A, B and C modes of *śrama* should have free mutual reciprocal interaction by being untethered and unfastened

from mode D. That means the first abstraction and third synthesis become untethered from the incompositionality and become untethered from the incompositionality of *karman*, *punarjanman*, *varna*, *brahman*, *nirvana*, *śunyata*, *mokṣa*. In this manner, the third synthesis and first abstraction instead of originating or culminating in a conditionality of *dravya* or *śunya* can be shown to be part of the tension of *racanātmaktā* of *prakṛiti*. All the *amurtan* and *sanslesan* of each phase of *śrama* should be able to mutually reciprocally interact, towards the motive force of *racanagaharāī*. In this way the *racanātmaktā tanāvīyata* latent in Indian *prakṛitik tattvaMīmāṃsā* can flower. Because of incompositionality, free and mutual interaction between abstractness and synthesis of different *śramas* not possible.

This discussion regarding the difference between *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda* has sometimes centred on the problem of temporal phenomenal causation, but the disagreement is about the question of the genesis or manifestation of *prakṛiti*. The two schools of *satkāryavāda* are (i) *parināmvāda*, according to which *prakṛiti* involves a real manifestation of *brahman* but not a transformation, in the sense that there is necessity in causation and (ii) *vivartavada*, according to which *prakṛiti* is an apparent manifestation of *brahman*. *Asatkāryavāda* and *satkāryavāda*, necessity and contingency in causation, *mulaprakṛiti*, the modification is called *Vikṛiti*, which is not novel. The main school of thought in *asatkāryavāda* is *arambhavada* of *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy in which there is contingency in causation. The philosopher Keiichi Miyamoto writes, “The term ‘*arabh-*’ from which ‘*ārabdha*’ is derived cannot, in this case, mean ‘to (make) aggregate,’ but must mean ‘newly to produce’ or ‘to produce anew,’ which in the *Vaiśeṣika* context can be paraphrased as ‘newly to produce one which has never existed in its cause.’”¹⁷⁷ For *Vaiśeṣika*, combinatorial activity between atoms and composites (*dvyaṇuka*, *tryaṇuka*) produces genuine novelty, but since each actual novelty can be said to exist potentially before actualisation, the *Vaiśeṣika* tend to deny the existence of potentiality. The important point is that it is *satkāryavāda* is the only logical theory that can be coextensive with *dravyavada* and *arambhavada* and *dravyavada* are nearly impossible

to reconcile. This has been a point of contention between Nyaya, Samkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Vaiśeṣika, Vaiśeṣika in order to refute *satkāryavāda*, also denied at times potentiality. Here I will distinguish between *mulasakti* or pure potentiality and *arambhitasakti* or ancestral potentiality to show that potentiality itself is contingent and historical. *Mulasakti* is the *racanatmakta* and *karyasamarthya* of *prakriti*, from which *arambhita racanatmakta* (ancestral compositionality) or *arambhitasakti* (ancestral potentiality) develops as mutual interactions between processes and occasions acquires *āpekṣika kṣetriya sangatata* (relative regional consistency), which when lost ancestral potentiality is also diminished. In the more complex understanding of *sunyata* as pure insubstantiality of activity, pure compositionality is made more real than ancestral compositionality. But from the point of view of the metaphysics I am developing, there is only an admixture of pure and ancestral compositionality and ancestrality is as real as distilled compositionality.

All the schools of Indian metaphysics except Cārvāka and the some heretical teachers are metaphysically *āstika*. The fundamental critique of naturalistic *nāstika* thought in Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism has been that naturalistic metaphysics is incompatible with an aspirational and axiological approach to existence. It has been one of my tasks to disprove this dogmatic assumption prevalent in Indian metaphysics in this discussion. The nature of the universe (*prakriti*) is *racanātmaktā tanāvīyatā* (tensionality of compositionality) and the motive force of natural experience is *racanāgaharī* which involves the deepening of intersection (*mishrangaharikaran*) between *upasārī amurtiya avichhinnita* (divergent continuity of the abstract) and *upasārī sanślesaniya avichhinnita* (divergent continuity of the synthetical), or durational complementation between potentialism and realisation, or deepening of participation in the genesis of care as power of composition. The motive force of *racanāgaharī* can demonstrate tension of attraction and repulsion between processes at the temporal level as well as between worlds and regions of divergent relational consistencies at the eternal level both of which are metaphysically related. The divergence in *racanātmaktā tanāvīyatā pradarsana* (demonstration of tensionality of

compositionality) is made an internal requirement of metaphysical systematisation and *tiryakasarvabhaumta* (transuniversality) and richness of ancestral potentiality, which translates into social life as the project of extension and depth of cooperation amidst complexity and richness of diversity.

2. THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE

2.1. The Statics and Dynamics of Compositional and Metacompositional Complexity

Pure compositionality is occasional events popping in and out of existence and bonding here and there without any significant sustained development of consistency of orders of interaction. The inconsistency of pure or distilled compositionality is in this sense an infinite heat motion of atomic occasions. The sustenance of bonding between occasionality against environmental entropy effectuates processual endurance on the molecular level. The linking of endurances and occasions into located efficaciousness constitutes a diagram or nexus. This bonding organises the intensive circulation of mobility and immobility both within a specific relation as well as in the relation's relation to its environment. This activity of organisation creates qualities of existence and experience. Nexus is a diagrammatic linking of multiplicity of endurances and occasions through ontological entanglement as nodes of circulation of motion and affection. As more diagrams, endurances and occasions become tied together in compositional activity, transcendental consistencies of interaction and causation develop. An environment is made of many diagrams, an endurance takes part in multiple diagrams. Diagrams constitute an internal consistency as well as relative autonomy of distribution of functions and frictions among members in mutually derivative geneses in active engagement with the environment.

Metacomposition (*Mahāracanā*) as cosmogrammatic activity is an originary mobilisation and relativisation of elementary cosmical factors that adds paradigmatic regional coherence in the universe conditioning novel compositional possibilities. Metacomposition is the relative internal coherence or the transcendental consistency and schematic of interaction that develops in the ongoing interactions between diagrams, endurances and occasions through mutual genetic derivation. It is the generation of environmental homeostasis that creates the conditions for further complexity and richness. It is a process in which certain characteristic modes of interaction between occasions and processes have spread so far and wide through mutual genetic derivation so as to constitute a world extension that by virtue of organising a highly complex and rich kind of order creates in activity the conditions for deeper improvisation. It is a threshold of abstraction in the universe that generates novel internal consistency that conditions new compositional potentiality which in a sense was not there before or is not there beyond its direct scope, at least in this modality and viscosity, which is to say that with the epochal loss of this regional internal coherence, the compositional complexity it enables in the universe would be lost as well. The universe is a diversity of such relative regional internal coherences as thresholds of abstraction that together constitute the complexity, breath and depth of *ancestral potentiality*. Loss is relative distillation of compositionality, and reduction of complexity and diversity of activity. Metacomposition is not merely the limit between compossibility and improvisability but indeed the very laying out of the plane of genuine improvisation upon fields of conformal efficacy, that is, improvisation compatible with certain kinds of endurance. Metacomposition or cosmogram creates a horizon of improvisability, but the horizon is fully positive in kind, that is to say, instead of being a demarcation of improvisability, it is the complex genetic ground of meaningful improvisation as such. There is fundamental ontological difference between transgression of limits of improvisation and composition and laying out of planes of improvisation and composition, even if the former in special cases is flirtation with cosmogrammatic incipience. It is the making, preserving and

breaking of laws or metapatterns applicable to internal consistency of worlds. Metacompositional and compositional novelties constitute ancestral potentiality of a specific cosmic epoch. There is no doubt that improvisation always has some reference to the subtractiveness of pure distilled compositionality, but it is ancestrally gained compositional orders that add body and flesh to the improvisatory potentials of activity. This ancestrality gets stored within and in mixtures or overlays of metacompositional worldsheets. There is a suffusion of an emphasis-pattern, but this is at the most fundamental level, while nexus and endurance constitute *patterns and tendencies of emphasis* but only as derivative from or constructive of the most fundamental sheets of environmental homeostasis outside of which isolated processes and occasions pop in and out of existence in the cosmos without entering into complex compositional orders. If there is no such order there won't be adequate consistency between processes to unite and thus would disperse via repulsion. An order holds together a scale of complexity. In pure disorder no feeling arising from one factor is reinforced by a feeling arising from another factor. But without some disorder the interactive realm achieves equilibrium and there is no tensionality of activity. Actual divergence in the cosmogrammatic activity of the overcoming of inconsistency of pure occasionality and objective demonstration of regional consistency constitutes the tensionality of activity since the prevalence of one consistent character of sociality across the universal circuit of absynthesis would constitute complete equilibrium and pure inactivity. This potential for divergent compositional and metacompositional demonstration of compositionality is the systematic character of the universe.

A world or cosmogram gets made when adequate complexity has been achieved in the mutual reactions of the nexus and processes, such that the different modalisation impetus of different factors acquire a nonergodic dimension, as in they fail to mutually equilibrate, hence demonstrate a functional tensionality, an adequate and yet not entropic dynamism that keeps the modalisation forces mutually inexhaustible. This will be termed a world, and there is something great or massive about a world. Not every small local occurrence constitutes a world except in the sloppiest use of

the term. Metacomposition in this sense is paradigmatic homeostatisation that renders mutuality of modalisation demonstrably inexhaustible. But this inexhaustibility is itself a function of the interrelations and separations between different divergently consistent and complex worlds. This constitutes the ancestrality of demonstration of functional tensionality. More the complexity of a world develops, more the details of sensation, prehension and composition get carved out and fleshed out differentially and distributedly in the process of the suffusion of the abstract sociality of interactive consistency.

A diagram is a device or apparatus of relating with the environment that connects and binds several occasions and processes into a social character, with a stabilised distribution of compatibilities and incompatibilities, but still there is a friction, negotiation and tension between the members. But each member belongs to several diagrams, and hence participates into contrastive and disparate arrangements of compatibility. It is a compositional unit, since different resources and capacities are required for different tasks of composition, depending on scale, complexity and intensity. The complexity of the diagrammatic adds to improvisability. Since too much disjunction can cause tensional consistency to rupture, the specific limit between compossibility and impossibility is being continually metacompositionally or cosmogrammatically negotiated. Each diagram is an appropriation of nature of force, but the historical genesis constitutes the character of each diagram. Diagram is an apparatus that brings different processes together for the purpose of construction of efficacy, efficacious power, power of making in which the tendencies to relate and separate or mobilise and immobilise are differentially distributed among the members. The diagrams that originally connect to make a world leave their mark on original shape of tension characteristic of that world in the same way as the character of diagrams operates within the horizon of the consistency of metacomposition. Thus diagrammatic novelty and endurance and cosmogrammatic novelty and endurance are reticularly tied to each other.

A coherent extensiveness must have a dominant paradigm of functional tensionality, and other tensions remain minor and cannot maximise without either endangering its thin line of demonstrability or fundamentally transforming the very character of metacompositional coherence. The more complex, contrastive and great this coherent extensiveness, the more is the improvisatory potential for experiential activity. Now the aim of experience is durational complementation between potentialisation and realisation, that is, natural motive force of modalisation, which is not an abstract principle but a thoroughly concrete local impetus of deepening of intersection between pulling of abstracts into fullness of synthetical constraints and pulling of syntheticals into fullness of abstract constraints. Since the integrity of particular extensiveness requires the domination of certain paradigm of functional tension, other tendencies can only remain diagrammatically minor within a particular world. But different metacompositional transcendental consistencies are in continuous interaction. Since different worlds are treading a different line of demonstration of force of compositionality, they are characterised by a different dominant character and different minor tendencies. This dominant character leads to different route of ancestrality of qualitative suffusion and plenitude. The minor underdeveloped vague tendencies in a given metacompositional extensiveness derive flesh and blood from other worlds which have already demonstrably achieved greater levels of ancestral complexification of the tendency in question but also other tendencies for the purposes of modalisation. Now novelty and originality fundamentally arises when a tendency in particular metacompositional extensiveness is in a position to synthesise alternative far and wide unconnected ancestralities of different metacompositional consistencies from its own unique perspective. There is no *creatio ex nihilo* and even though subtractiveness of pure compositionality is a factor of diagrammatic and cosmogrammatic novelty, it has fairly limited function by reason of being thoroughly devoid of ancestral potentiality. The internal diagrammatic diversity within metacomposition is also potential factor in novelty, but constrained by the requirements of metacompositional coherence. There is fundamental difference between environmental or intra-

regional diversity and metacompositional diversity, in other words, between compositional or diagrammatic complexity and metacompositional or cosmogrammatic complexity. Depth of qualitative contrast comes from divergent ancestral achievements and not from divergent mere tendencies. The tendencies are there but if they flower in a world they bring new abstraction in the universe, and become fully fleshed out and detailed and powerful. Otherwise they remain vague and unexpressed. Genuine novelty or originality is neither merely pure subtractiveness nor merely diagrammatic diversity but the synthesis of different unrelated strands of real alternative ancestral demonstration which combine in a thoroughly unique fashion under unique circumstances sparking something, which are fleshed out expressions of different worlds meeting in a different world. But there is also a way of thinking of originality as the stretching of a tendency or metacompositional consistency to its ultimate peak and ultimate depth, which can be seen as originality through endurance.

Thus diversity of environment is not enough, it must be diversity of metacompositional consistency and ancestrality, diversity of world-suffusion. Minoritarian tendencies in a given extensive continuum that remain vague and unfleshed at the limits of compossibility of the metacompositional consistency they partake in derive flesh and blood from divergent worlds of achievement. Because the system must have a homeostatic metastability, a dominant character of emphasis, dominant tension . Thus other tendencies are unexpressed. These tendencies must derive life from alternative metacompositions based upon different sets of assumptions and emphases, different meaning of relationality, where the divergent tendencies have already been realised and formalised as dominant character of the system. This saves the complexity and metadivergence of ancestrality and depth of compositionality. In other words, the reduction or loss or flattening of ancestral complexity is loss of worlds of achievements of divergent tendencies, thus loss and reduction of ancestral complexity is an approximation or movement towards pure distilled compositionality which is nothingness, that is, hypothetical pure inconsistency of heat motion of

atoms. As worlds of realisation of divergent tendencies are lost or reduced, the minor tendencies in the system lose more and more flesh and as though lose form and integrity, and the dominant character takes over, but this is the reduction of the depth of tensionality, hence approximating the nature of pure compositionality, that is, heat motion of atoms, which is pure distillation of all tendencies. Universal tensionality loses its historicity, its texture and depth hence loses complexity of the appetite for modalisation.

Metacomposition is explanatory of both genuine endurance and genuine novelty. As diverse and dense the universe is metacompositionally, that's how rich compositional potential is. Mixing of ancestral flesh of different worlds can contribute to mere feeble tendencies in given world which can deploy them utterly uniquely and out of context. This is the meaning of the utterly significant and ineliminable notion of 'originality' which has no *ex nihilo* connotation, which is the unique mixing and bending of unconnected ancestral flesh (along with subtractiveness of distilled compositionality as well as suppressed or forgotten intra-regional diagrammatic complexity) by feeble seeking tendencies completely out of its own context. Genuine novelty and originality is initiated diagrammatically but is conditioned not only by metacompositional consistency but diversity of metacompositional consistency. Thus we are back to the reticularity between the diagrammatic and the cosmogrammatic which is the key to the motive force of nature that is modalisation, which is deepening of intersection between pulling of the abstracts into fullness of synthetical constraints and pulling of the syntheticals into fullness of abstract constraints, that is demonstrative of both the eternity and temporality of tensionality of activity, force of attraction and force of repulsion. With the loss of ancestrality, the nature of tensionality loses its historicity, that is its complexity, its multifacetedness, and becomes reduced to a flatness in texture. Which is in direct proportion to the depth and texture of appetite for modalisation, which is implicated in the complexification of ancestrality of tensionality of compositionality.

2.2. Factoriality of Composition

The universe is a tissue of tensional togetherness of real interactive compositional activity. In the universe of interaction, everything can potentially interact with everything else. There cannot be something that does not have the potentiality to interact with anything else since that would contradict the very tissue of the universe. If there is something which cannot potentially interact with anything in the universe, then it is not part of the relational weave of the universe. Composition happens through primary and secondary bonding, when unconnected occasions and processes enter into patterns and rhythms of relating, or when the patterns and rhythms of relating between occasions or processes are sustained or undergo transformation or decay. The attraction and repulsion organises the intensive circulation of mobility and immobility both within a specific relation as well as in the relation's relation to its environment. This activity of organisation or dynamics and statics of connection and separation, mobilisation and immobilisation creates qualities of experience. But composition does not merely aspire for continuation but also a deepening or complementation between potentiality and reality which I have termed the impetus or motive force of modalisation.

The five factors of this real interaction and composition of tendencies and contingencies are -

- i. Occasion
- ii. Enduration or Process
- iii. Diagram or Nexus
- iv. Environment

v. Metacomposition

3. *Factors of Composition*

A prehensive occasion or entity as the most fundamental unit of actuality is the mobilisation of ingressing datum towards depth of realisation through the three universal modes of absynthesis. Occasions are the atomic occurrences of three modes of absynthesis. Enduration are individual bodies of experience and existence with relative continuity and integrity that have some kind of historic continuity and spatiotemporal extensity. Diagram or nexus (in process) is a kind of social and non-social linking of multiplicity of endurations and occasions through reciprocal prehensions and mutual genetic derivation with a defining characteristic differentially spread through the members in distributed functions. Metacomposition or the cosmogrammatic is an originary mobilisation and relativisation of elementary cosmical factors that adds paradigmatic coherence in the universe conditioning novel compositional possibilities. Metacomposition or cosmogram are the widest and most extensive worlds that provide enough order and coherence for nexus, endurations and ecologies to emerge with adequate complexity, richness and stability. Ecology or environment is any relatively coherent and commobile region in the universe populated by diverse cosmograms, diagrams, occasions and endurations. In the activities and interactions between processes and occasions, endurations and nexūs emerge. Effort is essential to the making, preserving and breaking of bonds or patterns. This bonding organises the intensive circulation of mobility and immobility both within a specific relation as well as in the relation's relation to its environment.

These are the final real entities in nature and everything else is derivative of them. There are also *paragram* and *program*, which we will discuss further in Section 3.10 of this chapter. There is no point or moment in the universe when all these factors don't exist in some capacity and form, if

only in incipience. If the universe is first order togetherness at the limit between compositionality and incompositionality, metacomposition is second order togetherness organised around the limits between compossibility and impossibility, while diagram is third order togetherness organised around the limits between compatibility and incompatibility. All the factors of composition are subject to the impetus of modalisation, though at varying degrees of abstractness. Occasions and endurances are on the synthetic pole while regions, worlds are on the abstract pole, and diagrams are intermediary. This means the syntheticity of environments and worlds is already relatively abstract in comparison to the syntheticity of occasions and processes. Universe is the interaction of composition of activity and resistance between these factors of compositionality. These divisions of the cosmic continuum are organised around two axes - forms and manners of mobilisation and immobilisation, degrees and patterns of relation and separation. There is reciprocity of production between the particular forms and manners of mobilisation and immobilisation and the specific degrees and patterns of relation and separation in the mutual prehensions of all the constitutive compositional components of the universe in making, namely, occasions, endurances, nexūs, environments and metacompositions. All the factors mutually constitute other factors. This activity continuously carves out the limits, thresholds, textures and rhythms and makes the dynamic interactions between occasions, endurances, nexūs, ecologies and cosmograms in the cosmic continuum. This reciprocity of production is largely uncomplicated in simpler processes and entities but complicated in more complex processes. Mobilisation is inclusion in the constitution of experience and immobilisation is exclusion from constitution.

While all these factors mutually participate in the dynamics of modalisation, occasion and endurance are the most fundamental constitutive factors in the sense that pure compositionality is made of occasionality and rest are relatively accretionary or ancestral combinations. The force of modalisation and its dynamics are complexifying along with the complexification of the universe. In the interaction between different modalisation impetus, the arrangements and organisation of

relations of attractions and repulsion get segmented. The question is not of the matter and form of modalisation but of the historicity of complexification of the dynamic between the abstract or supersensuous and the synthetic or sensuous sides of modalisation. But because abstraction and synthesis are constantly changing, modalisation never exhausts, and as nature complexifies, there develops a differentiation between the temporary (as in momentary) aims of experience, that is, purely connective and separative aims, and the durational (as in projective) aim along with the differentiation and complexification between general and contextual behavioural tendencies. But at lower complexity in nature, the difference between temporary and durational aims or general and contextual tendency are not prominent. This is the sense in which the complexification of nature cannot be reduced either to the form or matter of modalisation, since the nature and spatiotemporality of motive force also complexifies. This is because as valencies and resistances complexify, the diversity between valences themselves become incompatible relatively (this is different kind of incompatibility than the incompatibility of resistance), and as a resolution of this in nature the temporary aims of experience rise in prominence in the form of of desire, that is pure connection (potentialisation) and pure separation (realisation), and the issue of the complementation between connection and separation or potentialisation and realisation acquires a durational and projective ontology displaced from immediate speed of feeling. Basically care becomes slower than desire but not less powerful. It is a function of highly complex systems of extensiveness to promote periodic expansions and contractions to maintain the frictions and attractions between processes in homeostatic stability. The more complex a system (that is, integrating mutually contrastive forms of valences, resistances and ambivalences) the more the impetus of modalisation gets supplemented by mechanism of temporary release/cooling and temporary contraction as a function of the maintenance of homeostatic togetherness (because of general heat produced).

The relational capacity to compose, while partly dependent on the occasionality of interaction, is not purely a function of occasionality. Each process and factor has certain tendencies of

interaction and composition with other processes and factors. There are two different images of actuality which theoretical philosophy has struggled to negotiate effectively. One image of actuality is that its constitutive components enter into interaction and compose reality primarily based upon the contours and expressions of that interaction. The second image of actuality is that the occasion of interaction is not the primary factor involved, but in fact the components as well as the settled environment at large carry certain tendencies, dispositions, habits and inclinations of behaviour which inform the modes of interaction they enter into with each other. Processes have proclivity or capacity to relate with certain other processes or qualities or factors in more detail, intricacy and dimension and with certain other factors more vaguely and temporarily, or minimally. These segmentations organise general and contextual appetites for modalisation. This ongoing interaction creates inflections and folds of actuality. There are also qualities and other intensive aspects constitutive of abstractness of social fields that develop in the mutual genetic derivation of an ancestrally gathered world-transcendental, sustained by compositional and metacompositional ancestral complexity, that supply detail and texture to relational experience. Nature tends to become more and more abstract to itself or paradigmatically epochally lose abstractness in a historical contingent process as the ongoing homeostatic stabilisation of worlds creates or loses the conditions for richer and more detailed qualities and intensities. Thus there is a difference between relatively simple and complex endurances and diagrams. Appetite for depth of participation in composition is in direct proportion to exposure to depth of ancestrality and complexity.

We can rephrase the problem in the following manner - to what extent does the relation or interaction form on the basis of pre-existing character of the relata and to what extent is the nature of the relation or interaction a function of the contingency of the occasion? There is no absolute occasion which is not linked in some way to some kinds of enduring process implicated in certain nexus of reactions, even if minimally. The past prehensions and concrescences of the process in question develop a sense of germaneness or appetite for certain qualities and patterns and resistance

or aversion to certain others, and an overall tendency towards modalisation. There is also something irreducible in the event of interaction, something contingent. But such aversions and adversions are complicated not only by the fact that qualities always have concrete existence in different mixtures, combinations and intensities but also by the multidimensional distillation in contrastive abstraction of qualities and patterns achieved by the subject process in accordance to range of exposure to regional and environmental richness. Also the different factors mixed up in a concrete occasion also introduce novelty into the situation beyond the tendencies towards modalisation that participant processes carry. The tendencies are themselves complex and contradictory by virtue of thickness of ambient density. Moreover, tendencies themselves are complicated and contradictory, not only internal to a specific endurance but the disparate tendencies and dispositions of different processes in a field are often at odds with one another. There are habituated tendencies of interaction between the factors of experience and at the same time there is an improvisational and contingent aspect to real compositional interaction. The terms of interaction in a sense pre-exist interaction, except purely occasional entities, but also undergo transformation in interaction. Tendency is not necessity, it is suggestive but not determinative of the course of occurrences, it exists alongside contingency and openness in compositional interaction. The more the differentiation between temporary and durational end of experience crystallises, the more a difference between general and contextual tendency emerges.

To this effect, I propose that between all processes, occasions and nexūs there are forms of valence, forms of resistance and forms of ambivalence. These are complex tendencies that organise flows of sensitivity, solicitation and care. Valence is the aspect of prehensive compatibility while resistance is the aspect of prehensive incompatibility. Ambivalence is the aspect of indeterminateness which can be seen both as prevalence of complexity, that is, far too much detail for determination, or prevalence of vagueness, that is, far too little detail for determination. The distributive dynamical arrangement or momentary sedimentation of these forms of tendencies in a

given field constitutes a 'nexus of reactions' which is in a sense the abstract synthesis of real potentiality. There is something factors bring to an occasion subject to constraints of synthesis and at the same time there is factoriality immanent to the occasion subject to constraints of abstraction. Germaneness contributes to the concrete side of combinatorial capacity while ambivalence contributes to its abstract side. All these different aspects undergo change, even if slight at that, by the power of the occasion. Particular processes or events never interact in isolation but in an ecologically dense context unless very determinate laboratory conditions have been fashioned for very focussed encounter. The richness of a field comes from the diversity of vectorial incompatibilities it holds or promotes, or the fullness of satisfaction to which the compatibilities get synthesised. This broader ecological context or what we can term ambient density plays a significant part in how subject processesprehend qualities, patterns, forms, intensities in the respective fields. As we go from simple to complex entities, the role played by this ambient density becomes more and more relevant for analysis.


2.3. Solicitation and Sensitivity

In the interaction between occasions, endurances and nexūs, the abstract extensive relatedness of a region or a world works to achieve relative consistency of social order that can condition higher combinatorial complexity. Part of what the production of relative regional coherence entails is for the factors of composition to settle into patterns and tendencies of soliciting or mobilising the other factors into the constitution of experience and patterns and tendencies of being more or less sensitive to certain factors than others, and by implication shared patterns and tendencies of composing actuality. At the elementary physico-chemical level, nature is metacompositionally


developing consistent transcendental absynthetical schemas of activity and relationality. Generative mutual consistency between diagrams metastabilises into a nonergodic functional tensionality. An example of the early stage of metacompositional development is the genesis of the chemical elements constitutive of the structure of a world, with determinate mutual valencies and resistances between the elements, and patterns and schemas of relating, separating, mobilising and immobilising. In this sense, a region or world is made up of multiple abstract weaves and patterns of solicitation as well as multiple synthetical threads and strands of sensitivity or prehensivity. The operation is in a sense one and the same but viewed from different perspectives which together constitute the contours of compositional activity. The synthetic or ethological question concerns how an entity or process tends to mobilise the factors in its environment in its compositional activity, and the abstract or ecological question concerns how an entity or process tends to get mobilised by the various neighbouring or distant factors in the environment in their respective compositional activities. The tendency of abstraction I will term *solicitation* and the tendency of synthesis I will term *sensitivity*. The occasions and processes make relative weaves of consistency that make the abstract character of togetherness and compossibility, patterns of organisation of experience, this settles into environmental weaves of solicitation and experiential lines of sensitivity.

Solicitation is not only how an environment is systemically predisposed to an experience but also the actual ongoing genesis of an environment's disposition towards particular experiences while sensitivity is not just how an experience is genetically predisposed to the environment but the actual ongoing genesis of an experience's prehensive comportment towards its environment. Solicitation is the way in which the degrees and patterns of relation and separation between constitutive compositional components condition experience. It is the manner, extent and intensity with which a world or environment moves towards or makes itself present to a specific point, line or mesh of experience. Sensitivity is the way in which the forms and manners of mobilisation and

immobilisation of environmental details generate certain dispositions towards the environment. It is the manner, extent and intensity with which a specific point, line or mesh of experience moves towards or makes itself present to the world or its environment. Solicitation is the aggregate tendencies with which a process tends to get mobilised and immobilised by the environment. In a way solicitation is basically the aggregation of all different tendencies of individual or located sensitivities, but still there is an integrity to the environmental or structural tendency, by virtue of the fact that the syntheticity of the environment is itself relatively abstract. It is the centrifugal or disjunctive side of the relation between the abstract environment and synthetical process. Sensitivity is the aggregate tendencies with which a process tends to mobilise and immobilise factors in its environment. It is the centripetal or conjunctive side of the relationship between synthetical process and the abstract region (Fig. 10)



Solicitation




Sensitivity

10. Centrifugality of solicitation and centripetality of sensitivity

There is a pragmatic compositional context within which the flows of sensitivity and the patterns of solicitation operate. Composition is taking place continuously, and sensitivity of synthesis and solicitation of abstraction interact towards composition of reality. This compositional context is the attractive and repulsive interplay of impetus of modalisation, that is, durational localised deepening of intersection between the abstract and the synthetical. Composition is the result of different sensitivities and solicitations subject to different appetites for modalisation interacting and adjusting mutual attractions and repulsions. The geneses of tendencies of an experience to mobilise and immobilise its environment in certain forms and manners is the genesis of sensitivity. The geneses of tendencies of constitutive compositional components of the universe to relate and separate in certain degrees and patterns is the genesis of solicitation. In other words, abstraction factoring synthesis is solicitation and synthesis factoring abstraction is sensitivity. Actuality is a force field of interaction between extensive centrifugality of abstraction and intensive centripetality of synthesis. The occasions and processes make relative weaves of consistency that make the abstract character of togetherness and compossibility, patterns schemas of organisation of relational experience, this generates environmental weaves of solicitation and experiential lines of sensitivity. The interactions, entanglements and frictions between the designs of solicitation and the rhythms of disposition curate details of experience and textures of reality in the universe.


Now at the very early formative period of regional and metacompositional homeostatisation, there is a randomness and improvisationality in the interaction between the vague strands of sensitivity and preliminary arrangements of solicitation crystallising in the compositional activity of occasions and endurances. But as the regional transcendental consistencies of the sociality of abstractness of extensiveness mature, there develops relative isomorphism and mutual ontological correspondence between the dynamics and statics of solicitation, sensitivity and composition to the point that they are relatively undifferentiated, without significant gaps or delays (Fig. 11). The

improvisational or contingent aspect of this interaction in this period is not locally significant but is has mostly translocal significance in the form of feedback or indirect influence that activities of mutual coherence in one world or regional segment could have on another world or regional segment. This is an elongated period of crystallisation and systematisation of the absynthetical schemas and patterns of relatedness between multiplicity of processuality. Processuality is already fundamentally organised around the tensional modes of absynthesis pragmatically. But prehensive sensitivity and action is in the relationship between processuality and world or regional transcendental consistency, without which all prehensivity and action get distilled into pure atomic occasionality devoid of duration. More the complexity and sensible and compositional texture of a world complexifies, more the details and complexity of prehension, ingression and concrescence get carved out and fleshed out in differential and distributive manner. In the period of physico-chemical organisation of nature, flows of sensitivity, patterns of solicitation and shapes of composition are relatively undifferentiated and continuous. This is because the interaction between occasions, process and diagrams is mostly subject to the metacompositional and regional systematisation of homeostatic stability of a world or region and the determinateness of mutual valencies and resistances. The tendencies of abstraction and the tendencies of synthesis have relative mutual correspondence. The improvisational and random non-social aspect is concentrated in the indirect translocal influence between regional segments of homeostatisation and between spheres of homeostatisation.



11. Relative mutual correspondence between solicitation, sensitivity and composition

But gradually metacompositional and regional ancestrally gathered potentiality creates the conditions for new combinatorial, compositional and improvisational possibilities. Valencies and resistances between the factors of actuality complexify and multiply in biological processes, and sensitivity, solicitation and composition become increasingly displaced from the relative isomorphism of inorganic processes (Fig. 12). The richness of the environment is able to sustain higher grades of contrast and tension between processes and occasions, as a result of which the patterns of solicitation gain mutual incompatibility and friction, and incompatibilities and compatibilities of sensitivity diversify and interpenetrate. As the combinatorial valencies and resistances become complicated and indeterminate, a degree and quality of ambivalence or cloud of vagueness grows in experience in the displacements and discontinuities between solicitation, sensitivity and composition. This opening of ambivalence in relational experience create the conditions for practical tensile mentality as well as for the forces of care and desire.



12. *Relative mutual displacement between solicitation, sensitivity and composition*

2.4. The Work of Intelligibility

In the period in which there is relative correspondence between the flows of solicitation, sensitivity and composition, thinking activity does not take place in a localised sense, but the systematisation of environmental homeostasis in metacomposition does have an aspect of delocalised or ambient sense of practical universalism in the manoeuvrings and foldings of instauration of compossibility. When sensitivity, composition and solicitation are closely aligned there is effectively no such thing

called thinking. But there is some kind of thinking in metacompositional activity, since there is sense of delocalised universality about constitution of worlds, some kind of paradigm of physical synthesis of mutual incompatibilities. Thought is when the improvisational aspect of composition gets further localised from the metacompositional front. With the complexification of homeostatic environmental stability, valence, resistance and ambivalence also complexify and diversify and this leads to relative displacements in the correspondence between the patterns of solicitation, sensitivity and composition. In this manner, the aspect of practical thinking becomes more and more localised in endurances, diagrams and bodies of experience. Practical thinking is a kind of heuristic, gestural, tactile or manipulative sense, that operates through an immediate sensual analogism of the physical sense of interactional strenuousness. In practical thinking, even for abstract comparison of qualities and intensities or shapes and patterns, they need to be physically exemplified in order for the qualities to become abstracted as long as they are present in sensation. The abstractions of practical thinking are not categorical or conceptual but sensuously distilled strands of memories of manipulative, gestural, heuristic sense of strenuousness, push and pull, softness and hardness, valence and resistance, intricacies of curvature. Thinking is not seeking a return to correspondence between solicitation, sensitivity and composition, but an intelligibility or practical sense of their real and potential interrelation. Practical thinking, performs what can be termed *qualitative contrast*, since it is pertinent to preconceptual or nonconceptual thinking as well, where the quality or intensity prehended in an object gets contrasted with the environmental exposure to diversity of actuality of that particular quality in varied combinatorial mixes, which is based upon retentional memory.

Empirical thinking is intermediary between practical and theoretical thinking, where objects and factors and facts of experience are conceptualised or studied individually or in nexus in the context of practice or knowledge without theoretical conceptual systematisation. Empirical thinking and study is based on close observation, evidence gathering and comparison of the being of directly

sensuous objects and processes or empirical systems of relationality or empirical patterns of extensiveness in nature, the medium of which is indeed categories but in a taxonomic or presystematic sense and not categories embedded in conceptual systematicity. Empirical and practical thinking have a role to play in both work of actionability and the work of sensibility. Practical manipulative thinking is related to coping skilful activity that is crucial to the work of actionability. This practical coping activity is the primary context of the development of language and speech. The significant objects of experience and the significant or common strands or patterns of strenuousness get marked by cuts and inflections in sounds, gestures and lines. Empirical thinking becomes possible when slowly representational order develops, in terms of signs of perceptual factors of experience and the collectivised memories and thematics of tension, strain and release.

While practical thinking significantly overlaps with the work of actionability and universal thinking significantly overlaps with the work of cosmocomportment (to be discussed at length in Chapter 3, Section 2), it is theoretical thinking that constitutes the proper ownmost domain of the work of intelligibility. The work of intelligibility in its ownmost vocation of theoretical conceptual thinking is a response to the ambiguity and complexity of patterns of sollicitation. A second-order reflective thinking develops on this basis that abstracts the themes and schemas of tension and strenuousness and renders them the primary functions of thinking and attempts to understand and theorise the real as well as potential structures of sollicitation interacting with sensitivity and composition in given social formations through the mutual consistency of second-order abstractions of thematisations and schematisations of strenuousness and release.

In theoretical thinking or conceptual thinking the abstractions are of a different nature from that of practical thinking, the ideal abstractions are domain specific and help to translate between one domain of practice to another. It is a kind of reflection upon intricacies and pressure points of specific domain of practice, and an attempt to schematise the conceptual forms organising the

practice, in a way the sociality of abstractness of extensiveness of the domain, which is operating in a different register from the sociality of synthesis. It creates a plane of concepts and makes the interrelation and individuality of concepts the reference point of discourse. It solves problems on the plane of concepts themselves which are domain specific or inter-domain but not trans-domain, whether specific forms of activity or specific forms of relationality or both. In practical thinking the sociality of abstractness is not schematised or organised into extensive concepts but the relational abstractness is never separated from the sensuous determinations of bodies and processes, it is a kind of intuitive navigation in the supersensuousness within the form of sensuousness, which is mentally intensional. In practical thinking, the abstractions get recorded as sensuous analogues but not in extensive conceptual form. Thus in practical thinking, there is sense of immediacy of abstractness whereas in theoretical thinking, there is mediacy of abstractness, a mental extensionality.

Theorisation is either domain-specific or aspect-specific. Theoretical thinking proceeds through conceptualisation of abstract patterns and schemas organising sociality of interaction in specific domains and through the interrelations between domain-specific concepts attempts to adequate the nature of real and potential occurrences on a level of generality. Theoretical thinking develops on the basis of practical thinking as a kind of second order thinking on practical thinking supplemented by representational capacity and categorial memory. But theoretical thinking is domain-specific, as long as the purpose and form of the activity stays common, a conceptuality can be constructed that can abstract qualities, intensities and quantities without sensory exemplification in the context of the notion of the purpose of the given form of activity, gaining generality while losing intensity, different domains can thus be translated or communicated but not in conceptually universal terms but preconceptual universal terms, in other words, the dispersion of purposiveness tied to specific domains of compositional practise can be manipulated by the push and pull between

diverse domains of compositional activity but not in the context of the universal tensionality of compositionality.

The order of rigour of work of intelligibility, especially in its proper vocation of theoretical conceptual thinking, is the disambiguation and understanding of the structures and patterns of solicitation, that is the genetic transcendental schema or sociality of abstractness of extensive continuums, abstract sociality of mutual genetic derivation of systematicity of regional or aspectival order, and its link with sensitivity and composition from the lens of solicitation. In this sense, the pursuance of its vocation entails a relative suspension of the respective rigours of the work of sensibility and the work of actionability. Relative suspension not of the works of sensibility and actionability in themselves which are often quite intertwined or overlapping, but of their respective orders of rigour and requirements.

Work of sensibility and actionability deploys concepts in a very different way, primarily as single ideas or loosely connected ideas, in other words, the mutual systematicity of concepts is not the primary concern, since work of sensibility and actionability are organised around non-conceptual requirements and rigour, but for the work of intelligibility, there is minimally a system of concepts that is supposed to demonstrate tension, on two levels, between the concepts of schematisation as well as between the conceptual systematicity and the prevalent or actual schema of interaction between sensitivity, solicitation and composition. The deployment of concepts as single ideas in works of sensibility and actionability attempts to disturb and redistribute the existing interaction schema. An entire conceptual theoretical schema cannot be used in the work of sensibility and actionability without the techniques of universalisation of the work of cosmocomportment.

Premetaphysical or preconceptual universal thinking is different from metaphysical or conceptual universal thinking. Premetaphysical universal thinking involves an ordinary magical sense of immediacy and continuity among textures and patterns of strenuousness and release, requiring ritual or sacrificial maximisation and intensification of interwovenness of tension and

release by the fetishisation of greatest contrastive force as the eternal origination of the essential performative unity of the reciprocity of compositionality. Metaphysical conceptual universal thinking can proceed either according to the requirements of conditionality, in which the form of universality becomes the unity of the metaphysical schema or systematicity of concepts, or the requirements of compositionality, in which the tensionality of universality is precisely the tensionality between the constitutive concepts of the metaphysical schema. Practical thinking takes place on a more physical-tensional plane of modes of absynthesis (although not uninvolved in the ritual performances and non-ritual practices of the textural gathering of pre-metaphysical universality) whereas theoretical thinking tends to take place on a more theoretical second-order plane of conceptualisation and schematisation of modes of absynthesis of practical thinking. In metaphysical universal thinking, the physical-tensional (tending to *mentally* intensional) and conceptual-tensional (tending to *mentally* extensional) are able to transduce a universal-tensional.

2.5. The Work of Sensibility

If sensitivity is the tendency to mobilise and immobilise factors in the environment in certain manners, that is, the tendency of synthesis, sensibility is the absorbed continuity of quality of experiential aesthetic selection and the intensive pattern of differentiation between attraction and repulsion expressed in the process of ongoing compositional activity. There is the process of sensitivity which is spontaneously nonconsciously ongoing, and there is also the work, both individual and relational, that is, synthetical and abstract aspect, of the constitution of sensibility. The constitution of sensibility is in the leaking across each other of sensation and perception in the

context of the general as well as situational mood-board curated by fast instantaneous desire, slow projective care and emotional thematics constrained by actuality. Affection and prehension are more ontologically fundamental though not separate from perception. Sensibility constitutes the quality of experience, that as a response to the flows of sensitivity expresses a taste and appetite for selection in the absorbent continuity of a confused moistness of internality of feelings. It is constituted through continuous engagement with the enablements and constraints of actuality and yet there is a stubborn singularity to its internality which is a unique aesthetic response and appetite for the manner and style of engagement. Being the pole of affective vulnerability of bodily experience, it requires the work and rigour of harbouring and sustaining a capacity to be able to resist and organise the flood of stimulation, irritation or affection, but also not get closed up or desensitised. This in order to fully pursue its own vocation, that is, expression of aesthetic selection and ethological stylistic taste by retaining or gaining access to its inner spontaneity and capacity for affection in engagement with the patterns of solicitation of sociality of abstractness of real togetherness without getting obliterated. Much of social interaction and communication, especially in restfulness, but also in effortfulness, involves the expression, friction and cross-fertilisation of diverse aesthetic selection and ethological stylistics, aversions and adversions, likes and dislikes, pleasures and pains. What is crucial is that the work of sensibility does not operate primarily under the requirements and constraints or paradigms of rigour of intelligibility or actionality in the last resort but primarily and lastly under its own requirements, constraints and enablements.

A lot happens in the course of experience and there is continuous piling of tones and themes of affects, perceptions and thoughts, both vague and clear. The sensuous and perceptual details of experience provoke aesthetic, behavioural and moral responses from bodies of experience, of attraction and repulsion, pleasure and displeasure. Structuring patterns of solicitation and composition countenance their own constraints and enablements to such response and selection in the process of constitution of sensibility. Emotion is the bodily and experiential theme stretching

between the retentional and protentional pressures of consequentiality, while feeling is potentially more self-contained and independent of the series and pressures of consequentiality. There is a leaking through each other of the sensuous and perceptual details of experience in the narrow context of the stride of desire as well as in the broader context of the strive of care, both partly operating under constraints and enablements countenanced or furnished by actuality. Now the pursuance of the innermost vocation of the work of sensibility, that is, organisation of stimulation for the purpose of aesthetic and moral selection of ethological temperament, is carried out both in effortfulness and restfulness, personally or interpersonally as well as publicly or socially. But on a deeper level, it is performed by the skilled practitioners who are keepers and experimenters of traditionally or intergenerationally gained paradigms of rigour and requirement of the work of sensibility. This is done in the different domains of cultural activity such as ritual, music, theatre, story-telling, dance, mythology, art, cinema, poetry, literature, the ontology of which generally constitute the meeting point of the effortfulness of skilled practitioners and the restfulness of non-practitioners of the work of sensibility.


There is vague interspersion of feelings and perception in relation to the objects, processes and factors of experience. Through repetition and variety of ambulation through perceptual contexts, configured through practical and empirical thinking, and nuances of genesis of caring, there is constitution of sensibility as aesthetic, moral, experiential dispositions of valence, resistance and ambivalence towards forms of compatibility and incompatibility. But since this constitution takes place under constraints and enablements of sollicitation and composition and also direct and indirect pressures of metacompositional coherence, the real constitution of sensibility tends to get buried under palimpsests of impressions, valuations and actions. The different arts in struggle with structures of sollicitation, lace and enrich contrasts of feeling of both prehensive compatibility and incompatibility otherwise unmanageable with day to day lay functioning, stretching to limits and then releasing inconsequentially. Further mixing up affects, percepts and thought while transposing

subjects into an inner architecture utterly suffused with strange and diverse moral axiological significance, making experience touch the complexity of its feelings, valuations, notions in different sequences, combinations, different stories and contexts as though in a dream-state in different ways towards different kinds of purposiveness, in order to draw out and complexify or relieve, at a relative distance, in relaxation, since removed from the constraints of actionability, helping experience review or revisit its aesthetic and ethical selections. But apart from skilled work of sensibility, experience is itself continually participating in the constitution of sensibility. Sensibility is made of shapes, textures, waves, curvatures. It is all about at which points in which angles things curve and shift or sustain direction. Stories are meant to unveil the objective value and worthiness of the struggle of experience. A picture or image or pure shape frames existence in a specific evocative way.

2.6. The Work of Actionability

Reality of composition in nature is occurring continuously with indifference to the synthetical continuity and requirements of specific experiences. Within this flush of ongoing concretisation, the work of actionability involves the securement and composition of stable functioning and at the same time aspirational coexistence. Actionability thus entails, on the one hand, negentropic work against environmental entropy and degradation, and on the other hand, aspirational work in light of a vision or imagination of social existence. This involves working with the hardness of the concrete pole of nature formed and realised, the ancestrality of compositionality at the pole of reality, to harness it and redirect and repurpose it, and in effect intervene in the constitution of the structures and patterns of solicitation of real potentiality. Some form of language is a precondition of the social

organisation of cooperative effort upon the compositional pole of reality. This involves the organisation of the division of labour, and the development and intergenerational transmission of requisite skills, and the tools, techniques and methods, for the production of goods, services and facilities that can adequately address the interwoven diversity of negentropic and aspirational activities prevalent in a given society. The symbolic organisation of cooperation also involves structures of symbolic and material exchange and distribution of wealth. If work of intelligibility is reflection on structure of solicitation and conceptual contrast with speculative different structure, work of sensibility is carving out space for sensibility under constraints and enablements of solicitation and composition, work of actionability is the intervention in the real constitution of structures of solicitation at the pole of concretion (Fig. 13). Thus the rigour of the work of actionability is the actuality of intervention at the pole of real composition in the structuration of solicitation. Particularly practical and empirical thinking as well as the work of sensibility in general overlap with work of actionability.



13. *Three works of irreducible and overlapping rigour*


Experience is aspiring to participate in and give direction to this incessant indifferent flow of actual composition. This is the essence of the work and rigour of actionability or actionality, that is, to not get subsumed and engulfed by the utterly incessant flow of actuality and moreover, to actively express its aspiration and vision both in sense and idea. This gives a degree and quality of spatiotemporal externality and urgency to the work of actionability as compared to sensibility and intelligibility (in the theoretical and universalistic guise), which are both equally constitutive of the whole nature of social activity, but not as urgent and hard as action by virtue of countenancing the risk of becoming engulfed by the entropic pressures of actuality. In other words, the degree of suspension or flexibility or dispersion that can be introduced to the rate and manner of oscillation between effort and rest in sensibility and intelligibility cannot be introduced to effort and rest of actionability to the same degree. Therefore while the rhythm between rest and effort in work of sensibility and intelligibility is more spontaneous, in work of actionability it is more restricted and systematic. But rest and effort are as such phases of the whole of social and individual activity and not segmented according to the three works. There is greater sense of externality to the ontology of relative suspension of the rigours of sensibility and intelligibility towards the pursuance of the requirements of the work of actionability than the ontology of relative suspension of rigours of actionability towards the pursuance of the respective internal vocations of sensibility and intelligibility. But this sense of externality precisely tends to be the axis of division of political contestation and stratification in social formations. This does not mean that work of sensibility and intelligibility are not fully intertwined with this kind of work, but the requirements and paradigm of rigour are not those of sensibility and intelligibility. The paradigm of rigour of the work of actionality is precisely to not get subsumed by the flow of real objective composition and to enhance intensity of participation in it, that is, to give real and concrete public form to a vision of actuality and a taste and temperament of being, to aspirational sense and idea.

In parts of the developed and developing world, portion of the work of actionability is getting automated or mechanised or starting to get carried out by artificial intelligence, but the supervision, maintenance, energy production, electricity supply and storage infrastructure, etc. remain socially managed. In the case of artificial intelligence, the entire supply of resource data is the daily online activity of users without which artificial intelligence models would stagnate. The increasing technisation of work of actionability, can lead to massive unemployment and a growing reserve army of labour robbed not only from the material capacity to reproduce their existence but also from the sense of self-identity that comes from participation in socially meaningful labour, in fact, the very constitution of care or importance and the deepening of participation in the genesis of care or importance relies upon the mutuality of interaction between work of intelligibility, work of sensibility and work of actionability, instead of the autonomisation and insulation of a particular work from the rest which is the cause of demodalisation. A philosophically and cosmologically different kind of technics would be one which are not solving situated problems of efficiency and optimisation within production, because that further fortifies action from participation, but rather that enhance mutual participation between the three works of irreducibly different rigour. That is, a technics that is subsidiary to the wholeness of social activity and not dominating and driving social activity. The left-wing and right-wing dream of automation of the work of actionality for the sake of liberation of work of sensibility and work of intelligibility is erroneous and catastrophic. The genesis of care and composition is in the interaction between different works of the whole of social activity, if anything, the horizon of liberatory politics must be the deepening of interaction and mutual participation between different works instead of fortification and autonomisation of one for the sake of others. Instead of transforming the stultifying, unstimulating, unreflective parts of the work of actionality to make them more reflective and stimulating and meaningfully reintegrate them into the roundedness of social activity and the genesis of care and cosmocomportment, the ideology of artificial intelligence is to fully render such parts of work of actionality completely non-reflective

(or for that matter, the whole of the work of actionality) and channel all human reflectiveness solely to the work of sensibility and intelligibility (or in fact solely to restfulness), which will only exacerbate and intensify the rupturedness, estrangement and brokenness of social and individual experience, in other words, the motive is to render more more parts and aspects of life non-reflective and constrain and demarcate the activity of reflectiveness in life more and more.

2.7. The Genesis of Care

In the mutual interactions between the patterns of solicitation, flows of sensitivity and the actuality of composition, care takes shape as the motivational kernel of experience, the senseful sieving of universe in the texturation of experience, the real durational force of concern and selection of importance (Fig. 14). The genesis of care lies in the translation, interaction, and feedback between the three different registers of rigour constitutive of individual and social experience — the work of intelligibility as thought about the real and potential structures of solicitation, the work of sensibility as organisation of the flows of sensitivity, and the work of actionability as negentropic and aspirational intervention in the flush of composition. Care is the complex form of the durational aim of experience, that is, impetus for modalisation. Care is the appetite for modalisation, not actual modalisation, which is freedom. Care is a moist intricacy of vectorial feelings of the portions of actuality that come to matter and how. Experience functions through attentions and inattentions and care in a sense is a gathering of durational attentions.



14. Genesis of care

In the preliminary stages of the accretion of complexity and ergodic stabilisation of a world, the interactions between processes, occasions and nexus are mostly subject to the constitution of metacompositional transcendental homeostatisation. Thus sensitivity, solicitation and composition are in relative mutual correspondence in physicochemical processes and the tendency of abstraction and the tendency of synthesis have relative correspondence. There are distinct flows of sensitivity driven by the modalisation appetite, interacting and adjusting mutual repulsions and attractions but at lower levels of complexity at the earlier stages of metacompositional homeostasis. But with the gain of metacompositional consistency that enables higher complexity of interaction and causation,

valences and resistances gradually complexify, and sensitivity, solicitation and composition become relatively displaced from mutual correspondence. This leads to a splitting of the modalisation impetus into a differentiation between momentary aim and durational aim of experience, that is, between desire and care. Care as the fundamental appetite of modalisation becomes more projective and durational while desire as supplementary appetite is more momentary and temporary. This is because as valences and resistances complexify, the diversity between valences themselves become incompatible relatively (this is different kind of incompatibility than the incompatibility of resistance), and as a resolution of this in nature the distinction between temporary momentary and durational aims of experience rise in prominence of desire that is pure connection (potentialisation) and pure separation (realisation), and the issue of the complementation between connection and separation acquires a durational and slower refrain or return in existence, but gets displaced from immediate speed of feeling. Desire is either potentialisation or realisation, temporary, momentary, instantaneous (temporary aim of experience) (primarily spontaneous). Care is for modalisation, durational, projective (durational aim of experience) (spontaneous and reflective) (I have discussed the concepts of care and desire in relation to Deleuzian philosophy in section 1.2.2). Basically care becomes slower than desire but not less powerful. It is a function of highly complex systems of extensiveness to promote periodic expansions and contractions to maintain the frictions and attractions between processes in homeostatic stability. The more complex a system (that is, integrating mutually contrastive forms of valences, resistances and ambivalences) the more the impetus of modalisation gets supplemented by mechanism of temporary release/cooling and temporary contraction as a function of the maintenance of homeostatic togetherness (because of general heat produced). Modalisation is the universal metaphysical impetus in physical and chemical processes that takes the form of care in mentalistic experiences or biological processes. Care is not necessarily trying to maximise pleasure, it is more complex. Care is a the appetite for particular durational deepening of intersection between the abstract and synthetic, therefore it also

decides the meaningfulness or lack of it of which kinds of pleasure, displeasure and ambivalence. Lines and strains of care contend, negotiate, subtract, complement, transform, unite, adjust, compose, invent, constrain, transduce, destruct, in the constitution of the texture and detail of social life.

There are two dimensions to anxiety - one, in which there is excess of connectedness and lack of separation, or excess of potentiality over reality, which is separative anxiety, and two, in which there is excess of separation and lack of connections, or excess of reality over potentiality, which is connective anxiety. But both the connective and separative dimension of anxiety stem from the complex of modal anxiety, which is the anxiety regarding durational complementation between potentialisation and realisation. Hence the unity of the anxiety of being stuck in extension from the side of the synthetical (depotentialisation) and anxiety of being stuck in extension from the side of the abstract (derealisation) is unified in the anxiety regarding the projective intersection of the continuity of the abstract and continuity of the synthetical in the depth of survey (modalisation). So from both sides the unity is immersion in durational or projective modalisation.

2.8. Freedom, that is, *Racanāgaharāī*

There is continuity between simple and complex bodies of experience insofar as the motive force of experience is the impetus of modalisation, which is an appetite for personality of participation. The discontinuity between simple and complex bodies of experience is that the appetite for participation is in reticular proportion to sensitivity towards complexity of ancestral potentiality and the layers and phases of the dialectic between astonishment and sobriety. The cosmos has a tendency to

become abstract to itself as a result of which the mutual valence, ambivalence and resistance of factors of cosmos multiply and complexify. Now the richer the sensitivity to the complex variety of capacities and manners for connection and disconnection between current factors of subjective experience in their concrete as well as qualitative aspects along with vaguely merging factors surrounding the experience in an ecological sense, the richer will be the power of composition and appetite for participation. This happens when the split or divergence between solicitation and sensitivity acquires a truly constructive or problematic character. Earlier solicitation, sensitivity and composition are relatively aligned. This is because the interaction between processes is mostly subject to the metacompositional transcendental consistency at earlier stages of complexity and ergodic stability of a world. Hence the tendency of abstraction and the tendency of synthesis have relative correspondence. The problematisation of the split between solicitation and sensitivity induces a restlessness or a kind of buzzing-vibratory abstractness in experience which when it acquires an operative genericity of function is called imagination which when it gains a formal generality of representation is called consciousness. In a sense appetite for participatorial depth of an experience is in direct reticular proportion to abstract sensibility of compositional depth of the universe, hence the need to stress that appetite for participation is essentially appetite for participation in composition. The appetite for participation is in proportion to sensitivity to complexity of ancestral potentiality and depth of confusion of astonishment. Appetite for modalisation and threshold of satisfaction in direct proportion to exposure to ancestral complexity.

As the complexity of sensitivity to compositional ancestrality of nature and the compositional activities organisms undertake grows, the need for rest and sleep also increases for the purposes of recalibration of physical and mental stability and release of pent-up tensions. In complex bodies of experience, there occurs fourfold complexification and divergence between intensionality of activity (both physical and mental) and extensionality of activity (both physical and mental) and the physicality of activity (both intensional and extensional) and the mentality of activity (both

intensional and extensional). Rest and sleep develop as functions of experience to help recalibrate, reunify and regather the different aspects and strains of activity and to relax or release the cumulative stresses. Lower microorganism do not require rest or sleep in the same way because these contrastive stresses don't buildup in regular experience. This is the function of sleep in complex organisms, which constitutes only part of restfulness.

Relational experience on the diagrammatic plane is made of aversions and adversions, attentions and neglects, inclusions and exclusions, vacillations and metastabilities, mutualities and non-mutualities. There are phase-shifts and transductions in the complex determination of emotional, perceptual, affective, physical states. In all the different ways and intensities with which bodies, events and other factors affect and are affected by each other, we can say that there is gain of power of composition and loss of power of composition for endurance or nexus. Sometimes the gain of power for a certain experience is the loss of power for another. A field of experience as nexus of mutual sensitive reactions is characterised by a unique texture of relationality with the structure and flow of competition and collaboration, mediation and immediation, contraction and relaxation. Amidst all the entropic tendencies acting upon the delicate organisation of worlds of experience, effort is the force of composition in the case of simpler processes and organisms while in the case of more complex processes and organisms it is the combination of effort and rest that is the force of composition. Not only is there experiential effort but also environmental effort which is what I have called sollicitation.

Generally spontaneity is conceived of as being beyond effort in its operationality, but in fact spontaneity requires its own kind of effort. The real distinction is not between effort and spontaneity, which is effectively the difference between the extensional aspect of activity (whether in physical or mental operation) and the intensional aspect of activity (whether in physical or mental operation), the real distinction is between effortfulness and restfulness. The main distinction is not between effortfulness and spontaneity because that equates spontaneity with restfulness.

Spontaneity is thought of as effortless but it is the significantly intensional or intensionalising phase, moment or part of generally effortful activity whereas effortless is rest. The production of reality is not only a function of the organisation of effortful activity but is also the result of the organisation of restful activity. So there are phases of *effortfulness* and *restfulness*, both have *tensional unity of activity* with aspects of *extensional* and *intensional activity*, and both extensional and intensional aspects of activity have *physical* and *mental operations*. Effortfulness is, for example, if I'm trying to move an object for which I'm having to use physical force or if I'm trying to think some matter or issue which I'm finding very difficult to think about solely with the use of my existing ideational and conceptual tools, thus the effort is *extensionally* physical or mental. When we say spontaneity, we generally mean a significantly intensional or intensionalising phase, moment or aspect of a generally effortful action or activity. Spontaneity is, for example, I introduce very improvisational and free flow to my guitar playing during a music concert or I am walking down the street towards a destination and I suddenly decide to go somewhere else, but these activities are generally effortful, that is, they are not effortless in a general sense. Restfulness or effortless is, for example, if I'm just relaxing in the evening in my garden, a situation in which urgencies of action have been bracketed out, but that does not mean that I'm not moving my arms to smoke a cigarette or sip tea or that I'm not light-heartedly pondering, picturing my days. Effortfulness is a phase which has unity of activity but tends more to extensional than intensional processual in both physical and mental operations. Restfulness is a phase which has tensional unity of activity but tends more to the intensional aspect than the extensional in both physical and mental operations. There is no pure rest or pure effort, they overlap, so effort and rest both have extensional and intensional activity. Effort and rest are phases of tensional unity of activity. Effort tends to extension, rest tends to intension though both have both aspects. They are both mixed empirically but also irreducible. Spontaneity and improvisation are part of both. Sleep is ultimate rest. One source of freshness is to feel heaviness in restfulness and lightness in effortfulness. All this is in the

context of appetite for modalisation and the temporary and durational aspect of it and the general and contextual aspects.

Freedom is deepening of participation in the genesis of care as power of composition. In this sense, the meaning of freedom is *racanāgaharāī*, that is, deepening of composition. Care is the appetite for modalisation, not actual modalisation, which is freedom. Modalisation is the universal metaphysical impetus in physical and chemical processes that takes the form of care in mentalistic experiences or biological processes as appetite and as actuality of work of freedom. Freedom is not spontaneity of rhythm between effort and rest because effort in the last analysis requires a degree of social coordination. Rather freedom requires the ability of rest to affect effort and for effort to affect restfulness while maintaining independence, for there to be a mutual irreducible interaction. Because the power of composition is collective at root, there is investment towards the extension of deepening of genuine participation in the geneses of care, this investment has an instrumental side and a sentimental side. Modalisation is the durational complementation between potentialisation and realisation. Demodalisation is incapacitation of forming durational complementation, inaccess to modal anxiety and tensional unity of activity, suffusion of environment by regimented logics and enervation of diversity. Demodalisation is the blocking or reductiveness of this mutual irreducible feedback. It entails vacillation between connective and separative anxiety, suppression of modal anxiety and non-participation in genesis of care. Demodalisation is a state of intersection or enfeeblement and enervation of intersection between the abstract and synthetical.

2.9. Graded Sociality of Obligation and Contestation

In the fundamentally cooperative and interdependent process of the making of existence, symbolic and material structures of obligation and contestation develop with particular distributive arrangements. On the most fundamental level, these are regarding questions of the very meaning of cooperation and coexistence. This organisation of obligation and the activity of contestation is a major part of social existence.

The social organisation of the circulation and symbolic exchange of obligation deriving from the collectivised forms of meaning of mutual cooperation as well as the contestation regarding the terms, meaning and distributive structure of mutual cooperation have distinct gradations and strata of intensiveness. The organisation of obligation and the dynamics of contestation is in regard to the setting of the meaning and terms and distributive real and ideational structure of cooperative organisation. Contestation is fundamentally of the structure of mutual obligation, that is, organisation of cooperation. But not in any abstract sense, but in the concrete historical sense that it exists, and the alternatives or the limits, the concrete symbolic justification of hierarchy and stratification. It is fundamentally a wager at the reimagination of the speculative source, exchange and meaning of mutual obligation, that is crucial in conflict resolution. Contestation regarding the meaning, function and actuality of cooperative composition takes place in the context of the fact of interdependence, which complicates articulation of contestation significantly, but it also takes place in the context of the search for categorial cessation, minimisation or reconstitution of forms or factors of codependence and suspension of forms of obligation. The epistemology of metacompositional constraints and metacompositional reconstitution complicate this discussion

fundamentally. In this sense contestation at threshold tends to deploy alternative strands of fleshed out ancestral potentiality for its argumentation and work.

This articulation of the fetish of mutual obligation and power of cooperation is conditioned as a sphere of discussion and interdependent composition. This does not mean that it is linguistically determinate, but there is indeed a logic of the minimisation of mutual untranslatability in the linguistic ecology constitutive of sheets of the failures and achievements of the continuity of struggle of cooperation and coexistence. Mythological systems and narratives in their complexity are in a sense the traditional or intergenerational abstract toolkit of specific and localised articulations and deliberations of contestation that does not entail in principle cancellation of the order of obligation, and obligatory systematisation that does not entail in principle cancellation of contestation. Revolution is the metacompositional reconfiguration of distributive structures of obligation, apartheid is unidirectional constitution of interdependence free of obligation and war is the threat of cancellation of the order of obligation in search of existence beyond interdependence.

In each subject, there is a contradiction between the aspiration to extend participatorial capacity, reciprocity, not merely instrumentally for richness of compositional potentiality via contrastive diversification, but sentimental minimisation of exclusion and pain via sensual analogism, but also there is an aspiration for selection and exclusiveness, of being distinguished, to be a mark instead of blending, almost as an epistemological and affective pacification of irritability caused by unsubsumable difference and resistance in nature. There is an aspect of the value of belonging but also an aspect of care for exclusiveness or individuality. Inclusion and exclusion can be primary and secondary. Primary inclusion entails fundamental ontological inclusion in the very fact of existence, whereas secondary inclusion is inclusion in the aesthetic, ethological, experiential constitution of details of experience. Similarly, primary exclusion means exclusion from the meaning of existence whereas secondary exclusion means exclusion from the ethological constitution of personality of experience. Now primary inclusion is compatible with secondary

exclusion as, even more mysteriously, secondary inclusion is compatible with primary exclusion, but these sets of compatibility in principle are a central source of confusion, unintelligibility and drama in the practice of social existence. There are thresholds beyond which disagreement becomes intolerable, sometimes disagreements and agreements are building up gradually which lead to social realignments and alliance and divorce overtime but sometimes they happen eventually.

2.10.Regimentation and Projection

I have until now discussed the general character of the *occasional*, *endurational*, *environmental*, *cosmogrammatic* and *diagrammatic*. In this section I intend to develop the ideas and concepts regarding the *programmantic* (as divided into project and regime) and the *paragrammatic* (basically modalisation). Occasional, endurational and diagrammatic activity operate through combination of effortfulness and restfulness both of which are composed of intensional and extensional activity in an intertwined sense. We will term the tendency towards extensive systematisation of internal consistency between different diagrams and ecologies program and the tendency towards intensive enrichment of inconsistencies as well as complexification and seeking of the limits between consistency and inconsistency between different diagrams and ecologies paragram. The dynamism comes from the fact that each member is part of multiple diagrams and also that there is complex segmented distributedness to the order of mutual prehension in a given diagram in its interaction with the general environment. This effectuates divergences of compatibility and incompatibility. Programmatisation is oriented towards extension of a particular tensional and compositional ethos, originary valuation and motivational logic across a range of nexūs and environments.

Paragrammatisation is oriented towards intensionalising or deepening the tensional and compositional approach, expression and temperament. Program is different from diagram in the sense that it is constitutively oriented towards extension in the way that diagram is not. It is to spread a certain dominant character of inheritance or compositional tendency, temperament and disposition through different fields and nexūs. The programmatic is divided into *regimentation* and *projection*. Regimentation operates by severing or enervating the link between extensional and intensional aspects of activity, which means that it severs or enfeebles the mutuality of interaction between the three different orders of rigours of the whole of social activity. Project, on the other hand, drives the extension of participation compositional tendency and ethos out of principle of depth of diversity while sustaining the integral link between the intensional and extensional aspects of activity, that is, by promoting meaningful mutual affection between the three orders of rigour of social activity. Projection does not involve intensionalisation in the manner of paragrammatisation or modalisation does but it sustains or promotes non-reductive interaction between effortfulness and restfulness whereas regimentation systematises either a reductive interaction or relative non-interaction between effortfulness and restfulness towards the purposes of pure extensionalisation. Paragrammatic involves the foregrounding of modal anxiety as the complex of unity of separative and connective dimensions, whereas regimentation suppresses the crystallisation of modal anxiety and foregrounds vacillation and distribution between its separative and connective dimensions. Both programs of regime and project use both the stratagems of obligation and contestation for their purposes. Regime is the systematic severance of the interiority of relation between extensionality of activity and processuality of activity; project is extension from the point of view of sustenance of this integral link. These are general distilled concepts while actuality is always made of mixtures.

A regime of (dis)composition proceeds through the capture of multiple diagrams and the development of zones of resonance and isomorphism between them. The capture does not really follow a linear historical trajectory from war to pacification but in fact operates through constant

spatiotemporal displacement of war and pacification within and beyond the limits of its extensive schema. We can say that it is a non-improvisatory mobilisation that operates through the dual principle of extensive prehensional incompatibilization and optimal to pessimal concealment or substitution of the transrelational domain. A regime infiltrates into proximate and distant diagrams in order to progressively saturate the extensive spatiotemporal continuum with its own motivational logics and originary valuations, in other words, to reduce or impoverish a complex diverse environment to a definite social order by appropriating diverse forms of non-social nexus and vestiges of novel creation. The task is not only to determinately exclude diverse kinds of prehensional possibilities but in fact to indirectly render higher forms of contrast incompatible through an exhaustive permeation of its own subjective forms across different layers of multiple environments. And by blocking irreducible interaction between rest and effort. The extension of such ontological and logical incompatibilization has the effect of capture of real environmental potentiality by limiting its access to the depth of pure potentiality, that is, richness of ancestral potentiality. In this manner, variety of compositional processes within the regime's spatiotemporal extension become subjected to the dimensional survey of mere real potentiality. In this sense regime operates through the severance between the interiority of relation between extensionality of effort and intensionality of effort, while promoting the former. A regime works by separating the ties between compositional forces and then presenting itself as the sanctioned medium of value-creation and conjunctive synthesis, as the point of origination of relational creativity, the transcendent source of combined cooperative power; any kind of syntheses and connections carried out beyond its ambit become unsanctioned. The tendency of regime is to extend unidirectional hierarchies and generate relations of neglect. It operates through the logic of correspondence between the sollicitational structure and the genesis of sensibility that is premised upon an optimal to pessimal concealment of the transrelational domain of nondimensional survey. As long as the concealment of transrelationality remains minimal, a regime of composition presents itself as the ideal means of

connection and value-creation. But in circumstances of maximal replacement of pure potentiality with the dimensional survey of real potentiality, connection outside of the regime becomes unimaginable, and thus subject to the wrath of maximum sanctioned violence. It is not as though regime is the only factor that introduces internal consistency in the relations between different interconnected diagrams. The tendency is already there in a way as a subset of the issue of endurance of societies and metacompositional requirements. But regime accelerates it while paragrams and projection complicate it. By defining and segmenting combinatorial capacity and in this way dimensionalization of survey. This is what we have termed demodalisation. The aim of regime is to keep experience fluctuating between the two aspect poles but the integration of symcomposition and paracomposition can have the effect of nourishment of modal anxiety. Regime can make one subject have both phases or divide these anxieties amongst subjects. Regime invests in apparatuses to guide works of intelligibility, sensibility and actionality. The idea is that regime tries to displace or separate or immanent connections between processes and diagrams and occasions and make itself the *distensional* medium of synthesis.

Projection attempts to extend the scope of participation in a compositional framework while sustaining a link between the extensional and intensional aspects of activity and a non-reductive interaction between effortfulness and restfulness. In this sense, projection displaces the logic of correspondence between solicitation and sensitivity and renders the dynamics more improvisational. Project is what attempt to connect differences and different cares and strands and bundles of modalisation. It attempts to connect glue different cares and strands and lattices of modalisation. Because the power of composition is collective at root, there is investment towards the extension of deepening of genuine participation in the geneses of care, this has an instrumental side and a sentimental side. Projection attempts to widen scope of cooperation. The motivating logic is greater richness of diversity for richness of compositional potentiality. Project stretches extensive mutuality to the limit of cosmogrammatic requirements and regime stretches intensive unilaterality to the

limits of paragrammatic requirements. The programmatic of projection requires paragrammatisation as a source of continuous nourishment, but it is not as though there is no friction or struggle between project and paragram. Projection also entertains issues regarding the limits of participatorial extension, but they are generally limited by real or hypothesised metacompositional constraints, but they are counter-hegemonic to the functioning of regime insofar as regimentation has no such motivation towards extension of cooperational diversity at all. In this sense, despite its entertainment of the concern of limits of cooperation, projection is the soul of diplomatic effort for the sake of avoidance of conflict escalation and war. Use of violence is not in principle incompatible with projection. Counter-hegemonic use of violence in revolution, rebellion and defensive war are metacompositional by nature. The state or sovereign monopoly over hegemonic use of violence is both metacompositional and regimentational except in the case of expansionist war which is purely regimentational by nature.

There is constant battle between regimentational activity and projectional activity, and also constant negotiation and battle between paragrammatic activity and metacompositional activity. Regimentation aspires for a kind of *distensionalisation* of circumstances. Projection stretches extensive mutuality to the limit of cosmogrammatic requirements and regime stretches intensive unilaterality to the limits of paragrammatic requirements. The mutual potential inclusion in appetites for modalisation will create an interpretive communicative sensitive semiotic weave that regime will work upon by centralising frameworks or spatiotemporal arrangement of frameworks of the meaning of interaction as a pure extensification of its valency and project will work upon by supplying multiple frameworks of the meaning of participation as intensification of a general valency. The sociopolitical discourse of neglect has failed to distinguish between *systematic sustained neglect* and spontaneous momentary neglect. We need to develop a theory of systematic neglect. The durational increase of potentiality and reality of a process or nexus of processes we have termed modalisation. The durational decrease of potentiality and reality of a process or nexus

of processes we have termed demodalisation. Durational effects of gain or loss of power are functions of organised effort, environmental effort. Momentary temporary spontaneous neglect and loss of compositional power does not in itself have reference to systematicity of programmatic environmental effort. But sustained loss of compositional power and neglect or for that matter sustained attention and gain of compositional power have some reference to systematicity of programmatic environmental effort. Thus both the senses of sustained general attention, gain of power, and sustained general inattention, loss of power have reference to systematicity of programmatic environmental effort. While the former sense is the object of a hybrid of intensional and extensive aspects of projectional activity, the latter is the object of a purely extensive aspect of regimentational activity.


2.11. Speculative Geometry of Existence

The notion of the impetus of modalisation as the motive force of nature is meant to demonstrate the irreducible inseparability between the abstract and the synthetical, since it is the force of the deepening of intersection between the divergent continuity of the abstract and the divergent continuity of the synthetical, that is, of projective mutual complementation between potentialisation and realisation that is explanatory of both the force of attraction and repulsion as well as both the eternity and temporality of motion or activity. I have tried to show that how metacompositional differentiation or divergence in continuity of the abstract and differentiation in experiential selection or divergence in continuity of the synthetical demonstrate the tensionality of compositionality as the eternity and temporality of activity. Universe as tension of compositionality is the impetus of deepening of intersection between pulling of the abstracts into fullness of synthetical constraints

and of pulling of the syntheticals into fullness of abstract constraints. We can think of the former as paracomposition and the latter as metacomposition. The metacompositional limits placed upon paracompositional activity are utilised for the purposes of regimentation. The paracompositional limits placed upon metacompositional activity are deployed for the purposes of projection. Therefore the ongoing determination of deepening of intersection between possibility of paracomposition and possibility of metacomposition are simultaneously carried out in the real historical battle of environmental effort between projection and regimentation. Composition is the fact that nature is process of composition. Metacomposition is the categorical fact that world is the condition of deep experience. Paracomposition is the categorical fact that experience strives to deepen participation in the genesis of care as power of composition which entails durational complementation between potentialisation and realisation. Regimentation is the categorical fact that there are organised programmatic activity motivated towards extension of severance of link between the extensional and intensional aspects of activity. Projection is the categorical fact that there are organised programmatic activity motivated towards extension of the link between the extensional and intensional aspects of activity.

The intersection of intersection between constitution of world and constitution of experience is the result of mutual adjustments between the activities of these factual factors of fact (Figure. 15). All five are real facts or factors of fact, determination of intersection of intersection is the mutual adjustments of these five facts. Worlds and experiences may crystallise and perish but the universe is eternity of historicity. What complicates matters is that not only are there multiple metacompositions and paracompositions, but also regimentations and projections which all continually overlap and intermerge. Universe is made of difference between compositionality and incompositionality which is universal togetherness. Compositionality is made of difference between compossibility and impossibility which is metacompositional extensiveness. Compossibility is made out of difference between compatibility and incompatibility which is experiential selection.

Universe is temporal and eternal tensionality between multiplicity of processuality and multiplicity of extensiveness.



15. Speculative geometry of determination of composition

3. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT

3.1. Dialectic of Astonishment and Sobriety

There are three moments or phases of astonishment in experience, each phase has its own dialectic of sobriety, but the general sense of astonishment itself is involved with a dialectic of sobriety. Astonishment is the proliferation or maximisation of the intensity of the sense of existence, whereas sobriety involves the relaxation of the sensuous intensity not only into conceptual generality or routine functionality but also into habituation purely via sensuous and nervous exhaustion. Each phase of the dialectic of astonishment and sobriety is implicated in all three aspects of the work of sensibility, work of intelligibility and the work of actionability. In this sense, the irreducibility between the phases gets complemented by the irreducibility between the orders of rigour of the different works constitutive of the roundedness of social activity. The gluing or threading or mutualisation of the three phases of astonishment and sobriety and of the three aspects of the work of sensibility, intelligibility and actionability is termed the *work of cosmocomportment*, which is most essentially the craft, vocation, forte and search of social metaphysics, whether dogmatic or non-dogmatic, colloquial and systematic.

The first moment or phase of astonishment lies in the appreciation of workings and genesis of the motive force of modalisation, the special forms of which are care and freedom, operating in the interplay and cogredience between patterns of solicitation, flows of sensitivity and the reality of composition and also, not only that metacompositional consistency effectuates complexification of the impetus of moralisation, but also the manner in which different processes of modalisation

integrate and mutually adjust to constitute the metacompositional weave, the complementation between pulling of the abstracts into fullness of synthetical constraints and pulling of the syntheticals into fullness of abstract constraints. The experience and appreciation of this cogredience of care and modalisation and the co-implicatedness of modalisation and metacomposition evokes a sense of wonder in experience. This cogredience and genesis of care in participation inspires an aspiration towards intensification and deepening of participation. The sense of this cosmogenetic structure of cogredience evokes a feeling of astonishment in experience, especially in the case of significant mental complexity. The feeling of astonishment or spiration provides experience with an image of essentiality of participation as ontogenetic actuality of being. The remoteness and non-immediacy of the wonderful aspects and parts of natural experience, generally communicated semiotically, can induce a feeling of pain or envy of exclusion or insignificance in some sense of the term. While astonishment entails aspiration towards radical intensification of participation in the patterns and dynamics of cogredience, sobriety entails a kind of realism that develops in the face of the great resistance offered by reality, thus it is also an aspiration towards participation but more systematic and vigilant and self-constrained, not driven towards a radical degree of intensification.

But in the second phase or moment of astonishment, there is realisation that the universe is simply the plate of geneses of appetite for modalisation but it is not made of care itself, it is not care itself but is pure indifferent impersonal attention, pure patience, that which records each and every occurrence with objective attention and patience. Associated with this sense is the fact that cares potentially and actually diverge and contest in agonistic frictional arrangements, and the appreciation of the fundamental indifference of nature to the genesis of care, that nature is not care as such but only the possibility of care, creates a sense of terror in experience, the special and abstract object of which is regime. This evokes a deep sense of alienation and terror in experience, and care feels itself as suspended without gravity or orientation. The activities of care and

modalisation are happening in utter suspension in the universe, without any ground whatsoever. This creates world-fear. The empirical aspect of this moment discerns occurrences and patterns of tangible neglect, but the transcendental aspect discerns the intangible systematicity and abstract arrangements of neglect in social formations. The perceived remoteness and non-immediacy of such terrifying side of natural experience can elicit a secret pleasure of being relieved from the harshness of the impersonality of nature.

In the third moment or phase of astonishment, it is seen that solicitation, sensitivity and composition interplay in not simply genesis of care, but geneses of cares. Even though nature is not care itself but pure patience, cares can become integrated and combined to effectuate a social objectivity of concern and importance, which is in one sense what metacomposition is, which can be the manner in which to counter the indifferent impersonal aspect of natural universe. The emotional landscape of this phase is that of a sense of hope, the special object of which in this case is projection. This phase is indeed the primary source of sobriety in social experience.

This entire moral, aesthetic, conceptual complexity of the unity of all its phases leads to a great awful (terrifying-wonderful) neutrality of astonishment. But it is not simply the third moment of hope that serves the function of sobriety to the intensity of astonishment, but each moment or phase or aspect has its own sobering as well, that is to say, wonder sobering on its own and terror sobering on its own. Intensity reduces and becomes habit, reduces in sensuous particularity and acquires more conceptual generality. This being said, it is not only the aspect of work of intelligibility that supplies requisite sobriety to given phase, but the sustained intensity of sensation on its own has a tendency to eventually get exhausted, plateau and sober down. But sobriety equally turns into the intensity of astonishment in the dialectic.

3.2. The Work and Shape of Cosmocompartment

The three phases of astonishment ferment a sense of lostness and disorientation in experience. Cosmocompartment is the work of threading and mutualisation of not only the three aspects of social activity, the three different orders of rigour, namely, work of sensibility, work of intelligibility, and work of actionability but along with that the knitting and mutualisation of the three phases of the dialectic of astonishment and sobriety into orientation. Metaphysics as universal thought, stretching from its colloquial form to the systematic form, is the major component of cosmocompartment, which constitutes a complex tradition. A tradition is most fundamentally a search for cosmocompartment, which is composed of a spirit of effort more than successes and failures. The motive force of this effort is the force of modalisation (primarily from the side of the abstract) at a societal level. In the making of the affairs of human society, the work of cosmocompartment constitutes an important part of metacompositional activity. This discussion, composition and experimentation takes place on a social or transindividual as well as individual level. In a sense, these are tried and tested techniques of surviving, functioning and flourishing passed and improvised intergenerationally in the interactions between the occasionality and ancestrality of societies. In this sense, cosmocompartment is a society's most fundamental perspective on the meaning of the relationship between the nature of the universe and the nature of experience. Care is on diagrammatic plane what cosmocompartment is on a metacompositional plane. Cares are like boats and coracles traversing oceans of cosmocompartment.

There are people living day to day life together, composing and discussing social existence. This roundedness of social practise I have divided into the *work of actionability*, the *work of intelligibility* and the *work of sensibility* which are organised according to overlapping yet distinct

orders of rigour. The moments, pauses, phases, interstices of life when there is a sense of repose, silence, reflection, when we discuss or reflect in a highly abstract sense, the very nature of the universe, the nature of existence, this is what I have termed *social universalistic metaphysical discussion*. The discussion is an exploration of the concerns and issues and stakes constitutive of a social existence, the medium of which is indeed language, either a common language, dialect, script or a network of languages, dialects and scripts connected through high density of interaction and translation. Systematic metaphysics is the systematic and rigorous expression of this general colloquial discussion. The systematic metaphysics and more colloquial metaphysical discussion constitute the major part of the work of cosmocomportment. The work of cosmocomportment is the collective search for the nature of the requirements of the demonstration of universality, and in this sense, it is essential to societal autonomy, which is, precisely, search for the nature of requirements of actual and conceptual demonstration of universality. Freedom is deepening of participation in the genesis of care as power of composition. The work of cosmocomportment, that is, the work of mutualisation between the three orders of rigour of work, is crucial to the deepening of participation in the genesis of care. The work of cosmocomportment is to see the operationality of the force of modalisation from the side of the abstract, related to the metacompositional plane, while the genesis of care is to see the operationality of the force of modalisation from the side of the synthetical, related to the compositional plane. Thus the search for societal autonomy and the search for experiential autonomy are complicatedly intertwined, which is the source of the problem and struggle of obligation. The shape of cosmocomportment is at the same time the innermost limitation as well the essential powerfulness of a social metaphysical discussion.

The loss of autonomy of a society is when its search for the nature of requirements of actual and conceptual demonstration of universality becomes suppressed and predominated by the character of the search for the requirement of demonstration of universality of a different social formation with different genetic conditions. This is because the search for requirements of

demonstration is not separable from the constitution of care, the issues, concerns, stakes, importances which are constituted locally in the course of quotidian interdependent coexistence, which are the real context of the search for demonstration of universality. Under the predominance of the character of the search for universality of a different society, the issues, concerns, stakes of a given society get suppressed.

The transcendental consistencies of discussion and contestation diverge purely genetically. This is societal autonomy because in the context of cares, issues and concerns, requirements are sought, and loss of autonomy is when the set of requirements expressing the genetic consistency of a different set of concerns, issues and stakes overbears or predominates. What the Indian philosopher K.C. Bhattacharya called '*Swaraj* in ideas'¹⁷⁸, I will extend to the search for autonomy in colloquial as well as systematic metaphysical discussion, which is to search the nature of requirements and rigour of demonstration and not be subjected to the nature of requirements genetically emerging in a different society in a different context of care and metaphysical discussion. These divergences are a lot like the divergences in musical traditions and strands. To say that the internal diversity of western musical tradition covers all musical possibilities is ultimately a sad and impoverished way of imagining and thinking about the world, which unfortunately is the view regarding the internal diversity of western metaphysics in modern academia.

The Chinese philosopher Mou Zongsan has argued that each cultural system, out of metaphysical necessity but not historical necessity, "must emerge though an orifice".

We have said that people express their spiritual life through an orifice that is subject to the limitation of sensibility. This is the limitation intrinsic to humans. There is also the external limitation: namely, the world around us. Most people usually only notice the external environment and overlook intrinsic limitation. However, the environment is only an external condition, not the main cause of the limitations.¹⁷⁹

We say that each cultural system, no matter in what ways it emerges, must emerge through an orifice. There is a metaphysical necessity for it to manifest through an orifice. However, why a cultural system manifests through one particular orifice but not another is not at all dictated by metaphysical or logical necessity, but is dictated by historical necessity only.¹⁸⁰

This notion of orifice I will relate to the concept of care or importance in the constitution of cosmocompartment.

Cosmocompartment is the work of threading and integrating not only three moments of wonder, terror and hope, but also the aspects of regimentation, projection, modalisation as well as three different orders of rigour of social activity, namely, the work of intelligibility, the work of sensibility and the work of actionability. I will differentiate between three broad *horizons of cosmocompartment* — *premetaphysical diconditional universality*, *metaphysical conditional universality* and *metaphysical diconditional transuniversality*. Premetaphysical diconditional universality takes many different forms but that diversity is not pertinent to the current discussion. The cosmocompartment of metaphysical conditionality takes four different forms of universal conditional metaphysical thinking — *aconditionality*, *biconditionality*, *triuniconditionality* and *uniconditionality* (Table 3.1). All shapes include all the modes of absynthesis, but are characterised by tendencies of emphasis which I will term *meta-modality* or schematism which constitutes the consistency of metaphysical discussion, contestation, invention and consensus-building. The divergent meta-modalities of metaphysical diconditional will potentially be demonstrated by contemporary and future metaphysical discussion and cannot be anticipated in any real sense at the present.

The cosmocompartment of premetaphysical diconditionality involves an intuitive sense of tensionality as the continuity between nature and experience. It includes all the modes of absynthesis, namely, mode A (mobility + relation), mode B (mobility + separation), mode C

(immobility + relation) but minus mode D (immobility + separation), since there is no evidence or basis of mode D in an intuitive-tensional sense of natural experience.

Aconditionality emphasises the meta-modality or schematism of the mode D (immobility + separation), and since mode D is both immobile and separate, it does not include any other mode in any significant sense. The motive force associated with aconditionality is that of attainment and the emotional thematic of cosmocomportment is that of terror. In other words, this cosmocomportment threads aconditionality as the structure and shape of intelligibility, attainment as the structure and shape of actionability and terror as the structure and shape of sensibility into a universal perspective of the meaning of the relationship between the nature of the universe and the nature of experience. Thus the cosmocomportment is that of *attainment in nature of aconditionality*.

Biconditionality emphasises mode A (mobility + relation), which is then used as a Meta-modality and schematism of the consistency of argumentation, discussion, contestation and consensus-building to mutually relate any two modes as contrary modes. The motive force associated with biconditionality is that of composition and adaptation, and the emotional thematic of cosmocomportment is that of hope. In other words, this cosmocomportment threads biconditionality as the structure and shape of intelligibility, adaptation and composition as the structure and shape of actionability and hope as the structure and shape of sensibility into a universal perspective of the meaning of the relationship between the nature of the universe and the nature of experience. Thus the cosmocomportment is that of *adaptation with nature of biconditionality*.

Triuniconditionality uses the meta-modality or schematism of mode C (immobility + relation) to then articulate the participation of the participation between any two modes in a third. The motive force associated with triuniconditionality is that of acquirement and the emotional thematic of cosmocomportment is wonder. In other words, this cosmocomportment threads triuniconditionality as the structure and shape of intelligibility, acquirement as the structure and

shape of actionability and wonder as the structure and shape of sensibility into a universal perspective of the meaning of the relationship between the nature of the universe and the nature of experience. Thus the cosmocompartment is that of *acquisition of nature of triunconditionality*.

SHAPE OF COSMOCOMPARTMENT META-MODALITY	SHAPE OF INTELLIGIBILITY NATURE OF CONDITIONALITY	SHAPE OF ACTIONABILITY MOTIVE FORCE
<i>All modes minus D</i>	Premetaphysical Diconditionality	Texturisation
<i>A (Mobility + Relation)</i>	Biconditionality	Adaptation
<i>B (Mobility + Separation)</i>	Uniconditionality	Submission
<i>C (Immobility + Relation)</i>	Triunconditionality	Acquirement
<i>D (Immobility + Separation)</i>	Aconditionality	Attainment
<i>All modes minus D</i>	Metaphysical Diconditionality	(Modalisation)

4. *Shapes of Cosmocompartment*

Unconditionality foregrounds the mode B (mobility + separation) as the meta-modality or schematism of discussion to articulate the ultimate conditionality in any one of the modes. The motive force associated with unconditionality is that of loving submission. This cosmocompartment threads unconditionality as the structure and shape of intelligibility with submission as the structure and shape of actionability. Thus the cosmocompartment is that of *submission to nature of unconditionality*.

The cosmocompartment of metaphysical diconditionality is different from metaphysical conditionality, in that it threads all the modes of absynthesis minus mode D into universal tensionality, and it is different from premetaphysical diconditionality by virtue of being metaphysical and conceptually universal. The divergent meta-modalities of metaphysical diconditional will potentially be demonstrated by contemporary and future metaphysical discussion and cannot be anticipated in any real sense at the present.

The metacompositional divergences in cosmocompartment is not a matter of comparative philosophy, since the very approach to and significance of *sophia* (wisdom) itself has taken different shapes and forms in different traditions of universalistic thinking. This is the reason why I will term the study of metadivergence and metaconvergence in universalistic thought *geohistoriosophy*. Comparative philosophy is an inadequate term since philosophy as *philia* for *sophia* originating in the sense of wonder is a term ultimately appropriate only for western metaphysics and also a major strand of Islamic metaphysics. I will reserve the term philosophy for the western tradition and a strand of Islamic metaphysics, and use the term metaphysics more generally to refer to universalistic thought, and I use the term geohistoriosophy to refer to the metadivergence and metaconvergence in transcendental consistency of metaphysical discussion.

These are the very weave fabric transcendental consistency of discussion contestation disagreement. The original speculations regarding the nature of conditionality carried out by ancient

thinkers are so powerful, fundamental and constitutive of the very consistency and metastability of argumentation and disagreement that the different traditions have found it very difficult to transform this consistency on a very fundamental level. In this sense, the horizon and shape of cosmocomportment is the profound greatness of a tradition as well as its innermost limitation at the same time. This is what Whitehead meant when he says that “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”¹⁸¹ The frameworks and schemas of ancient thinkers is far too original and constitutive such that disagreement also takes place within the horizon set by them, for example, the epistemic horizon set by Plato and Aristotle in the context of western metaphysics, or that set by Gautama and Kapila in the context of Indian metaphysics, and Confucius and the Laozi or the Yijing in the context of Chinese metaphysics. This is not to say that fundamental opposition to the respective shapes of cosmocomportment has not taken place. But the opposition has generally taken the form of the sociopolitical and cultural foregrounding of work of sensibility (mythology, devotionism in Brahmanism and Buddhism, romanticism) or work of intelligibility (natural sciences, social sciences) or the work of actionability (capitalism) and sidelining or devaluation of the very significance of the work of cosmocomportment (metaphysics). But otherwise the novelty has either been very new interpretations of the respective shapes of conditionality or radical resignification of conditionality of the same shape, for example, renewed emphasis and new interpretation of the problem of triunconditionality during the enlightenment period, or renewed emphasis and rearticulation of the nature of biconditionality during the Chinese revolution.

Even though historically different traditions have found it very difficult to transform the fundamental nature of cosmocomportment, since the modern period has entailed the culmination, actualisation and planetarisation of conditional universal thinking as capitalist liberal technoscientific modernity, more fundamental originality can be seen now in universal thinking. This is to say, that in the period in which real tensionality was ontologically prevalent in the world

(for example, the relative isolation of societies and geographies from each other, howsoever complexly interlinked nonetheless, etc.), universalistic thought sought the nature of conditionality, but since modernity has been the process of the realisation of conditionality itself (in other words, globalisation, howsoever nuanced and ethnographically rich, etc.), universalistic thinking now seeks the nature of tensionality, in other words, not only very nature of requirements of demonstration of universality are undergoing transformation, but the very paradigm of rigour and requirement itself are undergoing transformation, that is to say, from that of dogmatic envisionment (*darśana*) to that of non-dogmatic demonstration (*pradarśana*). The strands of universal conditional thinking which since now are fully exposed to each other's innermost limitation as well as powerfulness, and conditionality has already been realised and planeterised, which is why the contemporary period solicits fundamental originality in metaphysical discussion, the requirements of universal thinking, demonstration systematisation are changing, and now the cosmcomportments can undergo more fundamental transformation, or novel strands can emerge.

3.3. Propaedeutic for Study of Geohistoriosophy

3.3.1. Pre-metaphysical Universal Thinking as Search for Texturisation within Nature of Diconditionality

Pre-metaphysical universal thinking has a great magical sense of continuity between experiences, fellow beings whether predatory or friendly, human and non-human, and between nature, where reality is practiced and performed as a diconditional or tensional productive process of receiving and giving. The rituals of sacrifice or dreamtime, which are at the heart of the constitution of universalistic cosmocomportment, are meant to enact and perform the the structure of reciprocity constitutive of the cosmogonic creation of nature, the receiving and giving is not only aimed at appeasing the fierce aspect of the cosmogonic deity or the totemic ancestral spirit but also aimed at the visitational energisation of social cooperative consistency and effectuation of key-points and key-moments constitutive of texturisation within nature of diconditional tensionality. But ritual is not the only site of work of cosmocomportment, the organisation of cosmocomportment is also carried out in non-ritualistic activity. This great magical continuity and unity does not preclude tensional modes of experience and differentiations. The universal aspect of pre-metaphysical thinking is not constituted by the flatness of general conceptuality since mode D (Immobility + Separation) is entirely non-existent as an experiential pattern, but the immediate continuity of textures of strenuousness and release, attraction and repulsion constitute the universality of practical thinking that is a kind of heuristic, gestural, tactile or manipulative sense, that operates though an immediate sensual analogism of the physical sense of interactional strenuousness. Pre-metaphysical

universal thinking involves an ordinary magical sense of immediacy and continuity among textures and patterns of strenuousness and release, requiring ritual or sacrificial maximisation and intensification of interwovenness of tension and release by the fetishisation of greatest contrastive force as the eternal cyclical origination of the essential performative unity of the reciprocity of compositionality. The ritual performances and non-ritual practices are involved of the textural gathering of the physical-tensional modes of experience. This texturisation via ritualistic performance and non-ritulistic practices is expressed differently in animism, as discussed by for example Eduardo Viveiros De Castro in the context of Amazonian perspectivism¹⁸², and in totemism, as discussed for instance by the anthropologist Barbara Glowczewski in the context of dreamtime ceremonies among the Walpiri people¹⁸³.

3.3.2.Chinese Metaphysics as Search for Adaptation with Nature of Biconditionality

The history of Chinese metaphysics has been a search for the nature of complementarity and rhythmic unity of contrastive opposition, that is, of *biconditionality*, and the methods of adaptation, harmonisation and composition with the Way of biconditionality, which is the tendency of emphasis of discussion and the consistency of discussion and contestation. This biconditionality and contrastive opposition has taken different forms in different strands of Chinese speculative thought — *Yin* and *Yang* in the appendices to the *Book of Changes*, *Dao* and *Qi*, *Tian* and *Kun*, *You* and *Wu* in ancient Confucianism and Daosim, *Ti* and *Yong* in Neo-Daoism and *li* and *shi* in Chinese Buddhism, *Li* and *Qi* in Neo-Confucianism, and the abstract and the concrete in Sinified dialectical-

historical materialism. This is what Angus Graham and Marcel Granet termed “the correlative thinking of China.” As Chenshan Tian writes, “The explanation of the creative process in terms of the interaction of complementary opposition is fundamental to an understanding of the Chinese tradition.”¹⁸⁴

The appendices to the *Book of Changes* or *Yijing*, comprising of the ‘Ten Wings’ and ‘the Doctrine of the Mean’, said to have been compiled by Confucius and later Confucians, was the metaphysics of ancient Confucianism. In the *Yijing*, the alternation between one *yin* and one *yang* is to be called *Dao*. In the trigrams, the undivided lines symbolize the *Yang* principle, and the divided lines the *Yin* principle. “Appendix III” says: “One *Yang* and one *Yin*: this is called the *Tao*. That which ensues from this is good ness, and that which is completed thereby is the nature [of man and things].”¹⁸⁵ The trigrams *tien* and *kun* being made up entirely of undivided and divided lines respectively, are the symbols par excellence of the *Yang* and *Yin*, while the remaining six trigrams are supposedly produced through the intercourse of these primary two. Through the interaction of these two primary principles, all phenomena of the universe are produced. Zhang Dainian argues regarding the meaning of the term *Dao* (Way) in *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy* that “The original meaning of the term was extended to refer to the norm that people or things must respect. The norm respected by sun, moon, and stars is called the Way of Heaven; the norm governing human life is called the Human Way.”¹⁸⁶ In *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, Feng Youlan has differentiated between the usage of *Dao* in Confucianism and Daoism

We may distinguish between the two concepts by referring to the *Tao* of Taoism as the *Tao*, and to that of the “Appendices” as *tao*. The *Tao* of Taoism is the unitary “that” from which springs the production and change of all things in the universe. The *tao* of the “Appendices,” on the contrary, are multiple, and are the principles which govern each separate category of things in the universe. As such, they are somewhat analogous to the concept of the “universal” in Western philosophy.¹⁸⁷

Regarding the term *qi*, Zhang Dainian writes,

as a philosophical category *qi* originally referred to the existence of whatever is of a nature to change. This meaning is then expanded to encompass all phenomena, both physical and spiritual. It is energy that has the capacity to become material objects while remaining what it is. It thus combines ‘potentiality’ with ‘matter.’ To understand it solely as ‘potentiality’ would be wrong, just as it cannot be translated simply as ‘matter.’¹⁸⁸

In the *Laozi*, the Way or *Dao* is taken as more fundamental than heaven in the sense that the Way of heaven comes from the Way. For Laozi, the *Dao* is neither being nor being less, in other words, it has both being and beinglessness. In the *Zhuangzi*, at times the *Dao* is taken as more fundamental than heaven, but at times *Dao* is subordinate to the norm or principle of heaven. The Way that is referred to in the appendices is always the Way of heaven and earth and never prior to heaven and earth. The Great Appendix makes a distinction that was to prove highly influential, especially in the Song dynasty, between what is above form, or metaphysical, and what has visible form, the physical. Confucius uses it in the human sense of moral behaviour, the Human Way, not as much Way of Heaven. *The Mencius* claims that *qi* belongs to the body whereas the will belongs to the mind. In Daoism, the term *Dao* was unnameable, formless, eternal and metaphysically general, whereas in Confucianism *dao* was nameable, with form, temporal and specific to categories or classes of beings and things in the natural world. *Yang* is associated with *tian* or the heaven, unbroken lines, sun, hardness, movement while *yin* is associated with *gun* or the earth, broken lines, moon, stillness, softness. *Zhuangzi* contrasts between *yin* and *yang* as stillness and movement - “Stillness and yin have a common virtue; movement and yang have a common stream.”¹⁸⁹ Also, he writes, “Yin and yang mutually shine on each other, mutually cover each other, mutually melt into each other. The four seasons mutually succeed each other, mutually give life and deal death”¹⁹⁰ By

you or being, Laozi means the concert existence of heaven, earth and myriad things. By *wu* or beingless or formless, Laozi refers to the empty part of a given thing but more fundamentally, to the source of generation of you or being. “The things of the world₁ are produced in forms; form is produced from formlessness.”¹⁹¹

The two major philosophers during the Han dynasty (206 BCE - 220 CE) and Six dynasties period (220 BCE - 589 CE) are the Confucian Dong Zhongshu and the Neo-Daoist Wang Bi. Dong Zhongshu continued on from the cosmology of the Great Appendix and understood *yin* and *yang* as forms of *qi*, one cold and the other warm, the waxing and waning movements of which are constitutive of the four seasons. He argued that the succession of *yin* and *yang* and the four seasons is the *li* or principle of heaven and earth and that the *li* of myriad things follows and is grounded upon the *li* of *yinyang*. For Dong, the heaven has a will and is the principal commander of the universe. Wang Bi understood *dao* or the way as *wu* or nothingness, but he proposed the distinction between *ti* or substance (sometimes translated as essence) of nothingness and *yong* or function, that is, what nothingness does or effectuates or performs. A rudimentary differentiation between *ti* and *yong* predates Bi’s philosophy, but he was the first thinker to systematically articulate this distinction as a response to the interactions and contradictions between Confucianism, Daoism and early Buddhism in China during the Six dynasties period, which became very crucial to both Chinese Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism in the subsequent periods. As he writes in *Commentary on the Laozi*, “The myriad things, even though valuable, take ‘beingless’ as their function. They cannot dispense with beingless and make themselves to be substances.”¹⁹²

Buddhism starts making inroads into Chinese discourse and life by the second century CE, but it is only during the Tang Dynasty(618 CE -907 CE) that robust philosophical schools of Chinese Buddhism develop. In a sense, with the different schools, Indian Buddhism is getting more and more deeply Sinified and Confucianised, that is, from the Consciousness-Only school to the T’ien-t’ai school to the Hua-yen school and culminating in Chan Buddhism of the Southern school.

In the T'ien-t'ai school, Zhiyi introduces a third ultimate truth to the doctrine of two truths of Madhyamaka philosophy of Indian Buddhism. The 'truth of emptiness (*kong*)' is that all *dharmas* (elements of existence) are empty without nature of their own and depend on causes (*pratityasamutpada*). The 'temporary truth' is that nonetheless, *dharmas* are produced and do possess temporary and dependent existence. And the 'truth of the mean' is that the very nature of *dharmas* is to be empty and temporally existent at the same time. According to Zhiyi and Zhanran, the third ultimate truth of the mean or middle constitutes the *ti* (substance) and the *li* (absolute or noumenal), whereas the other two truths constitute the *yong* (function) and the *shi* (phenomenal), and in this manner, the thinkers of T'ien-t'ai posit the perfect harmony of three truths. Fazang, the most important thinker of the Hua-yen school, constructs a systematic account of the mutual implication between universal interdependence of realm of *dharmas* (*dharma dhatu pratityasamutpada*) and the doctrine of three natures (*trisvabhāva*). The *parikalpita-svabhava* or the dependent nature is the nature of dependency upon exterior conditions, *paratantra-svabhava* or discriminated nature is the nature that is discerned and discriminated by the mind, and *parinispāna-svabhava* or perfect nature is the true essential nature. For Fazang, there is universal interconnectedness of the entirety of phenomenon, which is unity of reflection in the universal mind, therefore, individual phenomena or things are *yong* and *shi*, to which the universal interconnectedness of things is the *li* or *ti*, but in fact, the phenomenal universal interconnectedness is nothing other than the unity of reflection in the universal mind like Indra's net of jewels which in this sense is the true *li* or *ti*. As Brook Ziporyn writes regarding Fazang's philosophy, "all things are functions as *shi* whose *ti* is *Li*, and the activity of any individual mind is itself a *yong* which is the *shi* whose *ti* is *Li*, the one universal inter-reflective *ti* that is the sole real *Li* of all *shi*."¹⁹³ Thus, all three natures have existence and emptiness, and there is an identity of the phenomenal (*shi*) and the absolute (*li*) but within the inter-reflective conceptuality of universal mind as *li* and *ti*. The culmination of the search for the contrastive togetherness of the *li* or the absolute and *shi* or the

phenomenal in Chinese Buddhism takes place with Chan Buddhism when Huineng, the Sixth patriarch of the Southern school, writes, “Carrying water [with a shoulder pole and buckets] and cutting firewood are nothing but [practicing] the wonderful Way”.¹⁹⁴ Also, “Buddhism is in the world. It is not realized apart from the world. Seeking enlightenment apart from the world, is like looking for horns on a hare.”¹⁹⁵ The identification between the absolute and the phenomenal in the context of *dao* in Huineng takes place with the aid of the *ti-yong* schematic which is retained as the contrastive schema. Huineng writes in *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch*, “Thought’ means thought of the original nature of True Suchness. True Suchness is the substance of thought and thought is the function of True Suchness.”¹⁹⁶ As A. C. Muller writes,

In Buddhism, the *ti-yong* paradigm takes a pivotal role in the process of the sinification of Indian Buddhist doctrine, by taking such seemingly dichotomous notions as wisdom and expedient means 般若/方便, emptiness and form 空/色, principle and teaching 理/教, principle and phenomena 理/事, and Buddha-nature and sentient being 佛性/衆生, conjoining them as two aspects of a single thing.¹⁹⁷

In many ways, the Neoconfucianism of Song (960 CE -1270 CE) and Ming (1368 CE-1644 CE) dynasties was inspired by Chan Buddhism, but as Feng Youlan has pointed out, even though Chan Buddhism Sinified Indian Buddhism in the flattening of the absolute and the phenomenal or experiential, it fell short of affirming it in the context of the family and the state which is what the Neoconfucians aspired to do.¹⁹⁸ Mou Zongsan has articulated this problem as the absence of the concepts of *Dao* and heaven in Tiantai and Chan Buddhism, which Neoconfucianism had to address. In this respect, Zhou Dunyi is in many ways the first thinker of Neoconfucianism known for his work ‘Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate’. Wing Tsit Chan writes in *A Sourcebook of Chinese Philosophy*, “Neo-confucianism may be traced to earlier Confucianists, but

the one who really opened its vista and determined its direction was Chou Tun-i (Zhou Dunyi) (1017-1073), who is generally called the pioneer of Neo-Confucianism.”¹⁹⁹ Zhou took the Daoist concept of *Wu* but, disentangling it from the mysticism of Daoism, synthesised it with the generative metaphysics of *The Great Appendix to the Book of Changes*. In the *Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate*, Ultimateless, limitless Ultimate Non-being *wu-ji* is fundamentally The supreme ultimate *tai-ji*. *The supreme ultimate* through movement produces the *yang*. When the movement reaches its peak, it becomes tranquil and quiescent and this quiescent produces *yin*. When quiescence reaches its limit, it returns to movement. Thus movement and quiescence alternate, in alternation, become the root or source of each other. The interaction of the two forms of *qi* transform and generate the myriad things.

Neo-Confucians after Zhou Dunyi can be categorised into three schools: the School of Vital Stuff (*qixue*), represented by Zhang Zai and Wang Fuzhi; the School of Principle (*lixue*), represented by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi; the School of Mind (*xinxue*), represented by the Southern Song thinker Lu Jiuyuan (1139–1193) and the Ming philosopher Wang Yangming (1472–1529). Zhang Zai was opposed to the philosophy, whether in Daoism or Buddhism, in which the *wu* or ‘beingless’ or non-being was at the origin of the universe. For him, *wu* was nothing other than the expanded or scattered or dispersed state of *qi*. As he writes, “If one knows the Void is the *Qi*, one knows that there is no Wu.” *Qi* is the vital stuff of the universe, and reality is the alternation between dispersion and gathering of *qi*. As Tsan writes, “Chang Tsai (Zhang Zai) identifies material force (*Qi*) with the Great Ultimate itself.”²⁰⁰ The nature of *yin* is to crystallize and condense; the nature of *yang* is to spread out and scatter, which are both aspects of *qi* as vital stuff. Zhang Zai goes on to deny the distinction between ‘being’ and ‘beingless’: The distinction between ‘being’ and ‘beingless’ is simply that of the degree of gathering or scattering of *qi*.

While Zhang Zai interprets the Great Ultimate in terms of *qi* and develop an account of the material world based upon this notion, the Cheng brothers, that is, Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi,

interpret the Great Ultimate in terms of *li* (principle) as universal principle, and oppose Zai's identification of *dao* and *qi*. The Cheng brothers challenge Zai's notion of the formless *qi*, and argue that only the *dao* as *li* is formless, whereas *qi* produces the myriad things through transformation. "The concept of principle *li* is found in ancient Chinese philosophy, in Neo-Taoism, and in Buddhism,³ but the Cheng brothers were the first ones to build their philosophy primarily on it."²⁰¹ According to Cheng Yi, while Zhang Zai's philosophy is explanatory of the appearance and disappearance of concrete particulars in terms of the dispersion and crystallisation of *qi*, it fails to explain the differentiation between categories and kinds of concrete particulars. In other words, Zhang's metaphysics remain far too abstract in the scattering and gather activity of *qi* as vital stuff and does not adequately explain the differences between kinds and categories of things. In this light, for Yi, the notion of *li* as principle becomes significant. Different categories of thing or concrete particulars exist because the transformation of *qi* takes place in accordance with the different *li* of different categories of things. Thus for Cheng Yi, the universe is a result of both *qi* as material force as well as *li* as universal differentiating principle.

The twelfth century Southern Song philosopher Zhu Xi is the great systematiser of eleventh century Northern Song Neo-confucian thought in that he integrates in his system the concept of the Supreme Ultimate advocated by Zhou Dunyi, the concept of *li* (principle of heaven, pattern-principle) of Cheng Yi, and the concept of *qi* in Zhang Zai's philosophy. For Zhu, the Great Ultimate is eternal formless and general and consists of *li* as Principle of Heaven which exists in the entirety of things as a whole and also in each particular thing individually. Zhu followed the Cheng brothers in interpreting the *dao* or great ultimate fundamentally as *li*. As he writes, "What are *hsing shang* or above shapes, so that they lack shapes or even shadows, are *Li*. What are *hsing hsia* or within shapes, so that they have shapes and body, are things."²⁰² Also, "If Heaven is substance, its function lies in the fact that 'the myriad things begin their lives because of Heaven' (*Wan Wu Zi Shi*,

万物资始). If the Earth is substance, its function lies in the fact that ‘the myriad things are created and continue their lives because of the Earth’ (*Wan Wu Zi Sheng*, 万物资生). For *yang*, *yang* itself is substance and *yin* is its function. For *yin*, *yin* itself is substance and *yang* is its function.”²⁰³ On a deeper level, for Zhu, *li* or Principle of Heaven is the *ti* (substance), which is the proverbial root, while *qi* is the *yong* (function), the proverbial branch. “In the universe there are *Li* and *Qi*. The *Li* is the *Tao* that pertains to ‘what is above shapes/ and is the source from which all things are produced. The *Ch’i* is the material [literally, instrument] that pertains to what is within shapes/ and is the means whereby things are produced. Hence men or things, at the moment of their production, must receive this *Li* in order that they may have a nature of their own. They must receive this *Qi* in order that they may have their bodily form.” Lihua Yang in *Fifteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy* has noted that Zhu differentiates between *ti* and *yong* in three ways - beginning and ending, motion and stillness, and possibility and reality.²⁰⁴

The sixteenth century philosophy Wang Yangming was strongly critical of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. The project of rational inquiry and the investigation of fundamental principle of things had degenerated into what Wang considered fragmentary and isolated details and broken pieces. By advocating the investigation of particular things to unearth the functioning of the principle of heaven, according to Wang, Zhu’s philosophy promoted a separation between the principle and mind. Wang criticism of Zhu that searching for the principle in each individual thing fragments and divides the mind, the principle has to be beyond. The ultimate principle is already in the original mind, within, and has to be sought the unity of knowledge and action. In this regard, the central idea of Wang were that “The mind is The Principle of Heaven” and “The Principle of Heaven is not outside the mind.” While it is true that Wang is a monist when it comes to the question of *li* as principle of heaven, but he continues to deploy a perhaps more fundamental distinction between

substance (*ti*) and function (*yong*) to justify the difference between good and evil moral behaviour.²⁰⁵

In the modern period, Xiong Shili further develops the Lu-Wang thesis of mind is principle into a systematic cosmology. Xiong argues that not only mind but also matter is the Principle of Heaven, and *pi* (cosmic mind) and *xi* (matter) are two opposing yet mutually entailing and non-separable aspects of the complementarity between *ti* (substance) and *yong* (function). The substance of the universe, according to Xiong, is both emptiness and its universal operability. The transformation of substance consists in opening and closing, which is the process in which formlessness and formfulness interpenetrate instantaneously. This eternal movement of transformation of substance is composed of the opening and closing which are the mutually inseparable oppositional aspects of *pi* (mind) and *xi* (matter). As Xiong writes, “Mind and matter are constructed hypothetically on the basis of the universal operation in the forms of closing and opening” (Xiong 2001, vol. 3, p. 177) “Transformation is a matter which is relative, living, of inner contradictions, and develops through contradictions [...] Therefore transformation must follow the rule that two opposite things are complementary to each other” (Xiong 2001, vol. 3, p. 96) 390 feng Chen. Serina Chan writes regarding Xiong’s metaphysics,

Xiong’s theory of non-separability of fundamental state/condition and function stipulates that there is no fundamental state/condition outside of function.³⁵ In other words, “[one] must not seek the large body of seawater [fundamental state/condition or *pi*] outside of the masses of foam [*xi*]”. Mind (cosmic mind or *pi*) and matter (*xi*) are thus seen as two opposing yet mutually entailing (non-separable) aspects of the indivisible fundamental state/condition fully manifesting itself in functions.²⁰⁶

I think that modern western secular atheism partly develops in the Sinophilic strain of German rationalism with thinkers such as Leibniz and Christian Wolff who saw Chinese society and Confucianism as an example of organisation and mutual cooperation in social existence on largely secular basis without the need of any systematic religion or belief in god. Thus the modern western secular atheism at the heart of Marxism has some relationship with western philosophy's exposure during the enlightenment period to the Chinese intellectual tradition, particularly Confucianism. Ai Siqi and Mao Zedong are the most important theorists of the Sinification of dialectical and historical materialism following the Chinese Revolution. I think that the Sinification and vernacularisation of Leninism-Marxism did not merely mean the contextualised and localised application of a universalistic epistemological framework, but it also entailed a kind of radicalisation of the naive dialectical strain of the history of Chinese metaphysics, primarily with regard to the question of foregrounding agrarian society in the revolutionary process otherwise unaccounted for by Western Marxist theory in its industrial context, in which, firstly, the aspect of unity of opposites is de-emphasised and relativised and aspects of the struggle and tension between opposites is mobilised and foregrounded and, secondly, the dialectical interaction between the concrete of the real historical circumstances of social practice and social production and the abstract of the epistemological framework of Leninism-Marxism, involves in the dynamic the local-theoretical epistemological work of the history of Chinese thought already absorbed by or implicated in the concrete social practice. As Ai Siqi writes,

Comrade Yang Xianzhen's idea of one" "combining two into " merely stresses the inseparable link between the two sides of a thing," while Marxist-Leninist dialectics stresses the "ceaseless struggle" between the opposites, "the movement produced as a result of the opposition," and the "mutually rejecting, opposing tendency" of all phenomena and processes. It is true that Marxist-Leninists also affirm the link between opposites, pointing out that opposites are united as well as struggling against each other, thus actuating the movement and change of things. In this

connection, however, they emphasize in particular the relative character of unity and the absolute character of struggle....Lenin summed up the main substance of dialectics with the concept of "one dividing into two." Comrade Mao Zedong further develops this idea, pointing out that one dividing into two is a universal phenomenon, that all things are one dividing into two, and that we should also use the method of one dividing into two in observing and solving problems.²⁰⁷

As Chenshan Tian writes,

Ai's "unity of contradiction is" not Engels' mutual action of two opposite poles on one another. It is not the change of place consisting in approaching or separating; it is not contracting or expanding; and it is not "attraction or repulsion." In Ai's texts, we see little that can be identified with Engels' claim that all motion consists of the interplay of attraction and repulsion and that the form of motion conceived as repulsion is the same as that which modern physics terms "energy". For Ai, "contradiction" is a conceptual polarity in terms of continuity (or correlation) between two basic elements or contrasting concepts like *yin* and *yang*, which precludes any assumption of disjunction, negation, or exclusion (p and not p). *Mao* and *dun*, as translations of contradiction, are not regarded as essentially different kinds of existence standing in a dualistic relationship in which one aspect is independent of or determine the other but rather as particular aspects on a continuum. One is always "becoming the other". Instead of oneness, totality, union, synthesis, singularity,, et cetera, Ai reads "unity" as mutual reliance or interdependence (*huxing yilai*)²⁰⁸

This is what Tian understands as the tradition of *tongbian* that according to his reading, was a crucial idiomatic tool deployed by Siqu and Mao in the Vernacularisation and Sinification of dialectical-historical materialism which despite their claims was different from the interpretation of Engels and Lenin.

On the most fundamental level, Chinese thinkers have been searching for the adequate articulation of the nature of oppositional complementarity between formlessness of substance and

operationality of function. Therefore, the limited point I have tried to make in this section is that Chinese metaphysics has been a search for the nature of biconditionality which has constituted the consistency of discussion, systematisation and contestation.

3.3.3. Western Metaphysics as Search for Acquirement of Nature of Triuniconditionality

I have extensively discussed this topic in section 1.2 of Chapter 1, but I will very briefly summarise the central line of argument in this section. I have argued that in Plato and Platonism, the question between the mutuality of participation or unidirectionality of participation between the different forms and empirical reality is secondary to the issue of the participation of the participation between different forms and empirical reality in the form of the good or the principle of the One. Similarly, in the case of Aristotle and Aristotelianism, while there is a relative naturalisation of the problem of participation between temporal substances, this participation fundamentally participates in the unmoved mover as thinking of thinking, which is the eternal object of love and thought for natural teleological processes.

At the commencement of early modern philosophy with Cartesian philosophy, both substances, *res extensa* and *res cogitans* derive from god but Descartes is unable to show their mutual participation which get splintered into mechanics and metaphysics. In Spinoza's metaphysics, the participation between a finite mode and its immanent internal necessity entails participation in the the comprehension of the infinite intellect of god. An idea of the essence of each finite mode in God's comprehension or infinite intellect and the participation between the finite

mode and its internal necessity in the idea of its essence is a function of the adequacy of ideas. This is dependent upon the doctrine of parallelism in which the order and connection between things is the same as the order and connection between ideas. In Leibniz's metaphysics, there is a pre-established harmony between souls and bodies and souls and souls which never interact but there is correspondence between the compossibility of the different conceptual entities subject to primitive forces in the infinite analysis of the principle of sufficient reason and the efficient-mechanical interactions between bodies subject to derivative forces. Even though the monads are windowless and independent, the conceptual combinatorialism regarding monadic essences in the god's infinite analysis is explanatory of the entire relational activity of bodies and implicated monads.

I have shown how in Kantian philosophy, almost all permutations of participation of participation of two modes in a third are tried throughout his career which in Hegelian philosophy culminates as the very schematic dialectical movement of the real as the logical. In Kant's philosophy, in the pre-critical period, there was an ontological realism regarding powers of reciprocal physical influence between monadic spheres of activity, while an ultimate principle or original source of universal connection was dogmatically situated in god. In the critical period, while ontological realism regarding real entities and physical influence was maintained, the source of organisation of interaction between sensibility and intelligibility became the transcendental conditions of possibility of experience, that is, the modes of time-determination gluing unity of apperception. In this respect, I have argued that one way to understand Hegel's unique intervention in the tradition is that he infinitises the entire question of mediation by animating not only the poles of mediation, but the unity and form of mediation itself, to the point where a pure yet reflective mediateness realises its complete and absolute nature as pure negativity. In Whiteheadian metaphysics, creativity is the force of creative advance of novelty through which the primordial nature of god, deficient in actuality, assimilates the efforts of temporal concrescence and thus acquire physical multiplicity, and at the same time the disjunctive multiplicity of entities, deficient

in everlastingness, acquires a unity of everlastingness. In this sense, creativity is explanatory in the ultimate sense of this mutuality of requirement between God and World or permanence and fluency. the mutuality, coherence and systematicity between the process of concrescence by which the disjunctively many becomes one actual occasion conjunctively as actuality in attainment and the process of transition and the complete fact of satisfaction of conjunction join the many disjunctively as attained actuality.

Post-Kantian philosophy generally gets divided between continental tradition and the analytic tradition. The constitutive concern of the seminal thinkers of the continental tradition Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, has been the nature participation of the participation between mode A and mode C in the mode mode B (Mobility + Separation), that is, the nonconceptual nature of passive syntheticity of temporality of sensible, perceptual and practical experience respectively, as a counter to the objectivistic and naturalistic assumptions of modern science, and the constitution of temporal experience not centred on the transcendental analytic and the unity of apperception. In the subsequent period of continental philosophy, primarily the theoretical movement of structuralism of Saussurean ideas based on the structure of language and symbolic systems in theorists such as Claude Levi-Strauss and Louis Althusser, there is a reaction against the methodological primacy of mode B and an attempt at redressing this imbalance by foregrounding the socially objective structurality of mode C (Immobility + Relation) as the transcendental structure of symbolic systems and social practice. At the origins of the analytical tradition, the formative concern has been detachment of logic and semantics from all dependence on intuitions and the participation of the participation between mode A and mode B in the combinatorial mode C (Discontinuity of Process + Continuity of Extension) as the unity of the ideal extension of the linguistic forms and logical categories.

Thus the search regarding the nature of triunconditionality and the question of what does participation participate in has constituted the consistency of the discussion, argumentation, innovation and contestation in western metaphysics.

3.3.4. Indian Metaphysics as Search for Attainment in Nature of Aconditionality

I have extensively discussed this issue in section 1.3 of Chapter 1, but I will briefly summarise the central points of this argument in this section. The enduring question of Indian metaphysics has been regarding the structure and significance of the incessant activity of *prakriti* (nature) or *samsāra* (universe) and the different modes of universal activity or *śrama* reflective or adequate of the complexity of this structure. This is the fundamental problem that metaphysical discussion, contestation and seeking in the Indian subcontinent has organised itself around. The search of metaphysical systematisation in this regard in the different schools of Indian thought has been of coherence between the real cosmological and soteriological structure of incessant natural activity and the mutuality or non-mutuality of participation of diverse mode of universal activity or modes of absynthesis with the cosmological structure of reality. The different contested modes of *śrama* or universal activity make the tension of activity but each attempt at their integration in Indian thought reduces the tension to the incompositionality of mode D (*Acala + Viyoga*) (Immobility + Separation).

Indian metaphysics takes shape with the emphasis upon the knowledge-centric path of renunciation emphasised in the Sramanic movements of Buddhism and Jainism and in the Upanishadic literature as opposed to the ritual-centric view of the Vedic corpus. According to the

systematic episteme and cosmology that develops in the Gangetic plains of *karma*, *punarjanman* and *ātman*, existence is most fundamentally suffering, and each mental and physical action and the moral quality of each act adds to the *kārmic* accumulation. The soteriological aim in this cosmology is to exit the *sāmsāric* cycle of rebirth and be liberated from the infinite activity of nature into pure inactivity. Similarly, the Upaniśads, early Vedānta and other schools of Brahmanic philosophy propounded a more philosophical and knowledge-based approach (*jñāna mārga*) to soteriological and metaphysical problems towards the praxis of personal liberation compared to the Vedic soteriology. The issue in this knowledge-centric approach becomes to understand the relationship between *ātman* or self or soul-substance and *brahman* as the ultimate and attainment of liberation (*mokśa*) by the overcoming of the ignorance (*avidya*) regarding the nature of this relationship, to which the ritualistic and sacrificial approach (*karma mārga*) are deemed fundamentally inadequate. In the Upanishadic and Vedantic view, the endless cycle of rebirth is in fact the real manifest illusion caused by the ignorance or *avidya* and the path of knowledge unconceals the nature of aconditionality of Brahman. Therefore, in both the Brahmanic and Sramanic schools, nature or *prakṛiti* gets conceptualised as either an real illusion rooted in ignorance or endless suffering, from which liberation is sought into aconditionality of *Brahman* (in the case of Brahmanic philosophies) and the aconditionality of *Śūnyata* (in the case of Buddhist philosophies). In this sense, the fourth mode of *śrama*, which is *sannyasa* in the case of Brahmanism and *arhat* in the case of Buddhism is given primacy over the other modes of *śrama* in all the schools of philosophy and metaphysics. Even though the different modes of *śrama* have been hinted in the cosmo-sociology of Indian metaphysics, the emphasis has tended to be on the fourth as the primary path towards attainment of aconditionality, in all schools of Brahmanism (Samkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika, vedanta or Uttar Mīmāṃsā) (with exception of Purva Mīmāṃsā that foregrounds Vedic ritualistic soteriology) and Buddhism (Sautrantika, Sarvastivada, Madhyamaka, Yogacara) and Jainism. The difference between the ideas of aconditionality in Brahmanism and Buddhism is that, while in the Buddhist

metaphysics that culminates in Nagarjuna's system, aconditionality is understood ultimately as pure insubstantiality, whereas in Brahmanic metaphysics that culminates in Sankara, aconditionality is understood ultimately as pure substantiality. Nagarjuna and Śankara integrate the modes of activity in aconditionality which negates or reduces the tension of modes of absynthesis and results in *niracanatmakta* of *sunyikaran* (incompositonality of deoperationalisation) and *niracanatmakta* of *drayikaran* (incompositonality of substationalisation) respectively.

Only Carvaka and other materialist schools and teachers have questioned and critiqued this primacy of the *śrama* of aconditionality but it has never been accorded a respectable and serious position in the discussion in the history of Indian metaphysics because of the dominant schema that rejection of survival is incompatible with a moral and soteriological approach to existence. The Neo-Brahmanic thinkers of the *ātmavāda* tradition such as Vivekananda, Aurobindo Ghose, M. K. Gandhi, S. Radhakrishnan critiqued the Vedic-Brahmanic as well as Buddhistic-Śramanic encirclement of *racana* but failed to question the Vedantic-Gītic encirclement of *racanatmakta* and *śrama* in *ātman* and *brahman*, while the primary and exceptional Neo-Śramanic Neo-Nāstika thinker of the *anātmavāda* tradition, B. R. Ambedkar, (Nāstika in the sense that while axiomatic rejection of *ātmavāda* in Navya-yāna is in continuation of Buddhism, the axiomatic rejection of *karma* and *punrjanma* has more Carvaka heritage than Buddhist) strongly critiqued both the Vedic-Brahmanic and Vedantic-Gītic encirclement, but did not adequately question the Buddhistic-Śramanic encirclement of *śramic racanatmakta* in *śunyata* and *nirvana*.

3.3.5. Islamic Metaphysics as Search for Submission to Nature of Unconditionality

In the history of Islamic metaphysics, the central problematic has been of the ultimacy and oneness of unconditionality, which is theologically termed *tawhīd*, and to reconcile it with the multiplicity of the manifest empirical world. The central concepts that have been used in this discussion are that of *wujūd* (being or existence), *mawjūd* (actual existents), and *māhiyyah* (essence). The different schools of metaphysical and theological thought in the history of Islamic speculation, that is, the Aristotelian Peripatetic philosophy, the orthodox theology of *Kalām*, Andalusian metaphysics, and the Persian schools of Illumination (*ḥikmat al-ishrāq*), have attempted and struggled to theorise regarding the relations between *wujūd*, *mawjūd* and *māhiyyah* in a manner so as to secure the absolute transcendence of *tawhīd* without denying the reality of the manifest material phenomenal world. As the scholar of Islamic philosophy, Seyyed Hossein Nasr writes in *Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy*,

For Islamic thought, on the contrary, the world is not synonymous with *wujud*. There is an ontological poverty (*faqr*) of the world in the sense that *wujud* is given by God who alone is the abiding Reality, all “other” existents coming into being and passing away. The conceptual distinction between *wujud* and *māhiyyah*, therefore, gains great significance and, far from being inconsequential, becomes in fact the key for understanding the nature of reality.²⁰⁹

It is true that Islamic metaphysics places the Absolute above all limitations, even beyond the ontological Principle as usually understood. It knows that the Divine Essence (*al-Dhāt al-ilāhiyyah*) stands above even Being, that it is Non-Being or Beyond-Being² in that it stands beyond all limitation and even beyond the qualification of being beyond all limitation. Nevertheless, the language of this metaphysical doctrine revolves around *wujud* in most schools of Islamic thought. Hence, the discussion concerning the distinction between *wujud* and *māhiyyah* and their relation remains central to Islamic metaphysical thought even while most Muslim gnostics and metaphysicians have remained fully aware of the supra-ontological nature of the Supreme Reality and have not limited metaphysics to ontology.²¹⁰

The scholar Massimo Campanini in *An Introduction to Islamic Philosophy*,

Islam is intensely bound up with a burning passion for the Oneness of God or *tawhīd*. The concept of God's Oneness is therefore central to theological and philosophical speculation and, as is also the case for mysticism, is firmly rooted in the Quran.²¹¹

In the *Kalām* literature, between the Muta'azalite and Asharite schools of theology, this debate took place in the guise of the two concepts of *tanzīh* and *tasbīh*. The transcendence of God over the empirical manifest natural world is emphasised by the Mutazalite and in this sense, for the Mutazlites, the attributes of god are not different from the essence of god, and are fundamentally transcendent. The Mutazalites interpreted the anthropomorphic statements about the qualities and attributes of god in the Quran in purely metaphorical terms. This was termed *tanzīh*, the notion that the divine transcendence of God excludes the possibility of any attributes and characteristics. "Thus transcendence is radically affirmed by the Mutazilites. the Islamic idea of God is of absolute transcendence without any similitude to the creatures."²¹² In a similar vein, for the Mutazilites, it was not possible for God to be unjust, since that would be a limitation on the absolute transcendence, and in this way they rendered God in sense subject to the more fundamental principle of justice. The orthodox Ashari theology emerged as a reaction against what was perceived as excessive Hellenistic rationalism of Mutazilite school. The Ashari theology emphasised occasionalism and God's continuous intervention in creation. It also emphasised the significance and reality of the qualities and attributes of the nature of God as recorded in the statements of the Quran. This notion of the positive real character of the attributes and 'beautiful names' of God was termed *tasbīh*. Secondly, for Asharite theology, God's will reigns supreme over any possible principle of justice. As the scholar Fazlur Rahman writes in *Islam*, "Thus, whereas the Mu'tazila

subsumed the idea of God under that of human justice, the orthodox subsumed the idea of justice under that of God.”²¹³

Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (870 - 950) is the first philosopher who develops the account of emanationism as an explanation of *tawhīd* or God’s transcendence and unconditionality. This involves viewing the absolute transcendence of God in the Quran from the point of view of the structure of emanation in Neoplatonic philosophy, which is the notion that reality emanates in several gradations from the first principle of the One. Emanation is then linked to the process of intellection, of how God understands Himself and how other emanated beings understand God. The source of movement is the highest perfection of absolute being in self-contemplation and all emanations are intellective contemplations and emulations of the perfection of absolute being. From this defection emerges the multiplicity of nature which is not a result of the will of the creator but that of the knowledge of the necessary. For Al Fārābī, God is at the same time the originary source as well as the final goal of beings.

Abū-‘Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn-‘Abdallāh Ibn-Sīnā or Avicenna (980-1037) takes as the point of departure of his philosophical system the fundamental distinction between necessity or *wujūd*, contingency or possibility (*imkan*) and impossibility (*imtinā’*). The necessary is that the non-existence of which implies a contradiction. The contingent or possible is that the non-existence of which does not imply a contradiction. The impossible is that the existence of which implies a contradiction. In this sense, the necessary being must necessarily exist, the contingent being may or may not exist and the impossible being cannot exist. Now, as *māhiyyah* or quiddity, every entity except God is contingent as part of *mumkin al-wujūd*. But since it exists, it must derive the force of necessity of its existence from a source other than themselves. Existents or *mawjūdat* in this sense are *wajib al-ghayr*, that which derives its necessity through an agent other than themselves. There logically is required to be an entity which subsists through itself entirely and does not require any other entity to constitute the structure of its own necessity. This necessary being that stands beyond

and outside the world of contingency to necessitate its existence is God or *wajib al-wujūd*. They are necessary as existents by the very fact that they possess *wujūd* but are contingent in their essence in contrast to the Necessary Being, which is necessary in Its own Essence and not through an agent outside Itself. “Avicenna attempted to preserve, potentially at least, the dimension of contingency and of essential inexistence of the beings ‘created’ in order to reserve for God the total perfection of essence.”²¹⁴ According to Ibn-Sīnā, God is that entity in whom essence (*māhiyyah*) and existence (*wujūd*) coincide. “In itself, as a *māhiyyah*, every object save God is contingent, a *mumkin al-wujūd*. But now that it has gained *wujūd*, for it to exist necessarily requires the agency of a reality other than itself. Existents are, therefore, *wajib al-ghayr*, necessary through an agent other than themselves. They are necessary as existents by the very fact that they possess *wujūd* but are contingent in their essence in contrast to the Necessary Being, which is necessary in Its own Essence and not through an agent outside Itself.”²¹⁵ As Fazlur Rahman writes, “For Ibn-Sīnā, essences are real, not just mental, and he regards everything else thence forward to be a real composite of essence and existence.”²¹⁶ Since God gave existence to essences which in themselves were non-existent, existence gets ‘added to’ essences in some sense, by the necessary being that is pure existence.

Abû Hâmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazālī (1058- 1111) or simply Al-Al-Ghazālī’s philosophy develops as rejuvenation of the Asharite critique of the Mutazilite rationalism of the *falsafa* in Al Fārābi and Ibn-Sīnā. In the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) , Al-Ghazālī develops a strong critique of the rationalisation of the nature of the absolute transcendence of God, both from the point of view of the ‘beautiful names’ or characteristics of God given in Quranic literature, but even more fundamentally, from the perspective that the nature of the existence and eternal will of God is incomprehensible to human understanding and not reducible to logical necessity as understood in human-rational terms. The first critique that Al-Ghazālī makes at

the peripatetic philosophy of Fārābi and Ibn-Sīnā is that, the emanationist structure of creation of natural world excludes the possibility of *ex nihilo* creation by god and constrains God's creativity in a logical schematic bind. God's creativity must be affirmed uncategorically and unschematically, and the capacity of God's eternal will to act beyond logical constraints of human comprehension must be posited in line with the miraculous nature of divine action in the Quran. The only true necessity is ontologically divine will, to which nature is subject. Therefore, even if human beings are capable of establishing valid and rigorously argued a priori schema of reasoning, this does not mean that they can immediately grasp the logic of God's voluntary actions. While Aristotelian Islamic philosophy attempts to secure the absolute transcendence of God by positing the necessity as first cause and outside the emanation structure, Al-Ghazālī argues that this ends up reducing the freedom of divine action to categorical and logical constraints. Thus the absolute transcendence and unconditionality of God is precisely the incomprehensibility and pure freedom of god's eternal will. In the *Mishkāt al-Anwār* or *Niche of Lights*, Al-Ghazālī develops the symbolism of light in the Quran as expressive of the unattainable transcendence as well as tangibility of the existence of God. Light is a corporeal reality, but its corporeality is absolutely impalpable. In this sense, light is developed as a symbol of the incorporeal corporeality of the transcendence of God. As Al-Ghazālī writes, "God in Its essence is One, without partners; It has an individual reality which does not look like any other; It is a samad² without contraries, and is separated [from the material world] without anyone else who could be equal to It."²¹⁷ Massimo writes, "God, therefore, is the Being who discloses Itself in the creatures albeit while keeping Its transcendence: light unveils God, but at once covers It."²¹⁸

The Andalusian Muslim philosopher, Ibn Rushd or Averroes (1126 - 1198), attempted to bring Islamic philosophy back to its Aristotelian roots. According to him, on the one hand, the Muslim Neoplatonists, namely Al Fārābi and Ibn-Sīnā, have distorted and trivialised the teachings of Aristotle, and the other hand, Al-Ghazālī and other Asharite philosophers have misunderstood and

misrepresented the inner meaning and intent of the Quran. Firstly, Averroes contested the distinction between the necessary and contingent in Ibn-Sīnā's metaphysics, by the logic that to hold that natural entities are at the same time contingent and yet necessary from the source of god is contradictory and that, as the first cause, the properties and attributes provided to the multiplicity of the natural world could not be conceived to be contingent in any sense of the term, since that repudiates the wisdom of the first cause. Ibn Rushd critiques the emanationist integration of Aristotelian philosophy and Islamic theology in Al-Farabi and Ibn-Sīnā on grounds that god cannot be thought of as efficient and finalist cause in a purely logical or physical sense of the term, since the relationship between god and the creation is on a deeper level amorous, that is to say, god moves beings through a power of love, and beings are not only driven by the perfection of absolute but also out of love for the absolute. Ibn Rushd also critiqued Al-Ghazālī's and Asharite notion of *ex nihilo* creation on the principle that derivation of existence from non-existence is not only an ontological and physical impossibility but also a logical one. In this context, Ibn Rushd developed an eternalist account of God and nature as opposed to Al-Ghazālī's temporal occasionalist account of the creation of nature. For Rushd, it delimits the omnipotence and absoluteness of the God to conceive of creation as temporal and occasionalist. God in a sense is the essential structure of the principle of necessity, which excludes contingency and temporality in the affairs of the natural world. This is the unity and correspondence in Ibn Rush's metaphysics between the necessary order of reality and the necessary order of intelligibility. Thus Rushd critiques Al-Ghazālī's thesis of the 'eternal will' of God, by reason that any notion of will attributed to the agency of God constraint the absoluteness, because will signals to a defect of nature, or a desire, furthermore, the notion of will implies a temporal interval between the willing and acting of God. For Ibn Rushd, the will of God is nothing other than the knowledge of god, which is the correspondence between the necessary order of reality and necessary order of intelligibility, but is a will, knowledge and action of a fundamentally different order than human will, knowledge and action. As Majid Fakhry writes,

“Averroes does not deny that God may be spoken of as a free and willing agent, provided it is understood that His will, like His knowledge, is entirely different from human knowledge and that the modality (*kayfiyah*) of these two attributes, as predicated of God, is unknowable”²¹⁹

The Andalusian Arab metaphysician Ibn Arabi (1165 - 1240) attempted to integrate the Aristotelian Hellenistic rationalist strain of Islamic philosophy and the Mutazilite school and the more orthodox strand of theological philosophy of the Kalām and the Asharite school. Ibn Arabi negates every possible quality of God to affirm the absolute transcendence of God, but at the same time argues that there cannot be any quality in the natural world that is completely divorced from the essence of God, and in this sense must be considered as reflections and images of the existence of God. In this manner, his account of the relation between the essence of God and the qualities and attributes of God lies between *tanzīh* and *tasbīh*, in that God is said to be absolutely transcendent but also have qualities of which the manifest empirical world are reflections and images. Each entity has an exterior aspect (*zāhir*) and an interior aspect (*baātin*) and the process of *ta’wil*, or spiritual hermeneutics, is the movement from the exterior aspect to the interior aspect. The central doctrine of Ibn Arabi’s metaphysics is the concept of *wahadat al-wujūd* or the transcendent unity of being, which is the idea of the unicity of the meaning of being and the unity of being. From this perspective, the exterior and the interior, the first (*awwal*) and the last (*iikhir*), the lover (*iishiq*) and the beloved (*ma’shuq*), the *wujūd* and the *mawjūd*, all apparent contradictions are resolved in the essence of God that sustains all polarities in its own nature. The doctrine of Ibn Arabi was accused of pantheism by the theological Islamic philosophy. But as Nasr has argued, in Ibn Arabi while there is an essential identification between the manifest world and God, there is no substantial identification.

What is overlooked by the critics who accuse the Sufis of pantheism is the basic difference between the *essential* identification of the manifested order with its ontological Principle and

their *substantial* identity and continuity. The latter concept is metaphysically absurd and contradicts everything that Muḥyi al-Dīn and other Sufis have said regarding the Divine Essence.²²⁰

The doctrine of the transcendent unity of Being or "the unicity of Reality," as expounded by Muḥyi al-Dīn and other Sufis is, then, neither pantheism, nor panentheism, nor existential monism. Nor is it the fruit of a natural mysticism which fails to transcend the created order and which is devoid of the salutary guidance of revealed wisdom and grace. It means, rather, that while God is absolutely transcendent with respect to the Universe, the Universe is not completely separated from Him; that the "Universe is mysteriously plunged in God."²²¹

The Persian philosopher Shihāb ad-Dīn Yahya ibn Habash Suhrawardī (1154 - 1191) integrated Neoplatonic Islamic philosophy with Zoroastrian angelology in the context of the Quranic gnosis. He opposed the view of Ibn-Sīnā and other Aristotelians that in each existing thing, existence is principal and through the addition of which essence acquires being, and instead posited that it is essence that is principal and fundamental, that possesses reality, and that it is existence that plays the subordinate role of an accident in relation to essence or *māhiyya*. This doctrine of the principality of essence *al-māhiyyah* as opposed to the principality of existence *al-wujūd*, and this essence was the divine nature of light. According to Suhrawardī and the rest of the Ishrāqī school, all of reality is essentially light that possesses various degrees of intensity and the material world is simply the absence of light. The pure light or the light of lights is the divine essence whose light is fundamentally blinding in intensity. This is the source of all existence and all of reality consists of more or less degrees of light and darkness. As Rahman writes, "For al-Suhrawardī, reality was one, homogeneous continuum punctuated only by 'more or less' or 'grades of Being': 'the whole of God is Being and the whole of Being is God.'²²² The ontological status of all existents, therefore, depends upon the intensity with which they approach the divine light of lights and are in turn illuminated by it. In this manner, the various gradations of universal hierarchy are differentiated and

segmented from each other according the degree of light each possess, which is basically the knowledge and awareness regarding the principality of the light of lights.

The Persian philosopher Şadr ad-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī or Mullā Sadrā (1571 - 1635) takes over the doctrine of “more perfect and less perfect” from Suhrawardī’s philosophy as the keystone of his own systematic metaphysics. This thesis Mullā Sadrā terms *tahskik* or systematic ambiguity of being that departs from Suhrawardī in two key ways. One is that the gradations of more and less do not apply to essences but to existence which is the more fundamental and original reality of which essence is merely derivative secondary accident. In this sense, the doctrine of Mullā Sadrā is that of the principality of *wujūd* or *asalat al wujūd* as opposed to the doctrine of *asalat al mahiyya* in Suhrawardī. And two, the gradation of existence is not simply ambiguous, but systematically ambiguous, in other words, it is not a static gradation but one in perpetual motion. As Fazlur Rahman writes in *The Philosophy of Mullā Sadrā* , “The view that existence itself creates essence sets Mullā Sadrā apart from Muslim Peripatetics who believe that a concrete existent is a composite of essence and existence, each of them having a separate reality in its own right, and from al-Suhrawardī and his followers, who believe that essence is the reality while existence is a mere abstraction.”²²³ Essences are what emerge derivatively in the mind in contact with existences, the more complete existence is, the less essences it exhibits, thus essences constitute the attenuation of the intensity of existence. In this manner, Mullā Sadrā argues that God has no essence and only pure existence. Even though Mullā Sadrā takes from the Suhrawardī the entire notion of the ‘more and less’ and the gradation of existence, the notion of gradation in his thought is systematically ambiguous or *tashkik* because the ‘grades’ of being are no longer fixed and static but are involved in a perpetual and ceaseless motion towards higher forms of existence. The driving force or motive force of this perpetual universal movement from the lowest point to the highest is *ishq* or cosmic love, that impels everything towards a more concrete form.

Thus I've tried to show that the consistency of discussion and contestation in the history of Islamic metaphysics has been around the nature of unconditionality, which has taken different forms.

3.4. From Metaconvergent Dogmatic Metaphysical Conditional Universalistic Discussion to Metadivergent Non-dogmatic Metaphysical Diconditional Transuniversalistic Discussions

In primitive society, the manner of cosmocomportment is that of pre-metaphysical diconditional universality. The rituals of sacrifice or dreamtime, which are at the heart of the constitution of universalistic cosmocomportment, are meant to enact and perform the the structure of reciprocity constitutive of the cosmogonic creation of nature, the receiving and giving is not only aimed at appeasing the fierce aspect of the cosmogonic deity or the totemic ancestral spirit but also aimed at the visitational energisation of social cooperative consistency and effectuation of key-points and key-moments constitutive of texturisation within nature of diconditional tensionality. But ritual is not the only site of work of cosmocomportment, the organisation of cosmocomportment is also carried out in non-ritualistic activity. The ritual performances and non-ritual practices are involved of the textural gathering of the physical-tensional modes of experience.

Metaphysical conditional thinking emerges in different parts of the world in the period between 600BCE - 300 BCE. This period overlaps with the period of the agricultural revolution and large-scale urbanisation, settlements get concentrated in town formations with increased scale, complexification and abstraction of exchange, division of labour and social life in general with the

meaningful, sensible and logical structure of the sacrificial ritual becoming increasingly interiorised and abstract. Here emerges a new alien ghostly sense and experience of relation as well as mobility, a complexification of the abstract, and the pre-metaphysical diconditional cosmocomportment transforms in some parts of the world and diverges into different forms of the search for metaphysical conditionality while many strands of premetaphysical diconditionality continue in all parts of the world. As the Japanese historian of ideas Hajime Nakamura writes in *Parallel developments - A comparative history of ideas*, “The search for a fundamental principle which could be considered as the Ultimate or Absolute was developing in a variety of cultural areas in this ancient period - Eg. Greece, China, India, Persia, Israel, etc”²²⁴

The search for metaphysical conditionality, as we have discussed, diverges into four broad shapes of dogmatic universalistic metaphysical discussion -

i. *Adaptation with nature of biconditionality in Chinese metaphysics* based upon emphasis upon the meta-modality or schematism of mode A (mobility + relation) as constitutive of transcendental consistency of discussion, argumentation, contestation through which any two modes are mutually related in contrastive opposition. For example, either mode A and mode B are posited in contrastive rhythmic polarity, or mode B and C, or mode A and mode C in states of participation. This is the transcendental consistency of argument, contestation and discussion in Chinese metaphysics.

ii. *Acquirement of nature of triuniconditionality in western metaphysics* based upon emphasis of the meta-modality or schematism of mode C (immobility + relation) as constitutive of transcendental consistency of discussion, argumentation, contestation to then articulate the participation of the participation between any two modes in a third. For example, either participation between mode A and mode B is shown to participate in mode C, or the participation between mode B and mode C participates in mode A, or participation between

mode A and mode C participates in mode B. This is the transcendental consistency of argument, contestation and discussion in western metaphysics.


iii. *Attainment in nature of aconditionality in Indian metaphysics* based upon emphasis of the meta-modality or schematism of the mode D (immobility + separation) as constitutive of transcendental consistency of discussion, argumentation, contestation, and since mode D is both immobile and separate, it does not include any other mode in any significant sense, or rehearses the subsumption of the different modes into incompositionality of mode D. This is the transcendental consistency of argument, contestation and discussion in Indian metaphysics.

iv. *Submission to nature of unconditionality in Islamic metaphysics* based upon emphasis of the meta-modality or schematism of mode B (mobility + separation) as constitutive of transcendental consistency of discussion, argumentation, contestation through which the ultimate conditionality gets articulated in any one of the modes. For example, either mode A fulfils the criterion of unconditionality of participation, or mode B or mode C. This is the transcendental consistency of argument, contestation and discussion in Islamic metaphysics.

These are all forms of dogmatic metaphysical discussion regarding the nature of conditionality with different transcendental consistencies of argumentation, contestation and convincement. The culture of cosmocompartment of almost all parts and societies in the world can be studied as unique hybrids and mixtures of different strands of pre-metaphysical diconditional universality and these four traditions of dogmatic conditional universality. The point of this is to express the manner in which the world was metaphysically and cosmologically diverse before the planetarisation of capitalist technoscientific liberal modernity.

The modern period is that of the culmination of dogmatic conditional universality in the generalisation and globalisation of triunconditionality in the form of capitalist techno-scientific modernity that challenges and to a great extent paralyses the different traditions of both

metaphysical conditionality and premetaphysical diconditionality. Thus the modern period involves a metaconvergence to *dogmatic metaphysical conditional universalistic discussion* (Fig. 3.1).



16. *From Metadivergence to metaconvergence to potential metadivergence in metaphysical universal thinking*

In the current period of social, political and economic multi-polarisation and multi-lateralisation after four centuries of western hegemony, the limits and problems of the universalisability of triuniconditionality and global metaphysical convergence and homogenisation are getting exposed. Relatively autonomous Chinese, Indian, Islamic, alternatively western and different pre-metaphysical universalistic discussions have been ongoing throughout the period of the planetarisation of capitalist technoscientific modernity, and these discussions are especially perceiving the current period as an opportunity to carve out more space for relative autonomy. But what is crucial is that the current period is not simply one of the critique of the universality of triuniconditionality, but of the dogmatic form of envisioned conditionality itself, in other words, the very dogmatic form of envisioned conditionality is not adequate, rigorous and useful for the current period, that is to say, the very paradigm of requirements of rigour of universalistic thinking is undergoing transformation.

Even though historically different traditions have found it very difficult to transform the fundamental nature of cosmocomportment, since the modern period has entailed the culmination, actualisation and planetarisation of conditional universal thinking as capitalist liberal technoscientific modernity, more fundamental originality can be seen now in universal thinking. In the period in which real tensionality was ontologically prevalent in the world, universalistic thought sought the nature of conditionality, but since modernity has been the process of the realisation of conditionality itself, universalistic thinking now seeks the nature of tensionality, in other words, not only very nature of requirements of demonstration of universality are undergoing transformation, but the very paradigm of rigour and requirement itself are undergoing transformation, that is to say, from that of dogmatic envisionment to that of non-dogmatic demonstration. The strands of universal conditional thinking are fully exposed to each other's innermost limitation as well as powerfulness, and conditionality has already been realised and planetarised, which is why the contemporary

period solicits fundamental originality in metaphysical discussion, the requirements of universal thinking, demonstration systematisation are changing, and now the cosmocomportments can undergo more fundamental transformation, or novel strands can emerge. Which is what I have term diconditional universal thinking. In other words, the opposition to the horizontal shape of cosmocomportment need not be limited to sociopolitical and cultural foregrounding of the work of sensibility, intelligibility or actionability but can actually be active systematic work of cosmocomportment. If metaphysic is to regain its social function and role, it must fundamentally reinvent itself in the paradigm of diconditionality , since conditional universality has run out of steam as in has become planeterised, and in this context metaphysics will find itself becoming more and more futile in the face of technoscientific singularisation or co-extensive with popular theology and spirituality, reduced to the domain of work of sensibility. Only in the face of such emaciation and effacement, I argue that the work of cosmocomportment can perhaps entertain fundamental originality.

There is a potential for a re-divergence and rediversification in universal metaphysical thinking in the framework of metaphysical diconditionality which is non-dogmatic metaphysics insofar as tension between divergent metaphysical demonstrability and demonstration is the universality or transuniversality of activity. Metacompositional complexity and depth of ancestral potentiality provides for complexity and depth of compositional activity and is at the heart of the rigour of non-dogmatic universality. It is metacompositional diversity in nature that adds to biodiversity, ecological complexity at the physico-chemical pole of nature, the extension of this at the mentalistic pole of nature is divergence between cosmocomportment. There should be different divergent consistencies of metaphysical universalistic discussion that remain in communication and aspire to deepen communication and yet have fundamental epistemic irreducibility to each other. But these can no longer be dogmatic, but must be non-dogmatic, otherwise communication and discussion within societies and between societies gets barred. This is what it means to

metaphysically and cosmologically enrich and innervate the world and social existence. This would be movement from metaconvergent dogmatic metaphysical conditional universalistic discussion to metadivergent non-dogmatic metaphysical diconditional transuniversalistic discussions. The new faultiness between divergent cosmocompartment need not be the same can be new. The fault-lines and the character of the discussions cannot be anticipated in any real sense.

There were two intertwined aspects and aims of this research — one, to demonstrate a full-fledged metaphysical system of compositionality or tensionality that is at once non-dogmatic and rigorous in which irreducible inseparability between multiplicity of processuality, that is, divergent continuity of the synthetical, and multiplicity of extensiveness or relationality, that is, divergent continuity of the abstract, is the non-dogmatic tensional requirement of metaphysical demonstration of compositionality, and two, to articulate an imagination of world constituted by social metaphysical discussions regarding both the nature of requirements of demonstration of compositionality and regarding the actual demonstration of compositionality with different metacompositional consistencies that are non-dogmatic and rigorous both internally as well as in interaction with each other in which the tension between difference in actual demonstration carried out by societies is not only the transuniversality of compositionality but the source of metacompositional and compositional complexity and richness. I have tried to show how the question regarding tensional requirements of demonstration is the manner of intertwinement between these two aims. The push and pull between the primary concepts of the metaphysical schema tensionally relates to the push and pull in the interactions between patterns of solicitation, flows of sensitivity and reality of composition constitutive of the process of the genesis of care, and in this regard potentially entails deepening of participation in the genesis of care which is crucial both for, as care, experiential autonomy, and the push and pull in the interactions between the work of intelligibility, sensibility and actionality as well the three moments of the dialectic of astonishment and sobriety which is crucial for, as cosmocompartment, for societal autonomy.

Furthermore, the attractions and repulsions between the forces of modalisation at play between the abstract aspect of the push and pull in work of cosmocompartment constitutive of the project of societal autonomy and the synthetical aspect of the genesis of care constitutive of the project of experiential autonomy relates to, at the physico-chemical pole of nature, biodiversity and environmental complexity, and at the mentalistic pole of nature, geohistoriosophical metadivergence in cosmocompartment and transcendental consistency of social universalistic metaphysical discussion generative of metacompositional richness and complexity of ancestral potentiality which is precisely the tension between actual and potential demonstration and demonstrability of transuniversality of activity.

If there is one relational weave of metacompositional consistency, it would gradually subsume all heat motion of atoms in its order, and lead to incompositionality. This is why there must be metacompositional divergence, this metadiversity metadivergence is crucial for demonstration of tension of compositionality, that is inexhaustibility of activity and motion. This *metaphysical* argument on the physico-chemical level translates into the *geohistoriosophical* argument about why there must be divergent in societies of cosmocompartment, the is consistency of social metaphysical discussion, mere diversity on diagrammatic level is not explanatory of tensionality, since that achieves equilibrium with order of extensiveness, it has to be metadiversity on cosmogrammatic level.

Conclusion: The Temporalistic and Eternalistic Aspects of Quotidian Experience

Liberalism and Marxism contributed immensely to the foregrounding of the temporalistic aspect of social and individual existence, beyond the relatively eternalistic schema of the feudal-monarchical order, but this was carried out by demarcating eternalistic and universalistic anxiety to physics and effectively excommunicating metaphysics from any serious and important discussion. Liberalism and Marxism envision the freedom of individuals of the world and the deepening of mutual cooperative capacity conditioned by distillation, minimisation or trivialisation of any significant social-cultural-religious characteristics. It is indeed a compelling view of things since unique societal characteristics seem to go hand in hand with cultural conservatism and dogmatism. Liberalism conceptualises the individual as, on the one hand, the legal obligated citizen of political sovereignty, and on the other hand, as a self-interested economic actor in the market. Marxism aspires towards internationalist or regional revolutionary socialisation of the means of production, the maximisation and secularisation of cooperative capacity of free individuals and the meaningful reintegration of economic activity into the roundedness of social activity, and tends to attribute a provisional but not ultimate function to the political form of the state. Liberalism promotes the planetarisation of capitalist liberal technoscientific modernity, in opposition to which Marxism promotes world communism premised upon the planetarisation of the atheistic secular worldview and minimisation of societal character, thus in a sense mirroring the logic of individualisation, though crucially liberated from capitalistic exploitation, inequality and estrangement. The reason why I say that liberalism and Marxism involve a certain degree of minimisation of societal-cultural-religious character is because both tend to concede thought and study regarding the nature of the

universe to natural science, especially physics, which is meant to constitute the broad framework of universality of knowledge and the corresponding analytical secularisation of individuality, although in Marxism, the analytics of individuality epistemologically deriving from physics gets complemented by a dialectics of sociality ontologically deriving from history. For Marxism, the minimisation of societal character as part of outsourcing of universalistic thought and knowledge to natural science or for that matter dialectics as science would enable maximisation of cooperative capacity between free individuals beyond capitalist organisation of economic activity and the liberal form of nation-state. Right-wing libertarianism aligns with only the latter aim while left-wing libertarianism would align with both aims.

Marxism as indeed the most sober view of social life attempts to foreground the temporalistic material concerns of life, although on a deeper level, it is meant to be a critique of the estrangement of the labour process under the commodity form, in which the entire organisation of labour on an individual and social level becomes oriented towards the interests of self-valorisation of capital, and thus lacks genuine authenticity and purpose which could be the source of meaning in the composition of social value. But since orthodox Marxism discourages people to speculate regarding the nature of the universe, the nature of existence, it is unclear what the source of this authenticity, meaning and imagination is meant to be. Liberalism reduces the entire problematic of societal autonomy to that of political sovereignty and again, attempts to minimise the eternalistic universalistic anxieties of social life by outsourcing them to physics and maximise temporal concerns within the horizons of global capitalism and constitutionalism. Conservatism understands eternalistic and metaphysical social appetite, but subsumes the entire universalistic seeking to religiosity, naturalises existing social hierarchy, sows seeds of mistrust among sections of the society and curtails the space of individual questioning through degrees of apotheosis of sovereignty.

The way I have attempted to resolve this impasse is by proposing that renewal of naturalistic metaphysical discussion in non-dogmatic yet rigorous form can fill this gap, since the very character of metaphysical discussion can address the appetite for social character, the non-dogmatism of the nature of universalistic discussion can honour space for individuality, and the naturalism can emphasise the temporalistic aspect of life neglected in traditional dogmatic metaphysics. Metaphysics is more fundamental than physics and natural science, since, one, the object of natural science can only be ancestry of purity of compositionality, while the object of metaphysics is purity of ancestry of compositionality, and two, physics can only study the physical pole of compositionality whereas metaphysics studies both the physical and mental poles of compositionality, the unity of efficient and teleological causation. Philosophical conservatism tends to foreground eternity while philosophical progressivism tends to foreground temporality, but the conservative subsumption of metaphysics to theology is a complete disaster just as the progressivist concession of metaphysics to physics is a complete travesty. Societal diversity is valuable, which is ultimately diversity of cosmocomportment, that is, tension between transuniversality of compositionality. Natural metaphysical seeking is perhaps a rare yet significant bridging part of social existence and I have tried to defend it and articulate it systematically and imaginatively. Societal diversity is nothing other than different cultures of thinking and composing the nature of the universe and the nature of existence. Divergence between such cultures adds to metacompositional richness and complexity of ancestral potentiality.

Quotidian experience is made of both eternalistic and temporalistic aspects, anxieties and concerns, and also of both the force of attraction and the force of repulsion. It is the responsibility of systematic metaphysical discussion to address this aspect of life both systematically and imaginatively. It is this discussion and composition that can contribute to the work of the rediversification and enrichment of the world beyond the generalisation of capitalist liberal technoscientific modernity and the reactiveness of conservative theocratic authoritarianism. The

reason why the purely temporalistic view of life does not adequate the appetite for societal characterisation is because it does not address the abstractness of intergenerationality, the abstractness of relation between the past, present and future generations involved in a relative continuity of struggle of the work of cosmocomportment. The reason why the liberal and Marxist intelligentsia of the global south mock and humiliate this general conventional social appetite is because they tend to draw more direct heritage from the history of enlightenment and consolidate the repulsive side of identity formation by contrasting this direct heritage from the sections of the local population excluded from modern liberal education.

With capitalism already suffocating the temporalistic aspect of rural, working class and middle class experience, the more liberalism and leftism will suppress and suffocate the aspect of eternalistic universalistic seeking in quotidian vernacular experience, the more it will find resentful reactive expression in demands for theocratic reorganisation of social and political life, in which case the fetish of the object of the force of attraction in the figure of the priest-king tends to be complemented by the fetish of the object of force of repulsion in the figures of ethnic, religious, racial minorities. The left-wing diagnosis that genuine promise and genuine work of the egalitarian improvement of the temporalistic aspect of existence can dent the right-wing capacity to rhetorically capture this resentment is true but only partially true, since the ideational speculative universalistic aspect of social existence is equally significant, which is what conservatism primarily addresses. The reason why modern physics cannot fulfil this appetite is because it is incapable of showing the unity in the motive force at the physical pole of nature with the motive force at the mentalistic pole of nature. Only metaphysics is capable of speculating this unity, since it conceptually enquires the purity of ancestrality of compositionality, which is its rare yet irreplaceable social function, where seekers with incompatible pictures of the absolute can meet to find the intricate genesis of care without offending, antagonising and hurting each other. This meeting of deepening of participation in the constitution of care which is to be the very spirit, flesh

and vector of the reorganisation of effortfulness and restfulness and the roundedness of social compositional activity beyond capitalism is strangely bracketed out from imaginaries of postcapitalism, which exposes the liberalism at the heart of leftism.

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¹² "For although experience forms a system under *transcendental* laws, which comprise the condition of the possibility of experience in general, one might yet be presented with such an *infinite multiplicity* of empirical laws and so great a *heterogeneity of natural forms* in particular experience that the concept of a system in accordance with these (empirical) laws would necessarily appear alien to the understanding, and neither the possibility nor still less the necessity of such a unified whole would be conceivable." See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 320

¹³ Guyer, *Kant's System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays*, 29

¹⁴ Kant, *Critique of Power Judgement*, 15

¹⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 372

¹⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 326

¹⁷ Zinkin, *Kant's Concept of Force: A Dissertation*, 198

¹⁸ Ypi, *The Architectonic of Reason: Purposiveness and Systematic Unity in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 55

¹⁹ Guyer, *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness*, 64

²⁰ Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 53

²¹ Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, 23

²² Whitehead, *Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect*, 41

²³ Ibid., 43

²⁴ Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, 8

²⁵ Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 3

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- ⁴⁹ Deleuze, ‘How do we recognize structuralism?’, 174
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- ¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 30
- ¹¹⁷ Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy Of Right'*, 132
- ¹¹⁸ Sohn-Rethel, *Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology*, 26
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- 124 Pande, *Shramana Tradition: It's History and Contribution to Indian Culture*. 1
- 125 Nicholson, *Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History*, 172
- 126 Madhva, *The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha*
- 127 *evam militvā nāstikānām sat prasthānāni. tāni kasmān nocyante. satyam. vedabāhyatvāt tesām mleccchādiprasthānavat paramparayāpi purusārthānupayogītvād' upeksanīyam eva . Sarasvati, Prasthan Thraya Madhusudana Saraswati Smriti; Or, a Brochure on the Origin and Descent of the Shastras Relating to the Three Prasthanas*
- 128 “the entire history of the Vaiśeṣika school, in which only two independent means of knowledge are accepted (perception and inference), and the scriptural authority is always made dependent upon inference. Matilal, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, 55
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- 167 Sprung, *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, 10
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